Regulatory issues in the carbon market: the linkage of the emission trading scheme of Switzerland with the emission trading scheme of the European Union by Jakob-Gallmann, Jacquelline








Regulatory issues in the carbon market: the linkage of the emission trading
scheme of Switzerland with the emission trading scheme of the European
Union
Jakob-Gallmann, Jacquelline





Jakob-Gallmann, Jacquelline. Regulatory issues in the carbon market: the linkage of the emission trading
scheme of Switzerland with the emission trading scheme of the European Union. 2011, University of












The overarching objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better under-
standing of regulatory issues in the carbon market with the aim to analyse 
the main design options, benefits and challenges of linking the European 
with the Swiss Emission Trading Scheme. 
However, the various regulatory layers of the global carbon market render 
the international climate regime highly complex. Rules governing aspects of 
the climate regime become ever more technical and specialised, producing 
experts on individual topics but only very few individuals who dispose of an 
overall understanding of the complete picture.1  
As JOHN KAY, a well renowned economist and columnist to the Financial 
Times, highlighted with regard to carbon trading: “If you cannot explain in 
two or three sentences exactly why and how a new economic policy will 
work, you can be confident it will have unintended consequences.”2 
In this context, this thesis was compiled with the intention to use as few sen-
tences as necessary. At the same time, academic diligence requires to be 
insistent on very “technical” issues. Although comprehensibility was one of 
the guiding principles in drafting the thesis, there is no denying that emission 
trading is enormously complex and linking various Emission Trading 
Schemes only adds additional levels of complexity. 
As complexity has exacerbated the financial crisis of 2008 and possibly fos-
tered worldwide financial markets’ downturn in 2011, I hope that this publi-
cation may serve to grow general understanding and awareness of emission 
trading as a premise for potential simplification - for the benefit of our 
world’s climate. 
This thesis was supervised by PROF. DR. ROLF H. WEBER and PROF.  
DR. CHRISTINE KAUFMANN. I would like to thank both of them for their 
valuable support, their mentoring and their professional advice. Special 
gratitude is also extended to PROF. DR. JOËLLE DE SÉPIBUS, University of 
Bern and College of Europe (Bruges), for subject-specific exchanges.  
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2 JOHN KAY, “Why the key to carbon trading is to keep it simple”, in: Financial Times, 9 
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As I am writing these lines, delegations worldwide are preparing for the 
Conference on Climate Change in Durban beginning on 28 November 2011. 
In Switzerland, the newly elected Federal Assembly has the procedure for 
reconciling the Draft CO2-Act versions of the two chambers on its agenda. 
Whatever the results of these events will be, emission trading and the linkage 
of Emission Trading Schemes as means to tackle climate change will cer-
tainly remain in worldwide attention.  
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1.1 Emission Trading to Combat Climate Change 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. In order to hold 
the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius as documented 
by the Fourth Assessment Report of the “Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change” (IPCC), deep cuts in global emissions are required.3  
The Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change, released in 
October 2006, lists three essential elements to achieve emission reductions: 
carbon pricing, technology policy and the removal of barriers to behavioural 
change.4 These elements are mutually reinforcing: The adequate carbon price 
triggers technological innovation and, consequently, contributes to behav-
ioural change. Therefore, creating a broadly similar carbon price signal 
around the world as an initial step to combat climate change is an urgent 
priority for international co-operation.5 
Emission trading is one of several viable options. By allowing energy-
intensive sectors to trade units of CO2 to be emitted, carbon is given a price.6 
Other ways to establish a carbon price are the broad classes of systems of 
taxes, subsidies and command-and-control regulatory systems.7 
The theory of emission trading is simple. The marginal abatement costs for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions differ largely based on where the abate-
ment is made. As the global climate system benefits from these reductions 
wherever they are made, emissions should - from the point of view of eco-
nomic efficiency - be reduced where such reductions are cheapest to achieve. 
                                              
3 COPENHAGEN ACCORD, paragraph 1: “We underline that climate change is one of the 
greatest challenges of our time (…)”; paragraph 2: “We agree that deep cuts in global 
emissions are required (…) with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the in-
crease in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius (…).” 
4 STERN, Executive Summary, xviii. 
5 STERN, Executive Summary, xxiii. 
6 CONVERY/REDMOND, 88. 
7 STERN, Executive Summary, xviii; METCALF/WEISBACH, 9; See also EPINEY, 244, listing 
additional regulatory instruments such as emission ceilings and mandatory minimal use 
of renewable energy. 
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The securitized “emission units”8 may then be transferred and acquired in 
the carbon market tagging carbon emissions thereby with a price. 
The Kyoto Protocol concluded in 1997 established an early form of GHG 
emission trading with a first commitment period lasting from 2008 to 2012. 
It entails binding reduction commitments for 39 Parties.  
Other national and regional Emission Trading Schemes are established and, 
eventually, directly or indirectly linked to the Kyoto carbon market. The best 
established and largest Emission Trading Scheme worldwide is the Emission 
Trading Scheme of the European Union (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS would not 
exist if it were not for the Kyoto Protocol. It is the “flagship measure” by 
which the Member States of the EU intend to meet their obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period.9 Yet, the EU-ETS 
exists independently of the Kyoto Protocol.10 It was enacted before the 
Kyoto Protocol became legally binding in international law and it will stay 
operational even if there is no agreement on post-Kyoto provisions.  
In 2010, the global carbon market was estimated at a market value of 142 
billion USD with the EU-ETS, linked to the Kyoto carbon market by the 
unilateral acceptance of emission units from the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), accounting for 84 per cent of the volume.11 
The future of the Kyoto carbon market, however, is uncertain as the interna-
tional negotiations did not produce an agreement for the time after the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (the so-called “post-Kyoto pe-
riod”). While the international approach to climate change is blocked in a 
diplomatic stalemate, a system of linkages of Emission Trading Schemes on 
regional level may help to develop the experience and mutual trust necessary 
                                              
8 “Emission units” are, on the one hand, accounting units which are traced and recorded 
through national registries. On the other hand, they are also tradable instruments repre-
senting an entitlement to release a certain quantity of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
into the atmosphere and as such transferable under certain established conditions. This 
thesis generally uses the term “emission units” because of its all-encompassing defini-
tion. See also BUTTON, 574, referring (for the sake of simplicity) to all different units as 
“carbon units”. 
9 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 1, referring to JOS DELBEKE (ed), “EU Environmental Law: The EU 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme”, Volume IV of the EU Energy Law Series, 
Claeys & Casteels, Leuven Belgium, 2006. 
10 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 1. 
11 WORLD BANK, 2011, 9.  
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for global negotiations to succeed.12 The linkage of the CH-ETS with the 
EU-ETS may be a first step demonstrating European Countries’ commitment 
to combat climate change and, thus, increasing credibility and confidence 
within international negotiations. 
1.2 Thesis Objectives and Outline 
Emission trading was initiated as an instrument for environmental protec-
tion. By establishing a price for GHG emissions, the ultimate aim is to re-
duce emissions by inciting technological innovations and behavioural 
change. Emission trading, however, was also initiated as an instrument to 
reduce the costs to meet a given emission reduction target. The design of an 
Emission Trading Scheme therefore requires the permanent reconciliation 
between environmental protection and cost-reduction strategies. 
Emission Trading Schemes are created by legal provisions. They are sophis-
ticated entities, born out of a political decision to limit certain forms of pol-
luting behaviour and coming into existence only through a regulatory 
framework of objectives, rules, procedures and principles.13 Although ef-
fected emission reductions and cost-efficiency is the core interest, it is very 
difficult to measure the effect and to prove the consequences of regulatory 
regimes. Causes and effects may easily be superposed by complexity.14 Side 
effects such as terms-of-trade effects or the effect of other climate change 
policies are omnipresent.  
Still, the effectiveness of the Emission Trading Scheme may, to a large ex-
tent, depend upon the specific way in which the system has been put into a 
legislative framework. In that respect, particular legal aspects, for example 
concerning the methods of the allocation, the mechanisms to control trade or 
the provisions on enforcement are issues of particular importance.15 
                                              
12 JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 803.  
13 MEHLING, 111, referring to an in-depth analysis by KAROLIINA ANTTONEN/MICHAEL 
MEHLING/KARL UPSTON-HOOPER, “Briefing Life into the Carbon Market: Legal Frame-
works of Emissions Trading in Europe”, in: European Environmental Law Review, Vol-
ume 16, Number 4, April 2007, 96-116. 
14 WINTER, 291. 
15 FAURE/PEETERs (eds), 6. 
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This thesis aims at providing a systematic overview of regulatory issues in 
the three distinct carbon markets created by provisions of the Kyoto Protocol 
(“Kyoto carbon market”), by Community-legislation in the EU and by na-
tional legislation in Switzerland. On this basis, the main design options, 
benefits and challenges of a linked European-Swiss Emission Trading 
Scheme shall be analysed. 
The Kyoto Protocol affects the institutional setting for domestic Emission 
Trading Schemes as well as for their linkage.16 With the acceptance of emis-
sion units from the Clean Development Mechanism and from Joint Imple-
mentation projects, significant interdependencies have been established be-
tween the Kyoto carbon market and the EU-ETS on the one hand and the 
Emission Trading Scheme of Switzerland (CH-ETS) on the other hand. A 
linkage between the EU-ETS and the CH-ETS, hence, cannot be looked at in 
isolation from the international emission trading framework as provided by 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
Section 2 therefore introduces regulatory issues of the Kyoto carbon market 
before section 3 and 4 examine the legal design and central characteristics of 
the Emission Trading Schemes in the EU and in Switzerland respectively. In 
section 5, finally, different forms of linking and potential issues in the case 
of a linkage of the Emission Trading Schemes of the EU and the Emission 
Trading Scheme in Switzerland are discussed. 
However, since the linkage of the CH-ETS and the EU-ETS is neither defi-
nitely decided nor drafted, many of the issues discussed in the concluding 
section of the thesis are not primarily legal issues but rather economic or 
policy-related. The legal provisions implementing a linkage of the EU-ETS 
with the CH-ETS yet have to be drafted. 
1.3 Literature and Research  
There is an ample literature about emission trading, most of it is written from 
an economic perspective.17 The overwhelming majority of the literature on 
                                              
16 BAZELMANS, 299. 
17 See, for example, the important bibliography on tradable emission units compiled by 
TOM TIETENBERG, updated in 2008, available at <http://www.colby.edu/~thtieten/ 
trade.html>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
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emission trading has been published after the year 2000.18 Most of the exist-
ing literature belongs to the categories context/history, allocation, emission 
reductions, sectoral competitiveness/carbon leakage and offsetting via the 
Clean Development Mechanism.19 Yet, as MEHLING concludes, legal and 
normative considerations have featured only marginally in existing research 
on the conditions and implications of linking Emission Trading Schemes.20 It 
is interesting to note that hardly any literature can be found on compliance 
and enforcement, neither with regard to the Kyoto carbon market nor with 
regard to regional Emission Trading Schemes. An explanation therefore may 
be that carbon markets have not experienced the phase of systematic deter-
mination of issues of non-compliance yet.  
Emission trading is a very young and dynamic research field with direct 
interaction with the policy making process. The WORLD BANK annual re-
views of the carbon market, therefore, provide a global perspective and in-
clude separate sections on regional policies where the most important facts 
are summarized and new developments discussed.  
The European Commission and Commission staff has provided a wealth of 
material concerning the origins of the EU-ETS. The team led by JOS 
DELBEKE published a series of perspectives – legal, economic, political sci-
ence, and administrative – on the evolution of the trading idea from concept 
to execution. Their publications are important “insider sources”.21  
Whereas, for obvious reasons, the early literature was constraint to “ex-ante” 
syntheses of emission trading, a series of newer publications on the EU-ETS 
conducts “ex-post” analyses of phase I using EU data material. CONVERY/ 
REDMOND (2007), ELLERMAN/CONVERY/DEPERTHUIS (2010), ELLERMAN/ 
JOSKOW (2009), GRUBB ET AL. (2009) and KRUGER/OATES/PIZER (2007) are 
some of the existing syntheses providing a comprehensive overview and 
making some preliminary normative judgements. The ELLERMAN/BUCHNER 
contributions (2006/2007/2008), based on early statistical material, were the 
                                              
18 A search of the ISI Search Engine Web of Knowledge on 11 July 2008 using the key 
words Europe, Emission, Trading yielded 608 documents, of which over 78 per cent ap-
peared since 2000. CONVERY, 131. 
19 CONVERY, 123, adds to the list distributional issues, new entrants, markets, finance and 
trading.  
20 MEHLING, 111.  
21 CONVERY, 123/124. 
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first ones to endeavour to answer the important question whether the EU-
ETS in its pilot phase was able to induce emissions reductions.22 
Literature on linking Emission Trading Schemes has experienced a boost 
between 2006 and 2010 when the emergence of Emission Trading Schemes 
in various regions of the world seemed to be realistic and transatlantic links 
appeared to be a promising option. An early discussion of the linkage be-
tween Emission Trading Schemes has been provided by HAITES/MULLINS 
(2001). Some of the publications have been commissioned by the OECD and 
the IEA (e.g. ELLIS/TIRPACK, 2006) and the European institutions (e.g. 
MACE ET AL., 2008; SCHÜLE/STERK, 2008). A growing body of research 
(e.g. EDENHOFER/FLACHSLAND/MARSCHINSKI 2007; FLACHSLAND, Disser-
tation, 2010; JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 2009; MEHLING, 2009; SCHÜLE ET 
AL., 2006), has focused on comparing schemes by looking at the stringency 
of targets and timeframes, the equivalence of requirements for participating 
sectors, the definition of emission units, and procedural aspects such as 
monitoring, reporting and verification.23  
Emission trading in Switzerland has not been in the focus yet. A part from 
WEBER (2008) and two studies commissioned by the Federal Administration 
(FIRST CLIMATE/ ECONABILITY, 2009; ECOPLAN 2010), a synthesis on the 
CH-ETS does not exist. In November 2010, the VEREINIGUNG FÜR 
UMWELTRECHT (VUR) held a seminar on climate regulation in Switzerland. 
Respective articles of HAUSER, KECKEIS and BALLY are the valuable contri-
butions by Swiss climate policy practitioners.  
Further upcoming areas for research are transaction costs (e.g. JARAITE/ 
CONVERY/DIMARIA, 2009) and the policy process in a “second-“ or “third-
best world” (e.g. HOLTSMARK/SOMMERVOLL, 2008). Due to increasing sta-
tistical material available, the question of scarcity-reflecting pricing and the 
question of economic and ecological performance of carbon markets will 
also attract increasing attention and have the potential to shape the political 
debate and the future policy making process considerably. 
                                              
22 CONVERY, 134. 
23 MEHLING, 110/111. 
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2 The International Climate Policy Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The seed to what has become the Kyoto carbon market was planted with the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
1992 and was specified by its Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The so-called 
“framework treaty”24 and its successive protocols, annexes and related 
agreements was, to a large extent, influenced by the work of the “Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC), a panel established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO). However, the IPCC is not formally linked with 
the Convention and its protocols.  
The Kyoto Protocol marks a turning point in the field of international rela-
tions.25 Whereas international relations were so far governed by the principle 
of sovereign equality, the Parties now agreed on the “principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities”.26 Based on the consent that the largest 
share of historical and current global emissions of GHG originated in devel-
oped countries, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
paves the way for developing countries to let their share of GHG emissions 
continue to grow in order to meet social and development needs.  
The ways in which the mechanisms of the Kyoto carbon market would oper-
ate were negotiated after the finalization of the Kyoto Protocol by the institu-
tional bodies created through the Convention and the Protocol. Whereas the 
Convention sets an objective as well as basic principles and obligations 
within the climate change framework, the implementation modalities for the 
carbon market had to be designed by decisions of subsequent Conferences of 
the Parties (COPs) and Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC serving 
as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COPs/CMPs). A major 
                                              
24 In the rapidly developing field of international environmental law, framework treaties, 
together with the institutions they create, have become regulatory regimes. On interna-
tional regimes see BIRNIE/BOYLE/REDGWELL, 84 -98. 
25 VOÏNOV KOHLER, XXI. 
26 Article 3, paragraph 1 UNFCCC: “The Parties should protect the climate system (…) on 
the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibili-
ties (…).” 
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package of measures was agreed to at COP.7 which took place in Marrakesh 
in November 2001 and was confirmed at COP.10/CMP.1 in Montreal in No-
vember/December 2005. However, a number of key issues still remained to 
be settled either through practice or by further COP/CMP decisions.27 
The Kyoto protocol affects the institutional setting for linking domestic 
ETSs in two ways.28 Firstly, it provides a framework for international emis-
sion trading, linking domestic ETSs in Annex-B Parties. Secondly, it estab-
lishes internationally agreed procedures for generating emission units ac-
cording to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and according to the 
mechanism of Joint Implementation (JI). 
2.2 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was concluded in New York on 9 May 1992. It entered into force on 21 
March 1994, the ninetieth day after the 50th ratification had been submitted, 
and has now 195 Parties.29  
The basic objective of the Convention is to stabilize GHG emissions „at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system“.30 The level necessary to prevent dangerous interference is not 
specified in the Convention. It only stipulates that it should be “achieved 
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to cli-
mate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.31 Therefore, 
some Parties commit themselves to reduce emissions “with the aim of re-
turning individually or jointly32 to their 1990 levels of anthropogenic emis-
                                              
27 FREESTONE/STRECK, 18.  
28 BAZELMANS, 299. 
29 Article 23, paragraph 1 UNFCCC. The status of ratification can be checked at 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.ph
p>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
30 Article 2 UNFCCC. 
31 Article 2 UNFCCC. 
32 “Individually or jointly” - the lack of concretion left wide room for interpretation. To 
most negotiators and observers, this phrase primarily referred to the concept of “Joint 
Implementation”. The Member States of the EU, however, maintained that they would 
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sions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol”.33 The 39 Parties which commit themselves to reduce 
their emissions are listed in Annex I of the Convention.34 Additionally the 
European Economic Community and the United States of America are listed 
in Annex I.  
The Convention is universally accepted as the basis of the international pol-
icy on climate change. Its supreme body is the “Conference of the Parties” 
(COP).  
The climate regime is a process-oriented framework, allowing successive 
protocols, annexes and related agreements to be negotiated, adding to or 
revising the initial treaty and developing and evolving the regime over 
time.35 In the rapidly developing field of international environmental law, 
framework treaties, together with the institutions they create, have become 
regulatory regimes. 
The Convention, however, does not create any legally-binding obligation of 
industrialised countries to limit GHG emissions.36 The major importance of 
the Convention for the Kyoto process consists of the fact that it provided an 
objective as well as basic principles. Equally important, the Convention es-
tablished procedures and institutions, which provided the framework for 
political and diplomatic activities.37 
                                              
be allowed under this provision to agree on an internal “burden-sharing arrangement”. 
See OBERTHÜR/OTT, 141.  
33 Article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph b UNFCCC. Hereinafter, this thesis uses the term 
„greenhouse gas“ or “GHG” as an abbreviation for the whole phrase „anthropogenic 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol“.  
34 Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ja-
pan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 
35 OBERTHÜR/OTT, 207. 
36 The terminology has been characterised as “the most impenetrably treaty language ever 
drafted”. OBERTHÜR/OTT, 34, referring to PHILIPPE SANDS, “The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change”, Review of European Community & Inter-
national Law, Volume 1, 1992, 273. 
37 BIRNIE/BOYLE/REDGWELL, 13, point out that by using the consensus negotiating proce-
dure and “package deal” diplomacy, framework treaties are usually able to secure a 
 
 
2 The International Climate Policy Framework 
 10
2.3 The Kyoto Protocol  
The Kyoto Protocol’s supreme body is the “Conference of the Parties serv-
ing as the Meeting of the Parties” (CMP). The sessions of the COP and the 
CMP are held during the same period to reduce costs and improve coordina-
tion between the Convention and the Protocol. The de-facto function as su-
preme body is evidenced by the broad range of functions allocated to the 
COP/CMP whose primary function is “to keep under regular review” the 
implementation of the Protocol and to take, within its mandate, the “deci-
sions necessary to promote its effective implementation”.38  
2.3.1 The Article 3.1-Commitment 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the third “Conference of the Parties” 
(COP) to the Convention on 11 December 1997. With Article 3, paragraph 1 
of the Kyoto Protocol (“the Article 3.1-commitment”), binding commitments 
have been agreed for those Parties which are listed in Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol: “The Parties included in Annex I (of the Convention) shall, indi-
vidually or jointly, ensure that their39 aggregate anthropogenic carbon diox-
ide equivalent emissions of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A (of the Proto-
col) do not exceed their assigned amounts,(…) with a view to reducing their 
overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in 
the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”40 
The reduction commitments in Annex B are differentiated and range from an 
obligation to reduce emissions by 8 per cent (for the EU and many Eastern 
European countries) to permission to increase emissions by 10 per cent (Ice-
land) and Australia (8 per cent).41 The reduction commitments, listed in per-
cents, multiplied with the verified emission of the base-year 1990 results in 
                                              
general acceptance of the negotiated texts and, thereby, build the basis for subsequent 
developments. See also OBERTHÜR/OTT, 33. 
38 Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Kyoto Protocol.  
39 WINTER, 297. Before the Kyoto Protocol was drafted and ratified, “their” was under-
stood as emissions in the territory of each individual signatory of the UNFCCC. 
40 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 2008 to 2012 is, hence, referred to as first 
Kyoto commitment period. However, no decision has been taken on the post-Kyoto pe-
riod yet. 
41 See also OBERTHÜR/OTT, 121-123.  
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the “assigned amount” of each Annex B-Party.42 The targets apply to six of 
the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gases, all of which are listed 
in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Being one of the most ambitious treaties ever adopted, much of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s content represents “unfinished business”:43 “The Kyoto Protocol 
was not designed to solve the problems of climate change; rather it was de-
signed to set in motion a process by which the major economies of the devel-
oped world would begin to address in a meaningful way the means and mo-
dalities of radically reducing their carbon footprint.”44 
2.3.2 Annex B-Parties 
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol contains the same 39 countries as the Annex 
I of the Convention does, in addition also the USA.45 In 2001, however, the 
USA pulled out of the process and refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
Thus, the USA (although Party to the Convention) have to be considered 
outside of the Kyoto system. All other signatories to the Protocol are referred 
to as Non-Annex B-Parties. Non-Annex B-Parties are, without exception, 
countries of the developing world. They do not have any mandatory emis-
sion reduction targets.  
In order to enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol required ratification by 55 
Parties to the Convention including ratification by Annex I-Parties “which 
accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emis-
sions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I“.46 After the withdrawal of 
the USA from Kyoto in 2001, virtually all the other Annex I-Parties had to 
ratify the Protocol in order to bring it into force. On 16 February 2005, after 
the Russian Federation had ratified the Protocol, it came into force. 
                                              
42 In practical terms, the assigned amount is the total amount of “Assigned Amount Units” 
(AAU) or the „AAU budget“ at a Party’s disposal. 
43 OBERTHÜR/OTT, 95. 
44 FREESTONE/STRECK , 4. 
45 The Protocol itself refers to Annex I-Parties when addressing Parties with an Article 3.1-
commitment. This thesis generally uses the term Annex B-Parties. It only uses the term 
Annex I-Parties in citation of sources which use the term Annex I-Party for Parties with 
an Article 3.1-commitment. 
46 Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Each Annex B-Party must cover its emissions by an equivalent amount of 
“Kyoto emission units”, the “currency” of the Kyoto carbon market.47 The 
Kyoto emission units are, on the one hand, accounting units which are traced 
and recorded through national registries. On the other hand, they are also 
tradable instruments representing an entitlement to release a certain quantity 
of GHG emissions into the atmosphere and are as such transferable under 
certain established conditions.48  
The way to achieve compliance with its Kyoto commitment and how to get a 
sufficient amount of Kyoto emission units to cover its emission is up to each 
Annex B-Party.49 Annex B-Parties may set emissions obligations to be 
reached by the entities through a system of emission trading. If and to what 
extent the Annex B-Parties integrate their scheme into the international 
emission trading structure and link it to other schemes is up to the Annex B-
Parties.50  
Administrative support for the functioning of the Protocol and its bodies is 
provided by a “Secretariat to the Conference” that was initially located in 
Geneva, and then moved to Bonn in 1996.51 One of the secretariat’s most 
important functions is the maintenance of the registries for the issuance of 
the various forms of emission units.  
2.4 The Kyoto Carbon Market 
The Kyoto Protocol introduces the so-called “market-based” or “flexible 
mechanisms” enabling Parties to achieve the committed reduction targets 
where it is cheapest to do so. The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
combine the two differing flexibility concepts of “cap-and-trade” and “base-
                                              
47 Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs) and Removal Units (RMUs). To be added to the list must be 
long-term CERs (lCERs) und temporary CERs (tCERs) which apply to emission reduc-
tions achieved with CDM-projects through carbon sinks.  
48 The legal nature and characteristics of emission units are ambiguous and widely dis-
puted. For a summary of the discussion see WEMAERE/STRECK/CHAGAS, chapter 3.1. 
“The ethical dimension”, 37-40; See also BUTTON. 
49 A part from emission trading, other instruments to reduce GHG emissions may be taxes, 
charges and subsidies among others. 
50 BAZELMANS, 300. 
51 Article 8 UNFCCC. 
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line-and-credit” systems.52 Whereas the “Assigned Amount Trading” (AAT) 
under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol is a cap-and-trade system, the “Joint 
Implementation” mechanism (JI) under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol and 
the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) under Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol are baseline-and-credit systems: 
- In a cap-and-trade system, a maximal level (a “cap”) is agreed be-
forehand. The subsequent “trade” allows Parties to meet their tar-
geted cap by acquiring and transferring GHG emission units from 
and to other Parties.53 
- In a baseline-and-credit system, an initial baseline is established by 
calculation of the amount of emissions that would occur in the ab-
sence of the project (the “business-as-usual scenario”). The differ-
ence between this baseline and the effected (lower) emissions as a 
result of the project is converted into tradable emission units.54  
The emission units generated through JI and CDM are often referred to as 
“credits”. They stand for a “credit to emit” resulting from the difference 
between the baseline and the effected lower emission which is a “debit” 
from a project elsewhere.55 
2.4.1 “The Currency” 
As set forth in Annex A, the Kyoto Protocol regulates emissions for six of 
the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gases.56 As these gases differ 
with respect to their radiative forcing and their mean retention period in the 
atmosphere, their comparability with respect to their climate impact needs to 
be assured. All tradable emission units defined by the Kyoto Protocol have 
                                              
52 SIMONETTI/DE WITT WIJNEN, 159. 
53 Key element in a cap-and-trade system is the procedure in which emission units are 
allocated. See WEMAERE/STRECK/CHAGAS, 41. 
54 SIMONETTI/DE WITT WIJNEN, 159. 
55 This thesis generally uses the term “emission units” because of its all-encompassing 
definition.  
56 These gases are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluoro-
carbons and sulphur hexafluoride. Article 3, paragraph 7 of the Kyoto Protocol sets 1990 
as the general base-year for the calculation. Article 3, paragraph 8 of the Kyoto Protocol 
provides for a deflection of the general base-year 1990 and defines 1995 as the base-
year for the calculation of the emission limitations for each Party for the latter three 
gases. 
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the same unit of “one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent”, translated 
into “CO2 equivalent” or, in short, “CO2e”.57  
The emission units are differentiated according to their origin: 
- An “emission reduction unit” (ERU) is an unit generated by a “Joint 
Implementation” (JI)-project;58  
- A “certified emission reduction” (CER) is an unit generated by a 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)-project;59  
- An “assigned amount unit” (AAU) is an unit issued through the cal-
culation of each Party’s assigned amount; 
- A “removal unit” (RMU) is an unit equivalent to the net removals of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases resulting from activities under Arti-
cle 3, paragraph 3 of the Kyoto Protocol and its elected activities 
under Article 4, paragraph 4.60 
 
The legal character of an emission unit is disputed.61 There is a tendency for 
emission units to be treated as commodities which can be sold through spot 
trades for immediate delivery, or through futures contracts, pursuant to 
which emission units are delivered at a set price at a future date.62 Distin-
guishing characteristics of emission units as a commodity would be the 
equivalence of the various emission units. However, emission units are not 
equivalent throughout the market. Therefore, the argument has been made 
that emission units present clear currency-like characteristics, similar to a 
monetary instrument.63 The currency approach would overcome a problem 
                                              
57 Paragraph 1, annex to decision 3/CMP.1; paragraph 1, annex to decision 9/CMP.1; para-
graph 1, annex to decision 11/CMP.1; and paragraph 1, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
Each gas has a certain rating based on its power to accelerate global warming, calculated 
using the global warming potentials rating index that has been provided by the IPCC in 
its second assessment report of 1995. Decision 2/CP.3, paragraph 3. 
58 An ERU represents a credit. 
59 A CER represents a credit. 
60 Paragraph 25, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. A “removal unit” is issued on the basis of 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities which employ the use of 
“sinks” or any process that removes GHG from the atmosphere. Forests as sinks do not 
constitute a permanent GHG-sequestration. With deforestation, GHG is re-emitted. 
Therefore, slightly special accounting rules are applied for RMUs.  
61 See BUTTON; KÜLL; WEMAERE/STRECK/CHAGAS. 
62 BUTTON, 576. 
63 BUTTON, 587. 
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of not-equivalence of various types of emission units, while ensuring a liquid 
market for emission units.64  
Clear decisions on the nature and the treatment of emission units would be 
important to give legal security and certainty to both Governments and pri-
vate entities. In a linked carbon market, difference in treatment of emission 
units can make one sub-market of the overall system more attractive than 
others. Different treatment can lead to distortions of the market.65 
2.4.2 Cap-and-Trade: Assigned Amount Trading (AAT) 
The “Assigned Amount Trading” according to Article 17 of the Kyoto Proto-
col forms the basis for a global emission trading system among Annex B-
Parties. The mechanism under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol is often re-
ferred to as “International Emission Trading” (IET). 66 The AAT covers not 
only the transfer of AAUs but the international transfer of all Kyoto emission 
units.  
The “assigned amount” indicates the total quantity of emissions which an 
Annex B-Party is entitled to effect over a period. In practical terms, the as-
signed amount is the total amount of AAUs or the „AAU budget“ at a Party’s 
disposal. For each verified emission unit of the commitment period, one 
AAU must be invalidated. The unused (in other terms: not invalidated) 
AAUs of a commitment period can be transferred to another Annex B-Party. 
Likewise, not invalidated AAUs can be purchased from another Annex B-
Party. (Figure 1)  
                                              
64 See BUTTON, 583-595. 
65 WEMAERE/STRECK/CHAGAS, 36. 
66 The often used term “emission trading” under the international climate change frame-
work is somewhat misleading. Strictly speaking, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol is not 
about trading but only about transferring. Trading is buying and selling, whereas trans-
ferring is delivering/accepting the sold/bought assets. See SIMONETTI/DE WITT WIJNEN, 
157/158. Paragraph 2, annex to decision 11/CMP.1 corrects this imperfection in Article 
17, as it uses the phrase “transfer and/or acquire” rather than “trade”. May this imply 
the intention of the negotiators to limit the buying and selling of emission units and if so, 
how is the limit defined? 
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Figure 1: Assigned Amount Trading within Annex B 
For each verified emission unit of the commitment period, one AAU must be invali-
dated. 
Not only Annex B-Parties but also legal entities authorized to do so by a 
Party to the Kyoto Protocol can transfer Kyoto emission units.67 But if such 
trade leads to a transfer according to Article 17, such transfer can only be 
done by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.68 Each Party must maintain an up-to-
date list of the legal entities authorized to participate and make such lists 
publicly available.69  
                                              
67 The Kyoto Protocol does not mention private entities under Article 17. But paragraph 5, 
annex to decision 11/CMP.1 provides that a Party that authorizes legal entities to transfer 
and/or acquire emission units under Article 17 will remain responsible for the fulfilment 
of its obligation under the Kyoto Protocol and must ensure that such participation is 
consistent with the applicable rules. 
68 SIMONETTI/DE WITT WIJNEN, 162. 
69 However, in practice no such lists are existent. See SIMONETTI/DE WITT WIJNEN, 161, 
Fn. 16. 
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2.4.3 Baseline-and-Credit: Joint Implementation (JI) 
and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
In a baseline-and-credit system, an initial baseline is established by calcula-
tion of the amount of emissions that would occur in the absence of the pro-
ject (the “business-as-usual scenario”.) The difference between this baseline 
and the effected (lower) emissions as a result of the project is converted into 
tradable emission units.70 Under JI according to Article 6 of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and under CDM according to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, emis-
sion units can be earned by participation in emission reduction projects be-
yond national borders: 
- The Joint Implementation (JI)71 under Article 6 of the Kyoto Proto-
col allows any Annex I-Party72 to transfer to, or acquire from, an-
other Annex I-Party, reductions of GHG emissions. 
- The Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) under Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol is designed with the dual aim of helping developing 
countries in achieving sustainable development on the one side and 
of assisting industrialized countries in achieving compliance with 
Annex B-target on the other side.73 It allows industrialized Parties to 
achieve a portion of the required emission reductions in countries 
without targets (Non-Annex B-Parties) where reductions cost less.74 
A secondary objective was to foster climate change awareness in as 
many states as possible.  
 
 
                                              
70 SIMONETTI/DE WITT WIJNEN, 159. 
71 The term Joint Implementation itself is not mentioned anywhere in the Kyoto Protocol, 
but Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes the basis for what has become known as 
“Joint Implementation”.  
72 The term “Annex I-Party” (to the Convention) is used in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol 
meaning thereby the “Annex B-Parties” (to the Protocol). 
73 Shortly before the Kyoto COP, Brazil tabled a proposal regarding the establishment of a 
“Clean Development Fund” financed by contributions from non-compliant Annex B-
Parties. The United States welcomed the Brazilian proposal, as it saw the opportunity to 
both link the proposal with an increased flexibility in meeting the emission limitation 
targets and involve developing countries in the mitigation measures under the Protocol. 
STRECK (2004), 301. See also DE SÉPIBUS, Environmental Integrity, 2009, 4.  
74 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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For emission units generated by a project of one of the baseline-and-credit 
mechanisms, the term “credit” or, synonymously, the term “offset” is usually 
used.75 
With 3556 registered CDM-projects76 and only some 492 JI-projects77 by 
July 2011, the JI-mechanism may be described as a “wallflower”.78 The dis-
parity in the numbers between JI and CDM projects is partially attributable 
to the fact that the CDM enjoyed a “prompt start” authorized by Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol which allowed the registration of projects starting in 
2001, four years before the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force. This means 
that CERs obtained during the time between 2000 and 2008 can be used to 
assist in achieving compliance during the first Kyoto commitment period 
2008 to 2012. JI, on contrary, can only generate ERUs during the first com-
mitment period, namely between 2008 and 2012.79 
Due to the prompt start of the CDM, detailed modalities governing the CDM 
have already been provided by the Marrakesh Accords in November 2001.80 
The text regarding JI included in the Marrakesh Accords is, compared to the 
CDM modalities, vague and incomplete.81 Many of the rules guiding JI have 
been established relatively recently.  
ERUs must be converted into AAUs through the express approval of both 
the Annex B-Parties acting as transferor and transferees.82 The transfer of the 
ERUs is then a transfer of AAUs from the host country’s AAU budget into 
the acquiring Party’s AAU budget.  
CERs are not converted into AAUs. The transferring country is not an Annex 
B-Party and, therefore, has no reduction commitment resulting in an as-
signed amount of emission units. The acquiring Party, on the other side, has 
committed to reduce emissions and, therefore, has an assigned amount of 
emission units at its disposal. However, the assigned amount of the acquiring 
                                              
75 “To offset” is to compensate for GHG emission occurring in the regulatory entity by 
acquiring emission units which certify the reduction, removal, or avoidance of GHG 
emissions by a project outside of the regulatory entity. 
76 <http://cdmpipeline.org/overview.htm>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
77 <http://cdmpipeline.org/ji-projects.htm>, accessed on 14 November 2011.  
78 HOOGZAAD/STRECK, 177. 
79 HOOGZAAD/STRECK, 184. 
80 See decision 17/CP.7, with annexed draft decision -/CMP.1. Since the Kyoto Protocol 
was not in force yet, no decision by the CMP could have been taken at the time. 
81 See decision 17/CP.7, with annexed draft decision -/CMP.1.  
82 Article 6, paragraph 1, subparagraph a of the Kyoto Protocol.  
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Party remains unchanged while invalidating CERs in accounting for verified 
emissions. In other words, verified emissions are covered by invalidated 
emission units (CER) but the AAU budget of the acquiring Party remains as 
elevated as before. (Figure 2) Consequently, CERs enlarge the over-all cap 
of the Annex B-world.  
Figure 2: CDM: Purchasing CER from Non-Annex B 
20 CERs free up 20 AAUs leaving the Party of the installation that bought 20 CERs 
with 20 spare AAUs entitling to emit 20 extra tonnes of CO2e.  
The CDM has been subject to a lot of research and critical literature.83 The 
issues are, firstly, its onerous administrative requirements and the complex 
procedures. The governance structures established by the Kyoto Protocol 
create a high regulatory barrier to entering the CDM market.84 The regula-
                                              
83 For an overview of the literature see PAULSSON and also MICHAELOWA/MICHAELOWA, 
OLSEN, and PEARSON. 
84 Robust regulation resulting in complex procedures is necessary in order to protect the 
CDM from abuse and fraud. Regulatory intervention, however, has drawbacks, as it may 
erect barriers to entering the CDM market. Consequently, the process of issuing CERs 
must be examined carefully in view of the need to balance divergent interests. Only in 
this way may regulators determine the optimal amount of regulation. For a compact 
summary of the problematic see WEBER/DARBELLAY, 277-281. For practical examples 
see MICHAELOWA, 22/23. 
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tory process thus may not lead to the selection of the best CDM projects. 
Indeed, projects which really need the carbon payments to overcome hurdles 
are more likely to fail as a result of regulatory delays than are projects that 
are not as reliant on carbon payments for their construction and implementa-
tion.85 
Secondly, the criticism targets the environmental integrity of the CDM and 
questions the capacity to produce real, measurable and long-term benefits 
regarding the mitigation of climate change as required in the Kyoto Proto-
col.86 Because the CDM program intends to reduce emissions on a global 
scale, the environmental integrity of the CDM is only preserved if CERs are 
given exclusively to projects that would not have been developed but for the 
CDM.87 Only if a project is implemented “in-addition-to-what-would-have-
been-done” (“additionality”) without the CDM, the project contributes to a 
global net reduction of GHG emissions. 
From a perspective of international law, thirdly, the concept is questionable, 
because Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol asks Annex-I Parties to reduce 
“their” emissions.88 Before the Kyoto Protocol was drafted and ratified, 
“their” was understood as emissions in the territory of each individual sig-
natory of the UNFCCC. 
Another fundamental point of contention, fourthly, involves the geographical 
distribution of CDM projects. The biggest host countries are Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico and South Korea with about 77 per cent in terms of project 
numbers and 84 per cent as regards the expected volume of certificates.89 A 
small group of South East Asian and Latin American states have more than 
                                              
85 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 281, referring to WORLD BANK, 2008, 5. 
86 Article 12, Paragraph 5, subparagraph b of the Kyoto Protocol. The environmental integ-
rity of JI, in contrary, is less of an issue because ERUs are technically not offsetting any 
emissions. See HOOGZAAD/STRECK, 185, describing emission units generated by JI as 
“AAUs in disguise”. 
87 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 281, referring to SANDRA GREINER/AXEL MICHAELOWA, “Defining 
Investment Additionality for CDM Projects – Practical Approaches”, in: Energy Policy, 
Volume 31, Number 10, 2003, 1007-1015, 1007. 
88 WINTER, 296/7, describing the concept as economically comprehensible, but ecologi-
cally fatal. 
89 WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE, “CDM Market still undeveloped: Only industrialized Nations 
can improve geographical distribution”, JIKO Analysis, Volume 4, 2009, 5, available at 
<http://www.jiko-bmu.de/files/basisinformationen/application/pdf/jiko_info_4_2009 
_e.pdf>. 
2 The International Climate Policy Framework 
 21
25 projects each.90 Another group of countries hosts between 10 and 20 pro-
jects each.91 But there is a striking lack of CDM projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
2.4.4 Supplementarity and Additionality 
Supplementarity and additionality are key concepts for an environmentally 
effective and well-functioning carbon market. They are of high political 
relevance. Without adequate regulation on these issues, emission trading will 
not mitigate climate change. 
In practice, however, they are difficult to incorporate into clear and justicia-
ble legal provisions. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol asks for supplementar-
ity, the requirement that emission reduction targets should be achieved pri-
marily through domestic measures.92 Supplementarity is intended to preclude 
countries and companies from counting on the CDM to bypass their reduc-
tion targets.93 In 2001, at COP.7 in Marrakesh, the requirement to reduce 
emissions “primarily through domestic measures” was softened. The Mar-
rakesh Accords ended up by stipulating that domestic actions “shall consti-
tute a significant element of the effort” made by Parties included in Annex 
B.94  
WEBER/DARBELLAY draw the attention to the fact that limiting the demand 
for CERs by supplementarity requirements makes price discovery mecha-
nisms in the CDM market less efficient. CER prices cannot fully reflect the 
market conditions if the demand side is capped. They warn that establishing 
a supplementarity requirement can be counterproductive if demand results in 
                                              
90 This group includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, along with 
Chile and Colombia. 
91 Among these countries are Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, 
Peru, Kenya, South Africa and Israel.  
92 BODANSKY, 2. Supplementarity was promoted especially by the EU, whereas the United 
States of America (together with Australia and Japan) have pushed for the unrestricted 
use of the market-based mechanisms. 
93 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 283, referring to ERICH VRANES, “Climate Change and the WTO: 
EU Emission Trading and the WTO Disciplines on Trade in Goods, Services and In-
vestment Protection”, in: Journal of World Trade, Volume 43, Number 4, 2009, 707-735, 
710. 
94 Decision 15/CP.7, confirmed in decision 2/CMP.1, paragraph 1. The interpretations of 
“significant” may, however, differ significantly from Party to Party.   
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CER prices remaining artificially low. Consequently, CERs do not remain 
fully competitive with other emission units.95  
As WEBER/DARBELLAY suggest, supplementarity may to a certain extent be 
described as a protectionist measure of a government to privilege its own 
emission units. As a counter-argument, however, it may be argued that the 
net reduction of emissions is a constitutional requirement for the protection 
of population and health.96 Given the doubts on emission reductions by 
CDM-projects to result in global net reductions, a potential negligence to 
provide for supplementarity may also be considered to be a breach of consti-
tutional requirements.  
The second key concept in the carbon market, the requirement of additional-
ity, ensures that a project is implemented in addition to what would have 
been done without the flexible mechanisms.97 Additionality, hence, signifies 
that the credited reductions would not have taken place for other reasons 
thereby requiring the prove of a counterfact (“what-would-have-been-if-
not”). Therefore, the criteria of additionality requires the prove of more 
“climate-friendliness” than a reference project.98 Additionality is a require-
ment for both baseline-and-credit mechanisms.99  
Additionality is crucial within the CDM because there is a serious asymme-
try in the concept of the CDM: CERs may be accounted by the purchasing 
installation in an Annex B-Party and, hence, contribute to reach the reduction 
target of this specific installation in an Annex B-Party. But it does so without 
                                              
95 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 283. 
96 Switzerland’s CO2-Act, e.g., is an answer to the requirements in Article 74, paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the Constitution of Switzerland, to protect the population and its natural envi-
ronment according to the polluter-pays principle. Likewise, Article 174, paragraph 1 of 
the EC-Treaty provides that the Community policy contributes to the preservation, pro-
tection and improvement of the environmental quality, the protection of human health 
and the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources. Article 174, paragraph 2 of 
the EC-Treaty demands that the community policy shall be based on the principle that 
environmental damage should be rectified at source and that the polluter pays. 
97 For a description of additionality see WEBER/DARBELLAY, 281. 
98 WINTER, 297, highlights that so-called reference projects are often of very low standard 
which makes the prove of additionality of the CDM-project easy. To counter this issue, 
some certification methodologies ask for the prove of “financial additionality”: A pro-
ject is considered to be additional when only the income from the sale of emission units 
makes the project profitable. 
99 Article 6, paragraph 1, subparagraph b of the Kyoto Protocol for JI; Article 12, Para-
graph 5, subparagraph c of the Kyoto Protocol for CDM.  
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altering this Party’s AAU budget because CERs are produced in host coun-
tries with no AAU budget (Non-Annex B-Party). Hence, the production and 
transfer of CERs does not correspond to a transfer of an assigned amount 
because the host country of the CDM project is not an Annex B-Party and 
has no AAU budget at disposal. Consequently, each CER imported into the 
Annex B-registries represents an increase of the overall emission cap of An-
nex B-Parties. Therefore, the concept of additionality plays a decisive role 
within the CDM. Unless a CDM project is truly additional, the mechanism 
does not contribute to worldwide net emission reduction. To the contrary: A 
CER frees up an AAU leaving the Party of the installation that bought a CER 
with one spare AAU entitling to emit an extra tonne of CO2e.  
Although additionality seems to be an adequate criterion that provides credi-
bility to the project-based system, concerns have been raised about the diffi-
culties of enforcing this requirement in practice. The estimation of emission 
reductions poses practical problems and to prove that emissions have been 
reduced beyond a business-as-usual scenario is challenging.100 From an en-
trepreneurial perspective and in an atmosphere of high uncertainty with re-
gard to emission trading, it is hardly defensible to promote a project based 
on the assumption that only the sale of emission unit will allow the project to 
be profitable.101 
2.4.5 Governance Issues of the Kyoto Carbon Market 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (CMP) has recognized the importance of a strong com-
pliance regime in maintaining the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol: “[E]nvironmental integrity is to be achieved through sound modalities, 
rules and guidelines for the mechanisms, sound and strong principles (…) 
and a strong compliance regime”.102 
The compliance system forms an integral part of the governance system of 
the Kyoto Protocol. It provides for an unprecedented administrative review 
and the experience gained from its operation since 2006 constitutes a land-
mark in international climate policy.103 Supporters of the Protocol highlight 
                                              
100 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 281/282. 
101 On how the regulatory barriers to entering the CDM market may work against the goal 
of additionality see WEBER/DARBELLAY, 282. 
102 Fifth preambular paragraph of decision 2/CMP. See also MANGUIAT, 408. 
103 OBERTHÜR/LEFEBER, 134. 
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the fact that it represents the only legally binding international instrument to 
limit emissions. On closer examination, however, the consequences of com-
pliance or non-compliance with commitments are less clear-cut than one 
might imagine.104 
Important elements of a carbon market’s governance system are the rules for 
transferring and surrendering emission units, the provisions regarding report-
ing and reviewing and the issues of non-compliance and its consequences. 
Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) provide important input to, 
and themselves benefit from, the compliance system.105 
2.4.5.1 Temporal Flexibility 
An Annex B-Party is compliant with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol 
when for each verified emission within a given period a corresponding emis-
sion unit is invalidated. Moreover, unused emission units can be “banked”: 
Surplus ERUs, CERs and AAUs, may be carried forward into the subsequent 
commitment period for compliance purposes.106 The RMUs may not be car-
ried-over.107 
2.4.5.2 National Registries, CDM Registry and the 
International Transaction Log (ITL) 
All units, the Kyoto units as well as European or Swiss Units, exist exclu-
sively unchartered and in electronic form. Every transaction, hence, must be 
recorded in a registry. A national registry is responsible for ensuring the ac-
curate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer, acquisition, cancellation 
and retirement of emission reduction units.108 The registries centralize the 
accounting data, provide transparent monitoring of reductions, and track 
transactions to avoid the double counting of reductions. They provide assur-
                                              
104 TORNEY/FUJIWARA, 1. 
105 OBERTHÜR/LEFEBER, 152.  
106 Article 3, paragraph 13 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the general carry-over. Para-
graph 15, annex to decision 13/CMP.1 specifies the carry-over for ERUs, CERs and 
AAUs.  
107 Paragraph 16, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
108 The requirements for “national registries” are listed in paragraphs 17-48, annex of 
decision 13/CMP.1. 
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ances that reductions are maintained over time and are not sold more than 
once through transparent reporting and tracking of reductions.109  
Two types of registries are implemented: (1) Governments of the 39 Annex 
B-Parties run national registries, containing accounts within which units are 
held in the name of the government or in the name of legal entities author-
ized by the government; (2) As the certificates stemming from CDM projects 
are not generated within Annex B-Parties, national registries are not suitable 
to account for newly issued CERs. Hence, the so-called CDM Registry was 
put in place under the responsibility of the CDM Executive Board and ad-
ministered by the UNFCCC secretariat.110 
All transactions within the national registries and the CDM Registry are 
recorded through the “International Transaction Log” (ITL)111 which is es-
tablished and maintained by the UNFCCC secretariat. The ITL verifies regis-
try transactions in real time to ensure that they are consistent with rules 
agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. Eligibility112 of the Party involved in the 
transaction to participate in the mechanisms is one of the conditions required 
for the ITL to clear transfers between registries.113 The ITL requires regis-
tries to terminate transactions that are found to infringe upon the Kyoto 
rules. 
Similar to the registries, the ITL is implemented in the form of a standard-
ized electronic database. The principal function of the ITL is to verify the 
validity of transactions of Kyoto emission units as they are proposed by the 
Annex B-Parties.  
All transfers, including transfers initiated by legal entities which have been 
authorized to participate in AAT, are made through the national registries of 
the relevant Annex B-Parties. A participating legal entity will therefore need 
to have an account in the national registry of the relevant authorizing Annex 
B-Party.  
                                              
109 PASSERO, 523.  
110 Decision 3/CMP.1, appendix D. 
111 Established pursuant to paragraph 38, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
112 Eligibility is determined through the application of six criteria. One of these is to have in 
place a National Registry. Paragraph 31, annex to decision 3/CMP.1 (with regard to 
CDM); paragraph 21, annex to decision 9/CMP.1 (with regard to JI); paragraph 2, annex 
to decision 11/CMP.1 (with regard to AAT). 
113 Paragraph 42, subparagraph b, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
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2.4.5.3 Issues of Non-Compliance 
The basic institution of the Kyoto compliance regime is the compliance 
committee.114 It consists of two branches: the facilitative branch and the 
enforcement branch. The facilitative branch, on the one side, represents a 
cooperative approach to compliance. With the aim of promoting compliance 
and providing for early warning of potential non-compliance, the facilitative 
branch is responsible for providing advice and facilitation and, thereby, re-
sumes the function of an early-warning of potential non-compliance with 
regard to Annex B-Parties. The enforcement branch, on the other side, is 
responsible for the determination of non-compliance. It decides on the con-
sequences of non-compliance. 
According to the negotiations in Marrakesh and confirmed by CMP.1 in 
Montreal, there are three main issues of non-compliance by Annex B-Parties 
in the Kyoto framework:  
a) non-compliance with its quantified emissions limitation or reduction 
obligation under the Article 3.1-commitment; 
b) non-compliance with the methodological and reporting requirements 
under Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 
4, of the Kyoto Protocol; and  
c) non-compliance with the eligibility requirements under the three 
market-based mechanisms.115  
Each of these issues of non-compliance entails specific consequences. 116  
The most relevant issues of non-compliance is the non-fulfilment of a Party’s 
reduction commitment. This issue arises, of course, only after the end of the 
commitment period. The issue of compliance with emission targets for the 
first commitment period is unlikely to be raised before July 2015.117  
An Annex B-Party which does not fulfil its reduction commitment will have 
to face a deduction from the Party’s assigned amount for the second com-
                                              
114 For a detailed description of the compliance committee and its four years of experience 
see the Article of OBERTHÜR/LEFEBER, 133-158. 
115 Paragraph 4, subparagraphs a-c, section V, annex to decision 27/CMP.1. 
116 These consequences are, for example, the declaration of non-compliance by the compli-
ance committee, the suspension of eligibility of the Party in question, the requirement to 
develop a plan, in order to remedy the non-compliance and a timetable for implementing 
measures. Paragraphs 1-4, section XV, annex to decision 27/CMP.1. 
117 TORNEY/FUJIWARA, 5. The timeframe leading to decisions over compliance is outlined in 
OBERTHÜR/ LEFEBER, 149. 
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mitment period of a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times the amount in 
tonnes of excess emissions.118 The non-compliant Party has to develop a 
compliance action plan119 and faces the suspension of the eligibility to make 
transfers under Article 17 of the Protocol until the Party is reinstated.120 
The problem is that if there is no agreement on commitments for the next 
period, the deduction approach will not be enforceable – because the sub-
stantive deduction of tonnes of a Party’s assigned amount in a subsequent 
commitment period does not hurt if there is no subsequent period.  
An additional hurdle is the fact that a Party’s assigned amount would proba-
bly need an amendment of the Kyoto Protocol according to Article 18 of the 
Kyoto Protocol.121 Article 18 of the Protocol has been introduced by the ne-
gotiators because legally binding consequences are assumed to be more ef-
fective in ensuring compliance.  
While some enforcement measures, such as the suspension of eligibility to 
participate in the flexible mechanisms, could be considered as part of the 
“implied powers“ of an international institution, the substantive deduction of 
tonnes of a Party’s assigned amount in a subsequent commitment period may 
probably be considered to be of “a nature as to require an amendment of the 
protocol”.122 And, consequently, ask for an amendment. Such an amendment 
would not enter into force until three-quarters of the Parties had signed and 
ratified the amendment, i.e. more than 145 Parties. Experience has demon-
strated that this may take a very long time – if at all.  
The Kyoto Protocol stipulates legally binding commitments. But TORNEY/ 
FUJIWARA argue appropriately that, in reality, no legally binding conse-
                                              
118 Paragraph 5, subparagraph a, section XV, annex to decision 27/CMP.1. 
119 Paragraph 5, subparagraph b, section XV, annex to decision 27/CMP.1. 
120 Paragraph 5, subparagraph c, section XV, annex to decision 27/CMP.1. Reinstatement is 
provided for in in accordance with paragraph 3 or paragraph 4, section XX, annex to de-
cision 27/CMP.1 in an expedited procedure.  
121 Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol: “(…) any procedure and mechanism under this Article 
entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment of this Pro-
tocol.” The extensive powers of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system necessitated a 
strong focus on the establishment of a fair and credible institutional regime. SCHRAM 
STOKKE/HOVI/ULFSTEIN (eds), 3. 
122 SCHRAM STOKKE/HOVI/ULFSTEIN (eds), 4, warn that the lack of clarity on these issues 
may result in an unclear political situation after the first commitment period, for exam-
ple if certain Annex B-Parties that are found to be in non-compliance have not ratified 
an amendment that reflects the binding natures of these penalties.  
2 The International Climate Policy Framework 
 28
quences for non-compliance exist. There is no credible “stick” through 
which compliance could be enforced by the use of punitive sanctions.123 This 
is a serious loophole in the concept of the Kyoto carbon market. 
OBERTHÜR/LEFEBER, in contrast, are of the opinion that the strength of the 
compliance system (unique among Multilateral Environmental Agreements) 
can be traced to the incentives and disincentives that the overall design of the 
Protocol and its implementing decisions have generated. Even though Parties 
have not made the consequences legally binding by adopting an amendment 
of the Protocol, they can be effectively applied. However, OBERTHÜR/ 
LEFEBER agree that this is only the case as long as Parties do not withdraw 
from the Kyoto Protocol and as long as new commitment periods follow.124 
Either way, it may be concluded that targets are symbolically important. 
Parties may try harder to meet legally binding targets, not because of the 
formal legal consequences of non-compliance, but because of the reputa-
tional costs associated with failing to comply with legally binding commit-
ments.125 
2.5 Compliance with International Law 
Any linking arrangement created and operating within the realm of interna-
tional law has to comply with the framework of the international liberaliza-
tion of the markets and the Kyoto Protocol.126 Attention must especially be 
paid to the interface of emission trading and international trade law. Interna-
tional trade is regulated on a multilateral basis by the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
These agreements prescribe rules to facilitate free and transparent interna-
tional trade in products and services between Member States.127 
                                              
123 TORNEY/FUJIWARA, 6/7. 
124 OBERTHÜR/LEFEBER, 157. 
125 TORNEY/FUJIWARA, 7. 
126 WEBER, 2008, 482; MEHLING, 126.  
127 MACE ET AL., 90.  
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2.5.1 The Principle of Non-Discrimination 
The main relative WTO standards test whether a measure, as applied to 
goods or services, discriminates between “like” goods or services on the 
basis of their country of origin. The “most favoured nation”-principle de-
mands that each WTO Member Party accords to goods, services and service 
suppliers of any other WTO Member Party treatment no less favourable than 
the treatment it accords to the goods or services and service suppliers of any 
other country.128 Under the “national treatment”-principle, each WTO Mem-
ber Party must accord treatment no less favourable to the products, services 
and service suppliers of any other Member Party than the treatment it ac-
cords to its own domestic products, services and service suppliers.129 
Several analyses of relevant treaties reveal that the free trade disciplines set 
out for trade in goods are, for the time being, unlikely to constrain a link 
between emission trading markets.130 Emission units would not be impacted 
by GATT rules that prohibit measures leading to discrimination between 
products on the basis of country of origin or prohibit quantitative restric-
tions.131 However, it is not possible to foresee whether emission units would 
never be characterized as products for WTO purposes.132 Most WTO provi-
sions are considered “continuing” ones to be interpreted in an evolutionary 
manner, and the very absence of a fixed definition of “product”, it has been 
said, may allow the notion to evolve over time.133  
                                              
128 Article I, GATT; Article II GATS. 
129 Article III GATT; Article XVIII GATS. 
130 WERKSMAN, 255: “It can be concluded with some confidence that internationally traded 
emissions allowances are themselves neither goods nor services under the WTO. They 
are, instead, licences or permits issued by a government authority and entitling (under 
specified conditions) the holder to carry out a regulated activity within its territory.” 
See also MACE ET AL., 91, A. PETSONK, “The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Into The Global Marketplace”, in: Duke 
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Volume 10, 1999, 185-220, 200; Z.X. ZHANG, 
“Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trading System”, in: Journal of 
World Trade, Volume 32, Number 5, 1998, 219-239, 225; G.M. WISER, “Frontiers in 
trade: the clean development mechanism”, in: International Journal of Global Environ-
mental Issues, Volume 2, Numbers 3/4, 2002, 293.  
131 MACE ET AL., 92. 
132 ZUMBACH, 32. 
133 MACE ET AL., 91, referring to MARISA MARTIN, “Trade Law Implication of Restricting 
Participation in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme”, in: Georgetown Inter-
national Environmental Law Review, Volume 19, Number 3, Spring 2007, 437-474. 
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Unresolved is also the question whether the trade of emission units may be 
subject to GATS obligations and, if so, which sectoral classification is appli-
cable: financial, energy or environmental services.134 Commentators have 
argued that emission units could be characterized as one or more of the “de-
rivative products” recognised for GATS purposes as being traded in the fi-
nancial services sector.135 
2.5.2 Emission Units as a Subsidy? 
Design choices of regulation and allocation of emission units will most 
likely affect the competitive relationship between products and services that 
are governed by WTO disciplines.136 Therefore, the measures to implement 
an Emission Trading Scheme must be designed, just as any other domestic 
measures that have the potential to impact trade, in a manner sensitive to 
WTO rules against discrimination.137  
For example, emission units allocated at no cost on the basis of historical 
emissions (“grandfathering”) has been considered as a means to prevent 
carbon leakage to less regulated markets. The free allocation of emissions 
units may thus be interpreted as a “subsidy” under the “Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures” (SCM) Agreement.138 If the allocation methods of 
emission units undermine the competitive relationship between the subsi-
dized industries and “like“ products in the international or domestic market, 
they may be subject to a direct challenge or to countervailing duties.139 Some 
authors have also questioned whether a failure to enforce the terms under 
which emission units are granted constitutes a subsidy.140 So far, there is no 
                                              
134 WEBER, 2008, 482. 
135 WERKSMAN, 256. See also MACE ET AL., 94, Fn. 425, and MARTIN, (see Fn. above) argu-
ing that emission units could be described as “futures”, “options”, “transferable securi-
ties”, “negotiable instruments” or “financial assets” under GATS. 
136 WERKSMAN, 252. 
137 WERKSMAN, 262. 
138 MACE ET AL., 96, referring to PETSONK, 206 (see Fn. above); and S. CHARNOVITZ., 
“Trade and climate: potential conflicts and synergies”, Pew Center project “Beyond 
Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort against Climate Change”, Pew Center Wash-
ington DC, 2003. 
139 WERKSMAN, 259. 
140 MACE ET AL., 96, referring to PETSONK, 211 (see Fn. above). 
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sufficiently relevant guidance from past WTO disputes on either of these 
issues.141 
2.5.3 Border Tax Adjustments (BTA) to Compensate for 
Additional Costs? 
As national GHG emission reduction policies differ, national producers of 
goods who are obliged to comply with high environmental standards may 
face higher costs than producers in a country with lax environmental stan-
dards. Emission Trading Schemes may hence have anti-competitive effects 
in the same way as taxes do.142 To counter the consequent risk of carbon 
leakage, countries may consider introducing carbon-related Border Tax Ad-
justment (BTA) measures to compensate for the additional costs in connec-
tion with the application of the more stringent emissions standard, thus pre-
serving the competitive equality between the compared products.143 Such 
BTA measures can either take the form of carbon-taxes on products or the 
form of an obligation to purchase emission units in the destination country. 
The compatibility of such BTA measures under GATT provisions is heavily 
debated under WTO Law144 because the discrimination between domestic 
and foreign producers with regard to internal taxes or other internal charges 
is prohibited according to the National Treatment Clause of the GATT.145 
                                              
141 MACE ET AL., 97. See also WERKSMAN, 259, reminding that many WTO Member Parties 
are heavily subsidizing their fossil fuel industries without having been subject of a 
GATT or WTO dispute.  
142 KAUFMANN/WEBER, 505, referring to KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, National Board of Trade, 
“Climate Measures and Trade, Legal and Economic Aspects of Border Carbon Adjust-
ments”, 2009, available at <http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/Arbetsomr% 
C3%A5den/Handel%20och%20h%C3%A5llbar%20utveckling/Handel%20och%20milj
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%20Trade.pdf>, 9-10. However, the equivalence of a carbon tax with the obligation for 
domestic industry to participate in an Emission Trading Scheme is contested. 
KAUFMANN/WEBER refer to JAVIER DE CENDRA , “Can Emissions Trading Schemes be 
Coupled with Border Tax Adjustmenst? An Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law”, in: Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 15, Number 2, July 
2006, 131-145, holding that only Emission Trading Schemes in which emission units are 
auctioned are comparable to a domestic tax. 
143 KAUFMANN/WEBER, 498. 
144 See KAUFMANN/WEBER. 
145 Article III:2 GATT. 
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Also, foreign goods are not allowed to be treated less favourably than like 
domestic goods.146 
The crucial point thereby is the likeness of products. The test for a “like 
product” in the context of Article III:4 GATT was articulated by a WTO 
panel in the 1990ies. This panel called for a case-by-case determination in 
which a panel should assess four criteria: the product’s properties, nature and 
quality; its end-uses in a given market; its tariff classification and consumers 
preferences.147 Extending on these criteria, the question obtrudes how pro-
duction methods influence the “likeness” of products and if, hence, the dis-
tinction between products produced under the regime of an Emission Trad-
ing Scheme and products produced under no or differing environmental 
standards is also conceivable.  
Specific decisions thereon have not yet been taken within the WTO debate 
and the introduction of BTA measures to compensate for differing carbon 
prices, be it as a consequence of a participation in an Emission Trading 
Scheme or be it as a consequence of the submission under other environ-
mental standards, is contested.148 Firstly, the implementation of BTA is con-
sidered to be a violation of both the spirit and the letter of multilateral trade 
principles requiring equal treatment of like products. Secondly, it is claimed 
that the application of BTA is a disguised form of protectionism and, thirdly, 
there are fears that BTA in practice undermines the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.149  
2.5.4 Legitimate Non-Trade Policy Goals? 
It may be concluded that, by now, the WTO has not finally determined 
whether the carbon markets fall under its auspices and, if so, whether the 
trade of emission units concerns goods under the GATT or services under the 
GATS.150 However, if a WTO dispute settlement panel has to decide upon 
the question one day, the trade of emission units is likely to be subject to 
GATS general obligations and disciplines.151 Whether such a decision would 
                                              
146 Article III:4 GATT. 
147 WERKSMAN, 259, referring to the WTO-case “United States – Standards for Reformu-
lated Gasoline”, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996, paragraph 6.8. 
148 KAUFMANN/WEBER, 506-508. 
149 KAUFMANN/WEBER, 499.  
150 WEBER, 2008, 482. 
151 MACE ET AL., 95. 
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have any practical impact, however, may in any case be challenged by a 
justification of the measure as being “necessary” for the protection of hu-
man, animal or plant life or health,152 or as “relating to” the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources.153 A violation of the GATT based on legitimate 
non-trade policy goals may also be justified by the provision of Article III 
GATT provided that such interests are adequately balanced against the objec-
tive of free trade. As carbon-related BTA measures, for example, are clearly 
driven by the implementation of environmental goals and mitigating climate 
change, they are not motivated by avoiding competitive disadvantages for 
domestic industry.154 The importance of protecting these public policy inter-
ests can be underlined with the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body which 
increasingly acknowledges human health and environmental interests as 
justifications, and also with international agreements and resolutions such as 
the UNFCCC and the subsequent protocols and agreements.155 
Consequently, the crucial question is whether trade restrictions within an 
Emission Trading Scheme are either central to the effectiveness of an Emis-
sion Trading Scheme, or in contrast, whether trade restrictions are contrary 
to the Emission Trading Scheme’s objectives.156 WERKSMAN draws the at-
tention to the fact that, at the time of writing his article in 1999, Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol disagreed on the question of effectiveness. The author of this 
thesis perceives that, by today and given the fact that emission trading is 
reality, the necessity for robust regulation provisions is widely accepted. 
However, a general consensus on this fundamental question is far from being 
established as, for example, the ongoing discussion in Switzerland on sup-
plementarity and on the requirements for domestically achieved emission 
reductions makes evident.  
                                              
152 Article XX (b) GATT. 
153 Article XX (g) GATT. For a comprehensive discussion see WERKSMAN, 260/261. See 
also WEBER, 2008, 483; referring also to Article XIV(b) GATS. See also MACE ET AL., 
94. 
154 KAUFMANN/WEBER, 511. 
155 KAUFMANN/WEBER, 522. 
156 Ultimately, even the question whether emission trading itself is central to achieve envi-
ronmental goals will have to be answered. 
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2.6 Other Major Carbon Markets 
There are more countries and regions which are in the process of developing 
a domestic Emission Trading Scheme. One of the most experienced scheme 
is the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (NSW GGAS) 
in Australia.157 The NSW GGAS commenced on 1 January 2003 and aims at 
reducing GHG emissions associated with the production and use of electric-
ity. Project-based activities to offset the production of GHG emissions are 
considered to be the way to achieve this aim. 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first market-based 
regulatory program in the United States of America to reduce GHG emis-
sions.158 Ten north-eastern and mid-atlantic states have capped and will re-
duce CO2 emissions from the power sector by 10 per cent by 2018.159 The 
first compliance period covers the three years from 1 January 2009 to 31 
December 2011.160 
In New Zealand, the Climate Change Response Act of 2002 lays out the 
legislative framework for the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ-ETS).161 A 
number of amendments passed into law in September 2008. One of the 
changes is to introduce a transition phase to the scheme between 1 July 2010 
and 31 December 2012. During this period, participants will be able to buy 
emission units from the Government for a fixed price of 25 NZD. In addi-
tion, participants in the energy, industrial and liquid fossil fuel sectors will 
have to surrender only one emission unit for every two tonnes of emissions 
they produce. 
Japan’s Voluntary Emission Trading Scheme (JVETS) was launched in 2005 
leading to an experimental introduction of an integrated domestic market for 
                                              
157 See <http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
158 The Memorandum of Understanding of 20 December 2005 outlines the framework, 
available at <http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf>, accessed on 14 No-
vember 2011. 
159 Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
160 For general information see Fact Sheet available at <http://www.rggi.org/docs/ 
RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf >, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
161 See <http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/about/basics.html>, 
accessed on 14 November 2011. 
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emission trading in 2008.162 The results lead to the “Basic Act on Global 
Warming Countermeasures”, approved by the cabinet on 12 March 2010, 
which foresees to elaborate legislative measures for establishing a domestic 
Emission Trading Scheme within around one year after coming in to force of 
the Basic Act.163 
There is an additional category of emission units available. When private and 
corporate consumers intend to offset their emissions, they usually acquire 
and transfer “Voluntary Emission Reductions” (VERs). VERs are emission 
units sold on the so-called “Voluntary Carbon Markets” which are (in con-
trast to the regulated Kyoto carbon market and the regional or national Emis-
sion Trading Schemes) hardly regulated neither by international nor by na-
tional legislation.164 VERs can not be traded in regulated carbon markets 
such as the Kyoto carbon market or the EU-ETS and the CH-ETS. But the 
voluntary markets have provided a significant benefit by building public 
awareness and infrastructure for transactions also in the regulated cap-and-
trade markets and by informing about government climate policies.165 
2.7 Outlook on the Future of the International 
Climate Framework 
The text of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that negotiations towards a second 
commitment period should commence “at least seven years before the end 
of the first commitment period”.166 CMP.1 took the decision to initiate con-
siderations on further commitments for Annex I-Parties in December 
2005.167 Near the end of 2007, a two-year framework for negotiations (the 
                                              
162 See EISAKU TODA, “The current status of the Emission Trading Scheme in Japan”, 
presentation of 16 March 2010, available at <http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_me 
ch/current-ets100316.pdf>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
163 For a provisional translation of the bill of the Basic Act see <http://www.env. 
go.jp/en/earth/cc/bagwc/overview_bill.pdf>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
164 For a general overview see KATE HAMILTON/MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY/THOMAS 
MARCELLO, “Building Bridges: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2010”, available 
at <http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/resources.library.page.php?p 
age_id=7585&section=our_publications&eod=1>, accessed on 14 November 2011.  
165 PASSERO, 518. 
166 Article 3, paragraph 9 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
167 Decision 1/CMP.1. 
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so-called “Bali Action Plan”) was launched with a view to reaching an 
agreed outcome at the Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen in 2009. 
The Bali Action Plan did not conclude in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen 
Accord has not yielded a legally binding power over formal commitments by 
Parties. But it provides political guidance for continuation of negotiations for 
a future agreement without specifying an end date.168 The legal status of the 
Accord is uncertain, as it was only taken note of by the COP rather than be-
ing adopted as a formal COP decision.169  
The failure to agree at Copenhagen on further commitments for developed 
countries within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol has led to serious con-
cerns that there may be a gap between the first and subsequent commitment 
periods under the Protocol.170 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Com-
mitments for Annex I-Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) has pub-
lished, in July 2010, a document with the title “Legal considerations relating 
to a possible gap between the first and subsequent commitment periods”.171  
Meanwhile, the Conference on Climate Change in Cancun in 2010 has re-
stored trust in the international negotiations.172 With numerous references to 
the Framework Convention, the decisions of Cancun fuel the hope that po-
tential new instruments will be rooted in the prolongation of the 
UNFCCC.173 Although some political principles have been captured in a 
series of decisions and significant advances made on finance, technology, 
action to address deforestation and intensified reporting obligations, impor-
tant questions for the long-term response to climate change remain unre-
                                              
168 Decision 2/CP.15. 
169 TORNEY/FUJIWARA, 2. 
170 TORNEY/FUJIWARA, 3; HEUBERGER, 839; BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 808; See also GERD 
KOLBE, “Die Klimapolitik dreht sich im Kreise”, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), 17 
June 2011, available at <http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/international/die_klima 
politik_dreht_sich_im_kreis_1.10958936.html>. 
171 FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/10 of 20 July 2010, available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
2010/awg13/eng/10.pdf>. 
172 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 808: „Après la grand déception de Copenhague, la récente 
Conférence des Parties à Cancun a remis le processus multilatéral sur les rails.” The 
16th United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Cancun/Mexico was held from 29 
November to 10 December 2010. 
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solved.174 If trust could be restored, clarity on the future of carbon markets 
could not be established in Cancun, leaving a significant challenge for the 
Conference on Climate Change in Durban towards the end of 2011.175 
                                              
174 HEUBERGER, 842-845. See also KPMG, Business and industry issue of 13 January 2011, 
available at <www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/kpmg-
cop16-cancun/pages/post-cancun-what-it-means.aspx>. 
175 The 17th United Nations Conference on Climate Change will be held from 28 November 




3 The Emission Trading Scheme of the 
European Union 
3.1 Introduction 
The EU-ETS was originally established as a domestic policy tool to achieve 
the Article 3.1-commitment of the EU and its Member States.176 In order to 
increase the cost-effectiveness of achieving the Community emission reduc-
tions target, however, linking the Community scheme to GHG Emission 
Trading Schemes in third countries was foreseen since its inception.177  
Whereas the post-Kyoto regulatory regime on international level is yet unde-
cided, phase III of the EU-ETS from 2013 to 2020 is well defined by the 
revised ETS-Directive of 2009 and its subsequent regulations.  
The following sections concentrate on the regulations on Community level 
by the ETS-Directive and its subsequent regulations. The implementation by 
Member States is not subject of this thesis. 
3.2 Current EU-Legislation 
The European Union is a Party to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-15 took on a 
common commitment to reduce emissions by 8 per cent between 2008 and 
2012 compared to emissions in the “base-year”.178 The EU-27 does not have 
a common target under the Kyoto Protocol in the same way as the EU-15 
does. 
                                              
176 With Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol (“the Article 3.1-commitment”), 
binding commitments have been agreed for those Parties which are listed in Annex B of 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
177 Preamble, recital 18 of the Original ETS-Directive. 
178 For the EU-15, the base-year for CO2, CH4 and N2O is 1990; for fluorinated gases 12 
Member States have selected 1995 as the base-year, whereas Austria, France and Italy 
have chosen 1990 as the base-year. See EUROPEAN ENERGY AGENCY, “Annual GHG In-
ventory 1990-2008 and Inventory Report”, 2010, 5, Fn. 1.  
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During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU and its Member States 
opposed the introduction of any market-based flexible instruments into the 
international climate regime.  
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the Kyoto Protocol would enter into 
force, the EU conceded and agreed to the market-based mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol.179 Following US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in March 
2001, the EU faced increased pressure not only to demonstrate international 
climate policy leadership by saving the Kyoto Protocol, but also to set up a 
legal framework that would allow the Emission Trading Scheme of the EU 
to take up operations as early as possible.180 
Most EU Member States were used to domestic command-and-control 
measures, such as energy taxes or voluntary agreements and the idea of hav-
ing a free market regulating the access to a global public good appeared sus-
picious. An EU-wide CO2 emissions tax seemed not to be possible at the 
time since one had been proposed and rejected in the 1990s.  
A cap-and-trade approach, on the contrary, guaranteed a limit on a signifi-
cant part of the EU’s emissions, it was compatible with the emission trading 
provision of the Kyoto Protocol, and it seemed to be the only other instru-
ment available.181  
As any linking arrangement operating within the realm of international law, 
the Emission Trading Scheme of the European Union hast to be designed 
such as to comply with the framework of the international liberalization of 
the markets and the Kyoto Protocol.182 Attention must also be paid to the 
interface of emission trading and international trade law. International trade 
is regulated on a multilateral basis by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
                                              
179 POHLMANN, 340. There are four reasons why the EU’s attitude has changed: 1) The EU 
wanted to prepare itself for a potential IET that was expected to become operational by 
2008; 2) Key personnel in the Environment Directorate-General of the European Com-
mission were replaced by economists who favoured economic policy instruments; 3) 
The EU became increasingly aware of the need of market-based mechanisms to achieve 
its Kyoto target without compromising the EU industry’s competitiveness; 4) The earlier 
proposal of a Directive on an EU-wide carbon/energy tax became more and more likely 
to fail. POHLMANN, 340, referring to J. BIRGER SKJÆRSETH/J. WETTESTAD, ”EU Emis-
sions Trading: Initiation, Decision-making and Implementation”, Ashgate Publishing. 
Aldershot, 2008, 74-99. 
180 See POHLMANN, 340/341. 
181 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 7/8. 
182 WEBER, 2008, 482; MEHLING, 126.  
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agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) prescribing rules to 
facilitate free and transparent international trade in products and services 
between Member States.183  
3.2.1 Approval of Kyoto Protocol 
The European Community and the initial 15 EU Member States signed the 
Kyoto Protocol on 29 April 1998.184 With Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 
25 April 2002, the Kyoto Protocol was approved on behalf of the European 
Community.185 The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the European 
Community and by each of the 15 initial Member States took place on 31 
May 2002.186  
With the same Decision, a burden sharing commitment regarding the contri-
butions of each Member State to the overall Community reduction became 
legally binding among EU Member States.187 Article 2 of Decision 
2002/358/EC ascertains that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Community and its Member States have 
decided to fulfil their Article 3.1-commitments of the Kyoto Protocol 
“jointly”.188 (Figure 3) 
                                              
183 MACE ET AL., 90.  
184 Since the EC is not endowed with exclusive treaty-making competence in the area of 
environmental policy, the EU Member States themselves were also able to negotiate, 
sign, and ratify the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol under the so-called “mixed” com-
petence. 
185 Article 1 of Decision 2002/358/EC. 
186 See Press Release “European Union ratifies the Kyoto Protocol” of 31 May 2002, avail-
able at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/794&format= 
HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. 
187 The so-called “Burden Sharing Agreement” was decided by the Environment Council of 
16 to 17 June 1998, Doc. 9702/98 of 19 June 1998 of the Council of the European Un-
ion, Annex I. See also POHLMANN, 338, Fn. 5.  
188 Article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph b UNFCCC provides that some Parties commit 
themselves to reduce emissions “with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 
1990 levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol”. - “Individually or jointly” - the lack of concre-
tion left room for interpretation. The Member States of the EU maintained that, under 
this provision, they would be allowed to agree on an internal “burden-sharing arrange-
ment”. See OBERTHÜR/OTT, 141. 
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Figure 3: "Burden Sharing Agreement" (BSA) 
The European Community and its Member States have decided to fulfil their Article 
3.1-commitments of the Kyoto Protocol “jointly” by translating the 8 per cent emis-
sion reduction target of the EC under the Kyoto Protocol into differentiated emission 
reduction or limitation targets for each of the initial 15 EU Member States. 
Annex II to Decision 2002/358/EC translates the 8 per cent emission reduc-
tion target of the EC under the Kyoto Protocol into differentiated emission 
reduction or limitation targets for each of the initial 15 EU Member States 
for the initial commitment period from 2008 to 2012. The 8 per cent reduc-
tion target was redistributed by giving the United Kingdom, for example, a 
target of 12.5 per cent reduction but allowing Portugal an increase of 27 per 
cent. The 12 new EU Member States are not covered by this Decision and 
have, except for Malta and Cyprus, individual emission reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. (Table) 
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Table: 27 EU Member States and their targets under Annex II of Deci-
sion 2002/358/EC189  






Austria -13 Bulgaria -8 
Belgium -7.5 Cyprus No target 
Denmark -21 Czech Republic -8 
Finland 0 Estonia -8 
France 0 Hungary -6 
Germany -21 Latvia -8 
Greece +25 Lithuania -8 
Ireland +13 Malta No target 
Italy -6.5 Poland -6 
Luxembourg -28 Romania -8 
Netherlands -6 Slovakia -8 
Portugal +27 Slovenia -8 
Spain +15   
Sweden +4   
United Kingdom -12.5   
 
3.2.2 Original ETS-Directive 
In a Green Paper issued in March 2000, a cap-and-trade program was sug-
gested as an important component of the European Climate Change Pro-
gram.190 A concrete and specific implementing Directive was not proposed 
                                              
189 Table after POHLMANN, 338. 
190 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the 
European Union”, Brussels, 8.3.2000, COM(2000) 87 final, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2000/com2000_0087en01.pdf>. The European 
Community’s activities with regard to climate change is based on the requirements of 
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until October 2001, barely three years before the program was to start. The 
release of the proposed EU Directive on GHG emission trading in October 
2001 initiated the so-called “co-decision process”, whereby the European 
Parliament and the European Council would review, amend, and approve or 
reject the Directive.191 The final approval by the Council of Ministers oc-
curred in July 2003, and the Directive was formally issued in October 2003, 
a little more than a year before the program was to begin.192  
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
October 2003 formally establishes a scheme for GHG emission allowance193 
trading within the Community.194 The aim of the ETS-Directive is to “con-
tribute to fulfiling the commitments of the European Community and its 
Member States more effectively, through an efficient European market in 
greenhouse gas emissions allowances, with the least possible diminution of 
economic development and employment.”195 
Since the EU-ETS was adopted by way of a Directive, each EU Member 
State had to transpose the Directive into national law. Member State gov-
ernments were required to issue legislative and regulatory measures to im-
plement the Directive within each national jurisdiction by 31 December 
2003.196 
                                              
Article 174, paragraph 1 and 2 of the EC-Treaty, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E174:EN:HTML>. 
191 CONVERY/REDMOND, 90/91. The co-decision process was introduced by the Treaty of 
Maastricht to enhance the democratic functioning of the European institutions. A legisla-
tive proposal can become EU policy only with the approval of both, the Parliament and 
the Council.  
192 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 8. 
193 The official title of Directive 2003/87/EC uses the term “emission allowance trading” 
instead of the often used yet imprecise “emission trading”.  
194 Thereafter cited as “Original ETS-Directive”, as opposed to the “Consolidated ETS-
Directive” established by Directive 2009/29/EC.  
195 Preamble, recital 5 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
196 Article 31, paragraph 1 of the Original ETS-Directive. A directive under EU law is a 
legislative act, which is not self-executing but instead identifies a certain legally binding 
set of objectives while giving Member States some margins on how to transpose those 
objectives into national law. POHLMANN, 341, Fn. 19. See also ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 8. 
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3.2.3 Linking-Directive 
As soon as a substantive agreement had been reached on the ETS-Directive, 
the Commission issued the proposal for the so-called “Linking-Directive” on 
23 July 2003. Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 October 2004 was adopted after intensive debates and differed 
significantly from the Commissions’ proposal.197 One of the most important 
changes was to allow ETS-participants to use CDM credits for compliance in 
phase I from 2005 to 2007 instead of beginning in 2008 as was initially pro-
posed and as it is the case for JI credits.198 
Another important change was that, contrary to the proposal, operators are 
allowed to use CERs and ERUs directly and without conversion to offset 
their reduction obligations under the ETS-Directive.199  
3.2.4 Aviation-Directive 
Emissions from aviation are growing faster than from any other sector. All 
forecasts indicate that they will continue to do so under business-as-usual 
conditions.200 Increasingly concerned that the emission trends in the aviation 
sector could undermine the effectiveness of EU climate policy, the European 
Commission issued Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 2008 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC, addressing all the airlines landing and starting on EU 
airports, including non-EU airlines as of 1 January 2012.201  
                                              
197 DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 5, Fn. 22, referring for more details on the linking debate 
preceding the adoption of the Directive to JÜRGEN LEFEVERE, “Linking Emissions Trad-
ing Schemes: The EU ETS and the Linking Directive”, in: DAVID FREESTONE 
/CHARLOTTE STRECK (eds), “Legal aspects of implementing the Kyoto Protocol mecha-
nisms: making Kyoto work”, Oxford 2005, 511-533, 516; KAROLINE HÆGSTAD FLÅM, “A 
Multi-level Analysis of the EU Linking Directive Process – The Controversial Connec-
tion between EU and Global Climate Policy”, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2007, 25ff; 
GERNOT KLEPPER/SONJA PETERSON, “Emission Trading, CDM, JI, and More – The Cli-
mate Strategy of the EU”, Kiel Institute for World Economics, April 2005.  
198 CONVERY/REDMOND, 91. 
199 DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 6. 
200 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press Release of 7 March 2011, available at <http://europa. 
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/259>.  
201 Whether the inclusion of third-country airlines into the EU-ETS is compatible with 
international law is subject of an judicial dispute. See below.  
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3.2.5 Revised ETS-Directive 
Article 30 of the Original ETS-Directive asked the Commission to submit a 
report to the European Parliament and the Council by 30 June 2006 on the 
application of the Original ETS-Directive.  
On 13 November 2006, responding to Article 30, the Commission adopted a 
“Review Communication” where it identified growing consensus on the key 
strategic issues for review.202 Four main topics were identified in the Review 
Communication: (1) scope, (2) robust compliance and enforcement, (3) fur-
ther harmonization and increased predictability and (4) linking with Emis-
sion Trading Schemes in third countries. Each of these topics has been dealt 
with extensively within a subsequently established Working Group.203 Their 
reports represent a major input to the “Proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas emission allowance trading sys-
tem” which was put forward, together with an extensive accompanying 
document, the so-called “Impact Assessment”, on 23 January 2008.204 
The amending ETS-Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 April 2009205 was adopted as part of a climate-energy 
package containing measures to fight climate change and promote renewable 
energy. The package underlines the objective of limiting the rise in global 
average temperature to no more than two degrees Celsius above pre-
                                              
202 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Building a Global Carbon Market”, 2006. See Press Release 
“Climate change: Commission sets out agenda for revising the EU emission trading 
scheme from 2013” of 13 November 2006, available at <http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1548&format=HTML&aged=1&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en >. 
203 The Working Groups consisted of representatives of all interested Member States, the 
power sector (conventional and renewable), the energy-intensive industry and non-
energy ETS sectors, the carbon trading sector, the oil and gas sector as well as cross sec-
tor business associations. Non-governmental organizations, representatives of the re-
search community and other relevant institutions/organizations were also invited and 
participated actively.  
204 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 2008. Annexed to the Impact Assess-
ment are the final reports of the meetings of the Working Group preparing for the Pro-
posal of the Amending ETS-Directive. 
205 Thereafter referred to as “Consolidated ETS-Directive” as opposed to the Original ETS-
Directive. Where the provisions have remained unchanged, reference is made to the 
“Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive”.  
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industrial levels.206 To achieve this goal, the EU committed to an unilateral 
emission reduction target of 20 per cent by 2020, compared with 1990 levels, 
and agreed to a reduction of 30 per cent provided that other major emitters 
agree to take on their fair share of a global reduction effort.207 Hence, if there 
is a new international climate agreement which commits the EU to a stronger 
target, the European Commission is mandated to submit a legislative pro-
posal to further revise the EU-ETS in order to enable the EU to meet this 
target.208 
Both, trading within sectors covered by the EU-ETS and within sectors not 
covered (“Non EU-ETS”), will contribute to the 20 per cent objective. The 
Non EU-ETS sector broadly includes direct emissions from households and 
services, as well as emissions from transport, waste and agriculture. The 
volume of the non-trading sectors currently represents about 60 per cent of 
total GHG emissions.209 
3.2.6 Incorporation of ETS-Directive into the EEA 
Agreement 
On 26 October 2007, the EU announced that Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway, three countries of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) will link to 
the EU-ETS “through the incorporation of the EU-ETS Directive into the 
European Economic Area Agreement” (EEA Agreement), to be followed by 
national approval procedures.210 Whereas the European Commission in its 
press release uses the term “link”, other observers stress that, formally 
                                              
206 Preamble, recital 2 of Directive 2009/29/EC. 
207 Preamble, recital 3 of Directive 2009/29/EC: “The European Council of March 2007 
made a firm commitment to reduce the overall greenhouse gas emissions of the Commu-
nity by at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and by 30% provided that other devel-
oped countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically 
more advanced developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities.”; See also Article 28, paragraph 1 of the Consoli-
dated ETS-Directive, comprising provisions for adjustments applicable upon the ap-
proval of an international agreement on climate change by the Community.  
208 See also STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 5. 
209 EEA 2010, Executive Summary, 6. 
210 EU COMMISSION, “Emissions trading: Commission announces linkage EU ETS with 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein”, Press Release of 26 October 2007, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1617>. 
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speaking, it is not a “link” but rather an “adoption of the ETS-Directive in 
the framework of the EFTA”.211 
Whereas Liechtenstein and Iceland did not have an Emission Trading 
Scheme in place, Norway had established a cap-and-trade system very simi-
lar to the EU-ETS. Like the EU-ETS, Norway’s Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading Act (GGET act) entered into force on 1 January 2005.212 It creates a 
duty for covered entities to surrender CO2 emissions units that are freely 
transferable. For the period from 2005 to 2007, the Act covered about 10-15 
per cent of Norway’s GHG emissions.213 
3.3 Coverage of the Scheme 
3.3.1 The Cap 
The “cap” determines the maximum amount of emissions possible under a 
given Emission Trading Scheme. Setting the cap (the number of emission 
units allocated) is one of the most important decisions in the design of any 
cap-and-trade program.214 
Under the EU-ETS, Member States face two limits (“caps”) on their CO2 
emissions during the Kyoto period.215 The first is the “Kyoto cap” which 
results from the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. The second cap is the 
“EU-ETS cap” constituting a sort of a “cap within a cap”.216  
3.3.1.1 EU-Commitment under Kyoto 
The EU commitment under Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol is to 
reduce the base-year emission of the EU-15 by 8 per cent in the period from 
2008 to 2012. Following the UNFCCC reviews of Member States’ “initial 
                                              
211 FIRST CLIMATE/ ECONABILITY, 72. 
212 Available at <http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20041217-099.html>. For English version, 
see <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/Laws/Acts/greenhouse-gas-emission-tradingact. 
html?id=172242>. 
213 For more details on the Norwegian ETS, see MACE ET AL, 5-7. 
214 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 8. 
215 Since the first Kyoto period only started in 2008, this did not apply during the pilot 
phase of the EU-ETS. 
216 CONVERY/REDMOND, 90/91; ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 3. 
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reports” during 2007 and 2008, the base-year emissions for the EU-15 have 
been fixed to 4’265.5 million tCO2e.217 The yearly reduction commitment of 
the EU-15 is, hence, 341.24 million tCO2e. 
The EU-27 does not have a common target under the Kyoto Protocol in the 
same way as the EU-15 because not all the Member States of the EU-27 are 
Annex-B Parties. As Cyprus, Malta and the EU-27 do not have targets under 
the Kyoto Protocol, they do not have applicable Kyoto Protocol base-years. 
The European Energy Agency calculated for the EU-27 total GHG emission 
of 5’567.0 million tCO2e in the base-year 1990.218 
3.3.1.2 EU-ETS Coverage 
In phase I of the EU-ETS, the volume of the EU-ETS sectors represented 
about 41 per cent of Community-wide GHG emissions.219 
As of 2008, there were about 10’800 installations included in the EU-ETS 
representing a large range of emitters with annual emissions varying from 
less than 5’000 tCO2e (ca. 3’000 installations) to more than 5 million tCO2e 
(ca. 70 installations).220 The final allocations of emissions units in phase II 
amounted to almost 2’000 million tCO2 per year.221  
                                              
217 EUROPEAN ENERGY AGENCY, “Annual GHG Inventory 1990-2008 and Inventory Re-
port”, 2010, Executive Summary, 7. Calculation method pursuant to Article 3, para-
graphs 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol and, hence, including LULUCF. Base-year emis-
sions for EU-15 excluding LULUCF amount to 4’244.7 million tCO2e. 
218 EUROPEAN ENERGY AGENCY, “Annual GHG Inventory 1990-2008 and Inventory Re-
port”, 2010, Executive Summary, 10. GHG emission data for the EU-27 as a whole ac-
cording to the EEA refer to domestic emissions within the EU-27’s territory and do not 
include emissions and removals from Land Use and Land Use Change (LULUCF) nor 
do they include emissions from international aviation and international maritime trans-
port. 
219 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 13. Calculated on the basis of 2005 data, 
about 10’500 installations across the 27 Member States accounting for about 41 per cent 
of Community-wide GHG emissions were covered in the phase I of the EU-ETS. Note 
that these figures are estimations. MCALLISTER, 408, mentions 11’500 installations. 
POHLMANN, 345, mentions around 11’000 installation, accounting for about 45 per cent 
of EU-wide total CO2 emissions or about 30 per cent of its total Kyoto GHG emissions. 
220 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 23. 
221 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 12.  
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On 9 July 2010, the Commission has communicated the cap for 2013 being 
just under 1.927 billion emission units.222 This Community-wide quantity of 
emission units shall decrease in a linear factor of 1.74 per cent compared to 
the average annual total quantity of emission units.223 The linear factor shall 
be reviewed as from 2020, with a view to the adoption of a decision by 
2025.224 
3.3.1.3 “Cap within a cap” 
The EU-ETS, hence, covers far less than half of all the CO2 emissions con-
tained in the Kyoto cap of the EU. Consequently, more than half of the CO2 
and GHG emissions in the EU are not covered by the EU-ETS and must be 
reduced in Non EU-ETS sectors.225 The size of the Non EU-ETS allows a 
considerable flexibility in setting the cap for EU-ETS covered sectors with-
out running the risk to miss the Kyoto cap. If the EU-ETS cap is set on a 
non-ambitious level, it is up to the Non EU-ETS sectors to make up the dif-
ference to reach the Kyoto reduction target.226 (Figure 4) 
The EU-Commission has realized the importance of the Non EU-ETS sec-
tors with regard to reaching compliance with the Article 3.1-commitment. 
Decision 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions addresses further climate-energy measures in the Non EU-ETS 
sectors. Doubts whether the Decision together with further climate-energy 
measures of the European Union are sufficient to effectively combat climate 
change have been voiced.227 
The differing reduction requirements in the EU-ETS compared to the Non 
EU-ETS leads to considerable competitive distortion. A study conducted by 
                                              
222 The average annual total amount of EUAs for the period from 2008 to 2012 being calcu-
lated at 2,032,998,912 EUAs and subtracting 1.74 per cent thereof (35,374,181 EUAs) 
equals the cap for 2013 at 1,926,876,368 EUAs. 
223 Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
224 Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
225 Decision 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the 
Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, OJ L 
140/136, 5.6.2009, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF>. 
226 EPINEY, 239.  
227 EPINEY, 239. 
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ECOPLAN in 2010 concluded that marginal abatement costs in the EU-ETS 
currently amount to 16 CHF/tCO2e, in the Non EU-ETS to 82 CHF/tCO2e.228 
Figure 4: A "Cap within a Cap" 
The weaker the EU-ETS cap is (in concrete terms: the higher the amount of EUAs), 
the stronger is the necessity to reduce emissions in the Non EU-ETS sector in order 
to comply with the Kyoto commitment. The national assigned amount remains the 
same. 
3.3.2 Periods 
The EU-ETS is designed to operate in phases. Article 11 of the Original 
ETS-Directive mentions the “three-year period beginning 1 January 
2005”229 and the “five-year period beginning 1 January 2008”.230 Hence, 
phase II is isochronic with the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Phase III has been defined to operate in the period from 2013 to 2020.231 
                                              
228 ECOPLAN, 20/21. 
229 Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Original ETS-Directive.  
230 Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Original ETS-Directive. 
231 Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive: “Emission units issued from 
1 January 2013 onwards shall be valid for emissions during periods of eight years be-
ginning on 1 January 2013.”  
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Phase I, from 2005 to 2007, was meant to be a learning period. It was insu-
lated from subsequent phases so that any major problems would not carry 
over into subsequent periods.232 This warm-up phase was expected to pro-
vide the experience and establish the infrastructure to ensure success in the 
“real” mitigation period corresponding to the first commitment period under 
the Kyoto Protocol.233  
3.3.3 Sectors and Gases covered 
The gases covered by the ETS-Directive are listed in its Annex II.234 The list 
corresponds to the six gases included in the Kyoto Protocol. Corresponding 
to the activities listed in Annex I of the Original ETS-Directive, however, the 
EU-ETS has only been applied to CO2 emissions in phase I and phase II.235 
In the Original ETS-Directive of 2003, the list was limited to ten activities in 
the area of energy, production and processing of ferrous metals, mineral in-
dustry and the production of pulp, paper and board with a specific produc-
tion capacity, mostly subject to a minimum threshold for output.236 Transport 
was completely excluded.237 However, the role of transport in climate change 
was indirectly acknowledged in the ETS-Directive. In order to generate sub-
stantial emission reduction, the Commission is asked to consider policies and 
measures for the transport sector at Community level.238 
                                              
232 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 9. 
233 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 7. 
234 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
235 Annex I of the Original ETS-Directive. 
236 The review process made clear that, in phase I of the EU-ETS, different interpretations 
of combustion installations were used by Member States leading to differences in the 
coverage of similar installations under the EU-ETS. As a result, competitive distortions 
on the internal market of the EU occurred. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assess-
ment”, 17. 
237 Road transport accounts for about 19 per cent of the Community-wide CO2-emissions. 
Road transport represents one of the fastest growing GHG emission sources. CO2 origi-
nating from the fuel consumed by passenger cars and heavy vehicles has increased over 
the period from 1990 to 2004 by 26 per cent. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assess-
ment”, 53.  
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From the outset, it was foreseen to enlarge the scope of the EU-ETS after the 
learning period.239 With regard to phase III of the EU-ETS, the list of activi-
ties in Annex I of the Consolidated ETS-Directive has been expanded to 
twenty-nine activities, including aviation as of 1 January 2012.  
With the modifications brought about with the amendments of Directive 
2009/29/EC, the list of activities covered becomes larger and the EU-ETS is, 
theoretically, going to be expanded to new gases such as N2O and PFCs from 
the chemical and aluminium sectors.240 Following the activities listed in An-
nex I of the Consolidated ETS-Directive, however, the EU-ETS will, in prac-
tice, still cover CO2 almost exclusively.241 
3.4 Stationary Installations 
3.4.1 Permits, Opting-in and Opting-out 
According to Article 4 of the Original ETS-Directive, the Member States 
have to ensure that companies carrying out one of the listed activities in An-
nex I hold a “permit” issued by a competent national authority.  
With the amendment of Directive 2009/20/EC, Article 4 is extended to uni-
laterally included gases and activities according to Article 24 of the Consoli-
dated ETS-Directive (“opting-in”). According to Article 24 of the ETS-
Directive, Member States were allowed to unilaterally include additional 
activities, installations, and GHGs not listed in Annex I to the EU-ETS Di-
rective covered by the EU-ETS as of 2008, subject to prior approval by the 
European Commission.242 For example France and the Netherlands applied 
to the European Commission for an opt-in of N2O emissions from the pro-
duction of fertilizers, and the United Kingdom and Norway, the latter being 
linked to the EU-ETS as a non-EU Member State as of 2008, have applied 
                                              
239 Article 30, paragraph 2(a) of the Original ETS-Directive asked for a Review considering 
“how and whether Annex I should be amended to include other relevant sectors (…) with 
a view to further improving the economic efficiency of the scheme.” 
240 Perfluorocarbons emitted by the production of primary aluminium, nitrous oxide by the 
production of nitric acid, adipic acid and glyoxal and glyoxylic acid. 
241 EPINEY, 238. 
242 Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Original ETS-Directive, slightly adapted in the Consoli-
dated ETS-Directive. 
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for the inclusion of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) activities as 
of 2008.243  
The application for a permit has to include a description of the installation 
and its activities including the technology used, the raw and auxiliary mate-
rials used, the sources of emissions of gases and the measures planned to 
monitor and report emissions.244 The competent authority shall issue a GHG 
permit only “if it is satisfied that the operator is capable of monitoring and 
reporting emissions” and has to review the permit at least every five 
years.245  
A permit, hence, can be considered as a public authorization or license that is 
issued by way of an administrative act, and is linked to one or more specific 
installations. Consequently, the GHG permit cannot be traded.246 
A study in 2007 made apparent that the contribution of small and large emit-
ters to the overall emissions covered by the EU-ETS is very uneven: The 
largest 7 per cent of installations in the EU-ETS represent 60 per cent of total 
emissions, while the smaller 14 per cent of installations only account for 
0.14 per cent.247 Since the cost-benefit ratio for including small emitters ap-
pears unbalanced, Article 27 introduced into the ETS-Directive with the 
amendments of Directive 2009/29/EC provides that Member States may 
exclude from the Community scheme installations which have reported 
emissions of less than 25’000 tCO2e and, where they carry out combustion 
activities which have a related thermal input below 35 megawatt (“opting-
out”).248  
                                              
243 POHLMANN, 344, Fn. 34. 
244 Article 5, paragraph a)-d) of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
245 Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
246 POHLMANN, 348. 
247 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 2008, 23, referring to ECOFYS, “Small 
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In addition, Member States may allow simplified monitoring, reporting and 
verification measures for installations with average annual verified emis-
sions which are below 5’000 tonnes a year.249  
3.4.2 Cap-Setting 
In phase I and II, the EU-ETS itself did not set a cap to the number of emis-
sion units, but left the decision to fix the maximal amount of emission units 
allocated to their industry in the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) to the 
Member States.250 The Commission’s guidance for submission of NAPs for 
the first period was modest. It had stipulated that the Member State’s cap 
must be either the expected emissions from 2005 to 2007 or the emissions 
according to the Member State’s “path to Kyoto”, whichever is the lower 
amount.251 The NAPs were then submitted to the European Commission, 
which had to assess them and decide whether to grant approval.252 The 
Commission could reject a plan, or any aspect thereof, if it found it to be 
incompatible with the criteria set out in Annex III of the Original ETS-
Directive.253  
Initially, the Commission envisaged that, by the end of June 2004, it would 
be in a position to announce its decisions regarding the approval of the 
NAPs. In reality, the Commission’s NAP approval process was subject to 
considerable delay because of late submissions by many Member States on 
the one side,254 because of contention between Brussels and the individual 
Member State with respect to the Member State’s emission caps on the other 
side.255 Several Member States have brought legal challenges before the 
European Court of First Instance. Nine Member States have contested the 
                                              
249 Article 27, paragraph 1b) of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
250 Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Original ETS-Directive. 
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Commission’s significant reduction in the emission caps proposed by these 
Member States, all of the initial East European accession countries except 
for Slovenia. Their primary argument was that the Commission’s methodol-
ogy to determine Member States’ totals is inappropriate to their circum-
stances either because they are small or because the ongoing structural trans-
formation of their economies has not been properly taken into account.256 
Two of these applications for the annulment of the Commission decisions 
relating to other Member States have been ruled on by the Court so far. Both 
decisions rejected the Commission’s rejections of the NAPs of Poland and of 
Estonia arguing that the Commission has exceeded its powers.257 
Despite the adjustments by the Commission, phase I and phase II experi-
enced an overall amount of emission units that have been allocated generally 
considered excessive, a phenomenon known as “over-allocation”.258 Indeed, 
for the entire trading period extending from 2005 to 2007, the EU-ETS had 
allocated about 5.6 per cent more emission units than needed to cover emis-
sions.259 However, in addition to the modest ambition for emission reduc-
tions during the trial period, the difficulty of choosing an appropriate Mem-
ber State total was further compounded by a cluster of “technical” problems 
associated with data, sector definitions, and the use of projections.260 These 
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problems are decreasing with the second and post 2012-periods since veri-
fied data for earlier years have been determined in the meantime. 
The cap of phase II, the period from 2008 to 2012, finally, ended up to be 
about 13 per cent lower on an annual average basis than the phase I cap and 
6 per cent lower than comparable 2005 emissions.261 As of phase III, the 
current system of fixing 27 national caps on emissions from the ETS sectors 
will be replaced by a single EU-wide cap. On 9 July 2010, the Commission 
has communicated the cap for 2013 being just under 1.927 billion emission 
units.262 This Community-wide quantity of emission units shall decrease in a 
linear factor of 1.74 per cent compared to the average annual total quantity 
of emission units.263 The linear factor shall be reviewed as from 2020, with a 
view to the adoption of a decision by 2025.264 
However, the cap for 2013 is not definitive yet. The decision is based on 
Member States' NAPs for the period 2008 to 2012 and therefore reflects the 
current scope of the EU-ETS. It will need to be adjusted to reflect the ex-
tended scope the system will have from 2013 when new sectors and gases 
will be covered.265 This adjustment will also need to take account of the fact 
that new installations have been opted into the EU-ETS in the period from 
2008 to 2012 under the provisions of the revised Directive.  
Final figures for the 2013 cap may thus not be available before 2013. How-
ever, in order to keep the public informed, the Commission will update the 
figures in due time.266  
3.4.3 New Entrants Reserve (NER) 
The New Entrants Reserve (NER) is a pool of emission units set aside to 
enable Member States to allow new installations to enter the EU-ETS. The 
NER is also supposed to receive the emission units of any installations clos-
ing down which no longer require their allocated emission units. During 
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2008 countries did not make full use of their NER emission units. Indeed, 
the NER pot is likely to be gaining emission units faster than it can disburse 
them with recession making plant closures far more likely than plant open-
ings.267 There are estimates that there will be probably over 300 million sur-
plus emission units in the NER by 2012.268 
3.4.4 The Allocation Process 
The term “allocation” is frequently used to refer to both cap-setting within 
the scheme and the distribution of emission units by the Member States to 
covered installations.269 This thesis uses the term allocation only for the dis-
tribution of emission units to covered installations.  
In general terms, there are three methods of allocation: “Grandfathering”, 
“benchmarking” and “auctioning”. In the grandfathering system, calcula-
tions are based on historical emissions data. Although in the beginning po-
litically best acceptable, it is an unsatisfactory method of allocating emission 
units because it favours installations with higher emissions in the past over 
more efficiently working installations.270 Efforts to reduce emissions through 
technological innovation or greater efficiencies are discouraged, as this car-
ries the risk of receiving a lower allocation of EUAs.271 In addition, the sys-
tem pushed Member States to over-allocate emission units to in-state firms 
providing them an opportunity to become net sellers to the carbon market.272 
With the benchmarking method, the capacity of a plant is multiplied by a 
benchmark factor such as standard emissions per unit of power generated or 
best available technology. This method offers incentives for firms to invest 
in energy efficiency measures and to improve carbon efficiency. However, 
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benchmarks in manufacturing can become highly complex, given the wide 
range of products and production processes.273  
The method of auctioning, finally, offers the purest incentives. Since all ac-
tors face the full costs of carbon, it ensures that price signals remain intact to 
facilitate efficient corporate and private decisions on consumption, innova-
tion and low-carbon investment.274 
Auctioning is very popular among the supporters of cap-and-trade schemes 
puzzled by the magnitude of the “windfall profits”275 of the first phase of the 
EU-ETS. However, on the basis of calculations with a numerical case study, 
FEHR concludes that auctions cannot lower windfall profits to a reasonable 
level. They merely help the redistribution of the costs.276 Taking into account 
the considerable transactional costs in the case of auctioning, this seems to 
be a reasonable assumption. Auctioning will require a relatively higher ad-
ministrative burden for small emitters than for large emitters. Therefore, 
auctioning bears the risk of an unfair distribution of burden. 
The applied method of allocation in phase I varied from Member State to 
Member State.277 As stated in Article 10 of the Original ETS-Directive, every 
Member State was required to allocate at least 95 per cent of the emission 
units free of charge for the period of 2005 to 2007, and at least 90 per cent of 
the emission units free of charge for the five year period 2008 to 2012. Ac-
cording to the ETS-Directive, the distribution of emission units had to be 
based “on average emissions of GHG by product in each activity and 
achievable progress in each activity”.278 Thereby, the total quantity of emis-
sion units to be allocated shall be “consistent with assessments of actual and 
projected progress towards fulfiling the Member States’ contributions to the 
Community’s commitments”.279  
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Consequently, most Member States allocated emission units in phase I to 
sources according to their historical emissions during recent years (“grand-
fathering”) and distributed emission units free of charge. Only Denmark, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Ireland chose to auction a modest part of their re-
spective totals.280  
In the second trading period, Member States were allowed to auction up to 
10 per cent of their allocations. However, less than 4 per cent of emission 
units EU-wide have been auctioned.281 The allocations for phase II were 
negotiated against the realization that there was a great deal at stake, with 
phase I having shown the huge financial value of emission units, potentially 
more than 200 billion EUR in total over the five years of phase II. Not sur-
prisingly, governments were subject to enormous lobbying pressures.282 
WRÅKE summarizes that the allocation procedures in phase I and II have 
been “complex and opaque”, having “damaged the perceived fairness of the 
trading system by the public”.283 
As of phase III, the system is drastically centralized to avoid inconsistencies 
and remove the need for separate and interdependent negotiations in EU 
Member States. A principle of 100 percent auctioning is established and free 
allocation to the power sector abolished as of 2013. Free allocation in other 
sectors will be reduced from 80 per cent in 2013 to 30 per cent in 2020 and 
eventually to zero in 2027.284 
Commission Regulation No. 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 governs the 
auctioning of emission allowances.285 The Regulation provides for Member 
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States and the Commission to procure jointly a common platform to auction 
EUAs ensuring respect of the principles of non-discrimination, transparency 
and simplicity. Nevertheless, Member States may appoint an auction plat-
form of their own, since the Regulation provides for adequate rules as to the 
functioning of such auction platforms and the coordination with the common 
auction platform. Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom have informed 
the Commission that they intend to opt out of the planned common platform 
for auctioning EUAs for phase III of the EU Emission Trading Scheme start-
ing in 2013. Each of these countries will instead appoint its own auction 
platform.286 
The resulting revenues from auctioning are assigned to Member States. They 
shall determine the use to be made of revenues generated from the auction-
ing of emission units within a vaguely defined set of activities.287 The re-
vised ETS-Directive specifies the rules more precisely: At least 50 per cent 
shall be used for one of nine proposed activities.288 
3.4.5 Windfall Profits, Over-Allocation and Carbon 
Leakage 
Grandfathering as an alloction-method has been largely criticized for two 
reasons. Firstly, phase I has suffered from an over-allocation. The gap be-
tween effected emissions and emission units available raises the question of 
whether the EU-ETS cap based on a grandfathering-allocation can be strin-
gent enough. 289 Secondly, opponents of the grandfathering option argue that 
the free allocation of EUAs contradicts the “polluter-pays” principle as 
stipulated in Article 174, paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty.290 Grandfathering has 
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created the opportunity that so-called “windfall profits” can accrue. Windfall 
profits are additional profits for operators in certain sectors, such as the 
power sector, achieved by passing on the market value of EUAs to energy 
consumers while obtaining EUAs for free.  
Proponents of the grandfathering option, by contrast, argue that the increase 
of EU-ETS compliance costs caused by auctioning could put energy-
intensive industries at a competitive disadvantage as compared with non-EU 
industries, resulting in the relocation of such industries outside of the EU. 
This phenomenon of carbon-intensive industry moving to locations with low 
shadow prices for carbon is known as “carbon leakage”.291 
With regard to phase III starting in 2013, Member States have pushed suc-
cessfully for certain exclusions in the final version of the amended ETS-
Directive to address, in particular, special national circumstances and the risk 
of carbon leakage in certain sectors and sub-sectors. Article 10a of the Con-
solidated ETS-Directive provides for transitional community-wide harmo-
nised rules allocating free emission units in principle based on product-
specific benchmarks for each relevant product.292 In 2013 and in each subse-
quent year up to 2020, installations “in sectors or subsectors which are ex-
posed to a significant risk of carbon leakage” shall be allocated emission 
units free of charge at 100 per cent of the quantity determined in accordance 
with the Community-wide harmonised rules for free allocation.293 
According to estimations, more than half of the 258 sectors or subsectors 
defined so far will be able to receive free emission units claiming that the 
costs resulting from the implementation of the Directive into product prices 
                                              
291 METCALF/WEISBACH, 1.  
292 Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for 
harmonized free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2011/278/EU, OJ L 130, 
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will lead to a significant loss of market share compared to less carbon effi-
cient installations outside the Community.294  
Even more so, EPINEY assumes that Articles 10a, 10b and 10c of the Con-
solidated ETS-Directive provide for so many exceptions that auctioning may 
be the rule only as of 2027.295 
3.5 Aviation 
Emissions from transport in Europe have grown by approximately 34 per 
cent in the period from 1990 to 2004.296 Emissions from aviation are grow-
ing faster than from any other sector, and all forecasts indicate that they will 
continue to do so under business-as-usual conditions.297 Therefore, in its 
report „Building a Global Carbon Market” of November 2006, the Euro-
pean Commission announced its intention to expand the EU-ETS Directive’s 
scope to other sectors and activities such as aviation, transport and shipping.  
The Aviation-Directive of 19 November 2008, introducing Articles 3a to 3g 
into the Consolidated ETS-Directive, provides for the incorporation of avia-
tion, while shipping or transport within the scope of the EU-ETS was 
deemed premature without further analysis and pending international discus-
sions.  
The Aviation-Directive built on the experience of the EU-ETS avoiding the 
pitfalls of the Original ETS-Directive. It is hoped that the framework for 
aviation emission trading will thus be more effective than the EU-ETS in the 
first two phases of its operation.298  
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Emissions from international flight traffic are not covered by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.299 The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC requires developed countries to 
pursue the limitation or reduction of emissions of GHG not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol from aviation working through the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO).300 However, at an ICAO Committee on Avia-
tion Environmental Protection meeting in 2004, it was agreed that an avia-
tion-specific Emission Trading Scheme seemed unattractive and that it 
should not be pursued further.301  
The newly introduced European Union Aviation Allowances (EUAA), hence,  
do not correspond to an AAU.302 EUAAs are, consequently, not equivalent to 
EUAs. Technically speaking, the incorporation of aviation into the EU-ETS 
is a direct unilateral link between the EU-ETS and the aviation sector as it is 
the case with Clean Development Projects under the CDM. 
All flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated in the terri-
tory of a Member State shall be included in the EU-ETS.303 Flights with a 
weight under 5’700 kg are not covered. Further exceptions are, among oth-
ers, flights performed exclusively for official missions, military flights, 
search and rescue flights, flights for training and scientific research and 
flights performed by small operators.  
All the airlines landing and starting on EU airports are addressed, including 
non-EU airlines. The reason for this provision is to avoid competition distor-
tions: “In order to avoid distortions of competition and improve environ-
mental effectiveness, emissions from all flights arriving at and departing 
from Community aerodromes should be included from 2012”.304  
The Commission may exclude flights arriving from third countries from the 
aviation activities listed in Annex I, if a third country adopts measures for 
reducing the climate change impact of these flights and if these measures are 
deemed to be sufficient by the Commission and the Member States of the 
EU.305  
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Article 30 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive asks the Commission to re-
view, by 1 December 2014, the functioning of the Directive in relation to 
aviation activities and to make proposals considering, among others, the 
implications and impact as regards the overall functioning of the Community 
scheme and the functioning of the aviation emission units market.306 
3.5.1 Cap-Setting in the Aviation Sector 
Instead of Member States allocating a CO2 emissions cap for its respective 
aviation sector on national level, the Aviation-Directive includes an EU-wide 
CO2 emissions cap-setting mechanism for the aviation sector at EU-level.307 
The EU-wide cap is to be calculated by reference to a baseline of historic 
average CO2 emissions from aviation in the EU.308 As a baseline, the average 
of the annual emissions in the period 2004 to 2006 was chosen.309 For the 
period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012, the total quantity of emis-
sion units to be allocated to aircraft operators shall be equivalent to 97 per 
cent of the historical aviation emissions310 and 95 per cent each year from 
2013 onwards.311  
The ETS-Directive provided for a decision on the historical aviation emis-
sions by the Commission by 2 August 2009.312 This decision on historical 
aviation emissions data was finally published by the Commission on 7 
March 2011, defining the amount of 219,476,343 tCO2e as average of the 
estimated annual emissions for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 of all flights 
that would be covered by the EU-ETS performed by aircraft operators to and 
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from European airports.313 As a result, the total EU aviation cap for the pe-
riod from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 enlarges the EU-ETS vol-
ume by more than 10 per cent. 
3.5.2 The Allocation Process in the Aviation Sector 
The European Commission provides for a single method of allocation of 
EUAAs laid out in a respective Regulation.314 With this Regulation, the 
European Commission makes sure that the process is harmonized all over 
the Member States to avoid the experience of the multitude of allocation 
methods which governed phase I and phase II of the EU-ETS.315  
According to the Consolidated ETS-Directive, 15 per cent of the aviation 
emission units for the compliance period 2012 shall be auctioned.316 The vast 
majority of EUAAs, however, will be allocated free of charge.  
For the compliance period as of January 2013, at least 15 per cent of the 
EUAAs shall be auctioned.317 Three per cent will be hold back as a reserve 
in order to allow new aircraft operators to enter the EU-ETS.318 The rest, 
namely 82 per cent of the total EUAAs, will be allocated free of charge. 
Based on information submitted by the Member States, the European Com-
mission will calculate the benchmark that will define how many free emis-
sion units aircraft operators will receive. 
Aircraft operators were obliged to monitor and verify their emissions since 1 
January 2010. By 31 March 2011, each operator could apply for allocation 
covering compliance period 2012 based on their verified activities in 
2010.319 Based on information submitted by the Member States, the Euro-
pean Commission will calculate the benchmark that will define how many 
free emission units aircraft operators will receive. This benchmark decision 
together with the emissions cap and the percentages of EUAAs to be auc-
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tioned, given for free and allocated to the special reserve, will be published 
by 30 September 2011.320 
In summary, the aviation provisions are considerably more harmonized and 
transparent than the current EU-ETS. With this harmonization, the European 
Commission hopes to increase predictability which is necessary for aircraft 
operators to prepare for the inclusion into the EU-ETS. Moreover, by reject-
ing grandfathering in favour of benchmarking and placing greater reliance 
on auctioning, the scheme hopefully creates the necessary level of scarcity of 
emissions units.321 
3.5.3 Questioned Legality under International Law 
The inclusion of aviation into the EU-ETS has provoked harsh criticism by 
the aviation industry.322 Third country airlines are of the opinion that the 
inclusion of their airlines into the EU-ETS is illegal under international law 
because it is an extra-territorial application of EU policy on non-EU carriers. 
Furthermore, the unilateral expansion of the EU-ETS to aviation is consid-
ered to be an improper tax or charge contradicting international law.323 
Lately, China and representatives of the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA) have pronounced threats to retaliate, whether in the form of im-
posing additional taxes on European airlines or restricting access to mar-
kets.324  
On 16 December 2009, United Airlines, Continental Airlines and American 
Airlines, supported by the Air Transport Association of America (ATA), filed 
an application for judicial review to the High Court of Justice Queen’s 
Bench Division (Administrative Court) in the United Kingdom. The primary 
concern for the applicants is that the EU-ETS may be in breach of the Article 
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1 of the Convention of International Civil Aviation, which states that coun-
tries have sovereignty over the airlines in their own airspace. 325  
Asked on the validity of the amended ETS-Directive, the High Court of Jus-
tice made reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice 
in Luxembourg (ECJ).326 The key question referred to is whether the ETS-
Directive as amended by the Aviation-Directive is invalid, insofar as it ap-
plies the EU-ETS to aviation activities, as contravening to the provisions of 
the Chicago Convention327 and of the Kyoto Protocol.328 On 6 October 2011, 
the ECJ released an opinion of the Court’s Advocate General suggesting that 
the EU’s plan to extend the ETS to aviation does not interfere with the sov-
ereignty of third countries and complies with all relevant aviation agree-
ments.329 
Even if ATA has seemingly lost its bid at the ECJ, they could choose to in-
tensify their lobbying efforts in Washington to achieve a formal WTO com-
plaint. The dispute over its legality is likely to continue, but the Aviation-
Directive is already now reaching its aim by effectively changing the behav-
iour of airports and airlines around the world.330 
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3.6 Definition and Recognition of Trading Units 
3.6.1  Measurement of a Trading Unit 
In line with the provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, all tradable units within the 
EU-ETS have the same unit of “one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equiva-
lent”, translated into “tCO2 equivalent” or, in short, “tCO2e”.331  
The EU-ETS introduces the term European Union “Emission Allowances” 
(EUA) defined as “an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent during a specified period, which shall be valid only for the pur-
poses of meeting the requirements of this Directive and shall be transferable 
in accordance with the provisions of this Directive”.332 An emission allow-
ance within the EU-ETS is abbreviated as an EUA and is valid for emissions 
during the entire trading period in which it is issued.333 Emissions from in-
ternational flight traffic are not covered by the Kyoto Protocol.334 Therefore, 
the newly introduced European Union Aviation Allowances (EUAAs) do not 
correspond to an AAU.335  
The emission units of the EU-ETS have the same unit of measurement as the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, an EUA may not be applied in the same way as an 
Assigned Amount Unit (AAU), the emission unit attributed to Annex B-
Parties of the Kyoto Protocol. AAUs are what Annex B-Parties receive ac-
cording to their Article 3.1-commitment. From this AAU budget, European 
Annex B-Parties may convert a certain amount into EUAs and distribute it to 
entities covered by the ETS-Directive. An EUA, therefore, is a specific 
emission unit, an AAU designated as valid for trading under the EU-ETS.336  
Since only a part of the total national AAU budget is converted into EUAs 
and allocated to participants in the EU-ETS, the remaining AAUs have to be 
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allocated to Non EU-ETS-entities in order to achieve compliance with the 
Article 3.1-committment.  
The same is not true for EUAAs. The Aviation-Directive gives aircraft op-
erators full access to the EU-ETS. Aircraft operators may buy EUAs without 
trading restriction.337 Stationary installations covered by the EU-ETS, how-
ever, are not allowed to use aviation emission units for compliance pur-
poses.338  
3.6.2 Legal Nature of a Trading Unit 
Like the Kyoto emission units, EUAs are, on the one hand, accounting units 
which are traced and recorded through national registries. On the other hand, 
they are also tradable instruments representing an entitlement to release a 
certain quantity of GHG emissions into the atmosphere and are as such 
transferable under certain established conditions.339 There is a tendency for 
emission units to be treated as commodities. But there are elements which 
make emission units an asset akin to a currency.340  
According to the EU-principle of subsidiarity, the EUAs legal status is to be 
decided by each EU Member State in the context of its respective national 
laws.341 However, some legal characteristics apply EU-wide.  
The legal characteristics of an EUA may, according to POHLMANN, be gen-
erally viewed as “property rights”.342 As a publicly issued but privately trad-
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able asset with the objective of helping EU Member States to manage a pub-
lic good and comply with its international emission reduction obligations, an 
EUA has a unique dual (public-private) character that does not seem to fit 
easily into existing national legal terms.343 
In addition, the Registry Regulations allow EU Member States to permit a 
holder of an EUA to use it as a security.344 EUAs can be held by any person 
with an account in a national emission registry, allowing its holder to emit 
one tonne of CO2e into the atmosphere. An EUA can be transferred to an-
other person’s national emission registry account either within the EU or in a 
third country that recognizes EUAs, provided that the transfer is not blocked 
or suspended in accordance with the Registry Regulation. In accordance with 
the Registry Regulations, EUAs can be surrendered and cancelled.345 
EU Member States themselves have described or defined EU emissions units 
with different degrees of clarity and legal authority.346 The range of descrip-
tions among EU Member States include a “commodity”,347 an “intangible 
property right or asset”,348 a “financial instrument”,349 a “transferable 
‘right’”,350 a “transferable pecuniary right”,351 a “transferable ‘right’ or 
‘authorization’ to emit”352 and an “asset”.353  
In the context of global convergence of different markets through linking, 
BUTTON highlights that it is important for governments to seek consensus as 
to the legal characteristics of the basic unit of exchange in this market. The 
model ultimately adopted should reflect the economic substance of interna-
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tional emission trading while not compromising the environmental integrity 
of the system.354 
3.6.3 Offsetting from Abroad - Linking with “Kyoto” 
The Original ETS-Directive did not include the possibility for operators to 
use Kyoto emission units for compliance. But it stressed the fact that project-
based mechanisms including Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) are important to achieve the goals of both reducing 
global GHG emissions and increasing the cost-effective functioning of the 
Community scheme.355  
It is the Linking-Directive adopted on 27 October 2004 that allows operators 
to use CERs and ERUs directly “to offset”356 their reduction obligations 
under the ETS-Directive.357 In its original draft, the Linking-Directive had 
not included the possibility for operators to use Kyoto emission units for 
compliance under the EU-ETS directly. In order to have the purchased CER 
or ERU accounted to the reduction obligation of the entity, the CER/ERU 
first had to be conversed into an EUA. The conversion would have allowed 
the Member States to impose other criteria for the conversion of Kyoto emis-
sion units into EUAs.358  
3.6.3.1 The Issue of Double-Counting 
The Consolidated ETS-Directive foresees that Member States hosting project 
activities shall ensure that no CERs/ERUs are issued for compliance of in-
stallations covered by the EU-ETS unless an equal number of EUAs is can-
                                              
354 BUTTON, 571. 
355 Preamble, recital 19 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
356 “To offset” is to compensate for GHG emission occurring in the EU by acquiring emis-
sion units which certify the reduction, removal, or avoidance of GHG emissions by a 
project outside of the EU. In the literature, the terms ”offset” or “credit” are often used 
for compensating emission units effected elsewhere. 
357 Article 11a, paragraph 2 of the Linking-Directive: “Member States may allow operators 
to use CERs from project activities in the Community scheme. This shall take place 
through the issue and immediate surrender of one allowance by the Member State in ex-
change for one CER.”  
358 DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 5, Fn. 25, referring to JÜRGEN LEFEVERE, “Linking Emis-
sions Trading Schemes: The EU ETS and the Linking Directive”, in: DAVID FREESTONE 
/CHARLOTTE STRECK (eds), “Legal aspects of implementing the Kyoto Protocol mecha-
nisms: making Kyoto work”, Oxford 2005, 511-533, 524. 
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celled by the operator of that installation and only if an equal number of 
emission units is cancelled from the national registry of the Member State of 
the ERU’s origin.359 These provisions aim at avoiding the so-called “double 
counting”, when CDM/JI projects in accordance with Kyoto Protocol rules 
are used for compliance under the EU-ETS while at the same time also gen-
erating CERs/ERUs to be used for compliance under the Article 3.1 com-
mitment of the Kyoto Protocol.360 CERs, originating in Non-Annex B-
Parties which are, by definition, host countries without emission reduction 
targets, do not have an AAU budget and, therefore, have no emission units to 
cancel.  
There are a number of qualitative restrictions on the type of Kyoto projects 
whose emission units are eligible in the EU-ETS. Thus, in line with the Mar-
rakesh Accords, emission units from nuclear facilities are excluded.361 Con-
trary to the provisions of the Kyoto carbon market, emission units from sink 
projects are not eligible due to concerns about the permanence of the 
achieved carbon sequestration.362 Finally, taking into account concerns about 
possible negative social and environmental consequences, hydroelectric 
power production project activities with a generating capacity exceeding 20 
megawatt, have to be paid special attention to. Member States must ensure 
that relevant international criteria and guidelines are respected during the 
development of such project activities.363 
                                              
359 Article 11b, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
360 The measures against double counting are specified in further detail in Commission 
Decision 2006/780/EC on 13 November 2006 on avoiding double counting of green-
house gas emission reductions under the Community emissions trading scheme for pro-
ject activities under the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council, available at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:316:0012:0017:EN:PDF>. 
361 Article 11a, paragraph 3, subparagraph a) of the Linking-Directive.  
362 Article 11a, paragraph 3, subparagraph b) of the Linking-Directive. Sinks are sectors 
and projects able to remove CO2 out of the atmosphere by the sequestration of carbon. 
Sinks are, for example, projects summarized under LULUCF (land use-, land use 
change- and forestry-projects, including afforestation and reforestation) and under 
REDD-plus (reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest 
degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forest; 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks). Contrary to the EU-ETS, “afforestation and 
reforestation” projects are CDM eligible in the Kyoto carbon market. Decision 17/CP.7, 
paragraph 7. 
363 Article 11b, paragraph 6 of the Linking-Directive, introduced on the insistence of the 
European Parliament. See DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 6, Fn.33. 
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3.6.3.2 The Issue of Supplementarity 
While drafting the Linking-Directive, the Member States expressed the in-
tention to quantitatively restrict the use of offsets from abroad to ensure that 
the use of project-based emission units remains “supplemental” to domestic 
action in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol.364  
However, no quantitative limit was agreed on the use of CERs during phase 
I.365 For phase II, a requirement was introduced that Member States limit 
their use of CDM and JI emission units in the Kyoto period to a certain pro-
portion of their emission units allocation, which is to be specified by each 
Member State in its NAP.366 Hence, the limit varies among Member States 
and, in some cases, even among sectors within a Member State.367 The re-
duction volume by offsets from abroad are estimated to be about one third of 
the total reduction requirement of the EU.368 Whereas the limit of the use of 
CERs and ERUs in some countries is 10 per cent (UK, Italy, Germany), the 
limit raises up to 25 per cent in Poland and 50 per cent in Spain.369 On top of 
the scale, however, are the Netherlands providing for 20 million offsets from 
abroad in its NAP for the period of 2008 to 2012. This amount, in fact, cor-
responds to the total reduction target of the Netherlands for this period.370  
                                              
364 Preamble, recital 7 of the Linking-Directive: “Each Member State will decide on the 
limit for the use of CERs and ERUs from project activities having due regard to the rele-
vant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords, to meet the require-
ments therein that the use of the mechanisms should be supplemental to domestic action. 
Domestic action will thus constitute a significant element of the effort made.” In the 
Consolidated ETS-Directive, supplementarity is required by the preamble, recital 19: 
“(…) In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and Marrakech 
Accords, the use of the mechanisms should be supplemental to domestic action and do-
mestic action will thus constitute a significant element of the effort made.” 
365 Article 11a, paragraph 2 of the Linking-Directive. 
366 Article 11a, paragraph 1 of the Linking-Directive. 
367 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 4. 
368 WINTER, 296. 
369 CONVERY/REDMOND, 91. 
370 GILBERTSON/REYES, 71, referring to THE NETHERLANDS MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC 
AFFAIRS AND MINISTRY FOR HOUSING, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), 
“Netherlands national allocation plan for GHG emission units 2008-2012”, 10. 
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3.6.3.3 The Issue of Additionality 
The use of CERs for compliance with reduction obligations under the EU-
ETS reduces the need for domestic cuts in emissions.371 A CER frees up an 
AAU leaving the Member State of the installation that bought a CER with 
one spare AAU. The AAU could be allocated to another installation, which 
could now emit one tonne of CO2. As a result of the transaction, a reduction 
in emissions of CO2 by one tonne by a CDM Project would have the effect 
of allowing the emission of two tonnes of CO2 – one by the installation ac-
quiring the CER and one by another entity within the Member State holding 
the spare AAU. 
Unless CDM projects are truly additional, CERs in fact enlarge the over-all 
cap of the Annex B-world and undermine the environmental integrity of the 
CDM. (Figure 5) As a remedy, WINTER suggests that a transfer does not add 
to the national target, but that the State disposes of a reserve to serve an en-
tity having invested in CDM.372  
Additionality, however, is difficult to enforce in practice.373 The estimation 
of emission reductions poses practical problems and to prove that emissions 
have been reduced beyond a business-as-usual scenario is challenging.374 
Even worse, the regulatory barrier to entering the CDM market works 
against the goal of additionality. For instance, transaction costs involved in 
developing new projects are so high that it only becomes practical to incur 
the extra costs if much of the work for the project would have been per-
formed anyway.375 Developers with meritorious projects might nevertheless 
abstain from CDM projects because of the regulatory barriers.376  
                                              
371 SANDBAG, 4.  
372 WINTER, 296. 
373 Practical examples are described by MICHAELOWA.  
374 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 281/282. 
375 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 282, referring to JOHN HUMPHREY, “The Clean Development Me-
canism: How to Increase Benefits for Developing Countries”, in: IDS Bulletin, Volume 
35, Number 3, 2004, 84-89, 87. 
376 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 282. The author of this thesis is involved in such a project and 
knows such considerations by own experience. 
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Figure 5: EU-ETS - Offsetting from Abroad 
Each CER frees up an AAU enlarging the over-all cap of the Annex B-world. 
3.6.3.4 Offsetting from Abroad - Outlook 
The Consolidated ETS-Directive aims at reconciling the criticism and har-
monizing the use of offsets from abroad by entities within the EU-ETS. The 
most momentous novelty is that new CERs will, as of 2013, only be issued 
for new projects in one of the world Least Developed Countries (LDC), 
whereas the use of “conventional” CERs is subject to certain restrictions.377 
As long as there is no new international climate agreement, installation op-
erators will be able to use either leftover CERs and ERUs from the period 
2008 to 2012, or an amount corresponding to a certain percentage, which is 
to be set not below 11 per cent of their cumulated allocation during the pe-
riod from 2008 to 2012, whichever is the highest.378 New entrants will be 
able to use CERs/ERUs up to a certain percentage, which is to be set not 
below 4.5 per cent of their verified emissions during the period from 2013 to 
2020. Aircraft operators shall be able to use offsets from abroad up to an 
amount corresponding to a percentage, “which shall not be set below 1.5 per 
                                              
377 Article 11a, paragraph 4 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. On the UN list of least 
developed countries, there are currently 33 countries in Africa, 14 in Asia and 1 in Latin 
America. List available at <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/>, accessed on 14 
November 2011. 
378 Article 11a, paragraph 8, first subparagraph of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
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cent of their verified emissions during the period from 2013 to 2020”.379 
Measures will be adopted to determine the exact percentages.380 These 
measures shall also ensure that the total allowed use of offsets does not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the mandated reductions.381 
Once an international agreement on climate change has been reached, only 
approved emission units from countries that have ratified the new interna-
tional agreement will be accepted from 1 January 2013 onwards.382 Com-
mentators doubt whether the finally allowed amount of emission units from 
projects outside the EU to be used in the EU-ETS according to the Consoli-
dated ETS-Directive, will be in accordance with the supplementarity princi-
ple as laid down in the Kyoto Protocol.383  
As trading CERs has been driven mainly by the EU-ETS so far and the 
framework set by the EU-ETS directly influences the CDM market, political 
discussions in the EU on the treatment of CDM in the future have an effect 
on CER prices.384 CDM project developers are thus faced with considerable 
uncertainty about future post-Kyoto agreement and the exhaustion of low-
cost abatement options in developing countries raise concerns about the 
availability of such mechanisms.385 Almost a decade of experience with 
CDM projects has certainly contributed to improve projects and procedures. 
Yet, without a renewed international agreement, the future of the mechanism 
is uncertain, the potential of CDM projects in LDC-countries appears to be 
low and investments into new CDM projects are unattractive. 
                                              
379 Article 11a, paragraph 8, third subparagraph of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
380 Article 11a, paragraph 8, fifth subparagraph of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
381 Article 11a, paragraph 8, subparagraph 4 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. Based on 
data of the European Commission, the non-governmental organisation FERN estimates 
that, in the period between 2013 and 2020, a real reduction of emission of 3.9 per cent 
compared to emission of 2005 will be achieved, and that 60 per cent thereof will be 
achieved through compensation credits. FERN, “Reducing Emissions or Playing with 
Numbers?”, EU Forest Watch, March 2009, available at <http://www.fern.org/ 
sites/fern.org/files/Playing%20with%20numbers.pdf>. 
382 Article 11a, paragraph 7 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive and Article 28, paragraph 3 
of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
383 BAZELMANS, 308. 
384 ZUMBACH, 47. 
385 ANGER, 2047. 
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3.6.4 Linking with Aviation 
With the inclusion of aviation into the EU-ETS, another unilateral offset-
mechanism is introduced. The Aviation-Directive gives aircraft operators full 
access to the EU-ETS. Aircraft operators may buy EUAs without trading 
restriction.386 Stationary installations covered by the EU-ETS, however, are 
not allowed to use aviation emission units for compliances purposes.387  
Since emissions from international flight traffic are not covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol, the newly introduced European Union Aviation Allowances 
(EUAAs) do not correspond to an AAU.388  
This poses a problem for the inclusion of aviation emissions into the EU-
ETS, as transfers of aviation emission units from and into the EU-ETS could 
have a distorting effect on the Member States’ assigned amounts.389 The fol-
lowing example illustrates this point.  
If an entity currently covered by the EU-ETS successfully reduces its emis-
sions by one tonne of CO2e, it can sell one EUA to an aircraft operator which 
would now acquire the right to emit one tonne of CO2e. However, because 
aviation falls outside the scope of the Kyoto Protocol, an AAU cannot be 
transferred alongside the EUA, which would leave the Member State of the 
installation that sold the EUA with one spare AAU. The AAU could be allo-
cated to a Non EU-ETS-entity, which could now emit one tonne of CO2e. As 
a result of the transaction, a reduction in emissions of CO2e by one tonne by 
the original installation would have the effect of allowing the emission of 
                                              
386 Article 12, paragraph 2a of the Consolidated ETS-Directive: “Administering Member 
States shall ensure that (…) each aircraft operator surrenders a number of allowances 
equal to the total emissions during the preceding calendar year from aviation activities 
(….)” 
387 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive: “Member States shall ensure 
that, (…) the operator of each installation surrenders a number of allowances, other 
than allowances issued under Chapter II, equal to the total emissions from that installa-
tion during the preceding calendar year(….)”. Chapter II of the Consolidated ETS-
Directive contains the provisions concerning aviation. 
388 By contrast, domestic aviation is included within the Kyoto targets. KAMINSKAITE-
SALTERS, 333/4. 
389 KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, 331. Various options have been considered by the European 
Commission in this regard, namely the allocation of no emission units to the aviation 
sector, or imposing trading restrictions. For a discussion of the considered options, see 
KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, 333/334. 
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two tonnes of CO2e – one by the aircraft operator, and one by a Non EU-ETS 
entity within the Member State.390 
The additional demand for EUAs by airlines may have as a consequence a 
reduced availability of EUAs for industry and energy companies.391 The 
unrestricted access to EUAs for aircraft operators thereby enhances the risk 
of “carbon leakage” in the energy-intensive sectors.392 
If energy-intensive sectors have to cope with an increased demand for EUAs, 
they may consider to relocate production to countries outside the EU. In 
addition, it remains unclear how the provision regarding the swapping of 
EUAAs for EUAs would work in practice. Would this require the Member 
States to provide aircraft operators with access to the AAUs which have not 
been earmarked for EUAs? Such a de-facto one-way linkage of the aviation 
sector to the Non EU-ETS will probably limit the environmental and eco-
nomic benefits of emission trading seriously due to the effect of carbon leak-
age in the case of restricted access to emission units.393 
3.7 Compliance Issues 
The effectiveness of emission trading depends on compliance with the provi-
sions of the ETS-Directive as amended.394 The compliance regime comprises 
the various provisions that ensure participants hold emission units equal to 
their effected emissions during the relevant compliance period.395 
Entities and installations covered by the EU-ETS have to comply with the 
allocated amount of EUAs. It is the Member State’s duty to ensure that, by 
30 April each year at the latest, the operator of each installation surrenders a 
number of emission units equal to the total emissions from that installation 
as verified.396 Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) provide impor-
tant input to the compliance system.397  
                                              
390 Example according to KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, 332. 
391 FIRST CLIMATE/ ECONABILITY, 79. 
392 KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, 334. 
393 KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, 335. 
394 EPINEY, 242. 
395 HAITES/MULLINS, 57. 
396 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Original ETS-Directive.  
397 OBERTHÜR/LEFEBER, 152. 
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The respective provisions are remarkably precise. However, deficits in the 
implementation of control mechanisms are to be expected.398 For example, 
control mechanisms are generally the responsibility of national bodies. The 
European Commission has limited instruments at its disposal.  
3.7.1 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
The European Commission is conscious of the fact that, especially with re-
gard to the future linkage with other Emission Trading Schemes, the role of 
MRV is essential for the reputation of the EU-ETS.399  
In order to allow the market function properly, market players must have 
trust and confidence in the overall performance of an Emission Trading 
Scheme. According to the ETS-Directive, it is the Member State’s responsi-
bility to ensure an appropriate MRV-system according to regulations adopted 
by the Commission.400 Access to information is guaranteed by Article 17 of 
the Original ETS-Directive. This principle is reinforced by Article 15a, in-
troduced with Directive 2009/29/EC. Access to information covered by pro-
fessional secrecy is restricted.401  
Commission Decision 2004/156/EC established guidelines for the monitor-
ing and reporting of GHG emissions during the pilot phase. In order to ren-
der the guidelines more clear and cost-efficient, the Commission replaced 
them with new guidelines. Commission Decision 2007/589/EC of 18 July 
2007 (“Monitoring Decision”) sets out MRV-guidelines in its annexes. An-
nex I contains the “General Guidelines”.402 Activity-specific guidelines are 
set up in subsequent annexes. The Monitoring Decision has been amended 
                                              
398 EPINEY, 242/3, referring to MARTIN A. BECKMANN/ANDREAS FISAHN, “Probleme des 
Handels mit Verschmutzungsrechten – eine Bewertung ordnungsrechtlicher und markt-
gesteuerter Instrumente in der Umweltpolitik;“ in: Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht (ZUR), 
Volume 6, 2009, 29-303.  
399 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 62. 
400 Article 14 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive with regard to monitoring and reporting, 
Article 15 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive with regard to verification.  
401 Article 15a, paragraph 2 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
402 The “general guidelines” of Annex I to Decision 2007/589/EC are thereafter referred to 
as “Monitoring Guidelines”. 
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by three Decisions on nitrous oxide,403 aviation activities404 and capture, 
transport and geological storage of carbon dioxide.405 
The new Monitoring Guidelines are applied as of 1 January 2008.406 They 
attempt to define the appropriate balance between cost-effectiveness and 
accuracy.407 A special concern is to facilitate the application of the guidelines 
for installations with average verified reported emissions of less than 25’000 
tonnes of fossil CO2 per year during the pilot phase.408 
The Monitoring Guidelines stress fundamental principles such as complete-
ness, consistency, transparency, faithfulness and trueness. Due diligence 
shall be exercised to ensure that the calculation and measurement of emis-
sions exhibit “highest achievable accuracy”. The operator shall enable rea-
sonable assurance of the”integrity of reported emissions”.409 
Section 4.2. of the Monitoring Guidelines describes two methodologies410 for 
the determination of effected GHG emissions: The operator may propose 
either (1) a calculation-based methodology, determining emissions from 
source streams based on activity data or (2) a measurement-based methodol-
ogy, determining emissions from an emission source by means of continuous 
measurement of the concentration of the relevant GHG. The use of a meas-
urement-based methodology shall be subject of the approval of the compe-
                                              
403 Commission Decision 2009/73/EC of 17 December 2008 amending Decision 2007/589/ 
EC as regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions of ni-
trous oxide, available at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2009:024:0018:0029:EN:PDF>. 
404 Commission Decision 2009/339/EC of 16 April 2009 amending Decision 2007/589/EC 
as regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions and tonne-
kilometre data from aviation activities, available at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:103:0010:0029:EN:PDF>. 
405 Commission Decision 2010/345/EC of 8 June 2010 amending Decision 2007/589/EC as 
regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions from the cap-
ture, transport and geological storage of carbon dioxide, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:155:0034:0047:EN:PDF >.  
406 Article 3 of the Monitoring Decision.  
407 Preamble, recital 10 of the Monitoring Decision. 
408 Preamble, recital 4 of the Monitoring Decision. 
409 Annex I of the Monitoring Guidelines, Section 3, “Monitoring and Reporting Princi-
ples”. 
410 According to Section 2 „Definitions“ of the Monitoring Guidelines, “monitoring meth-
odology” means the sum of approaches used by an operator to determine the emissions 
of a given installation. 
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tent authority. For each reporting period,411 the operator shall corroborate the 
measured emissions by means of a calculation-based methodology in accor-
dance with the provisions regarding “Corroborating calculation of emis-
sions” of the Monitoring Guidelines.412 The operator has to submit the veri-
fied report for emissions during the preceding year to the competent author-
ity by 31 March each year for emissions during the preceding year.413 
Before the start of the reporting period, the operator has to establish a moni-
toring plan which shall be approved by the competent authority and again 
after any substantial changes to the monitoring methodology have been in-
troduced.414 The monitoring plan415 shall, among others, contain a descrip-
tion of the calculation-based methodology or measurement-based methodol-
ogy to be used and a description of the measurement system.416  
Section 14 of the Monitoring Guidelines contains a standard reporting for-
mat. The information required in this format shall be used as a basis for re-
porting of the quantitative data.417 The operator has to establish, document, 
implement and maintain an effective control system to ensure that the annual 
emissions report does not contain misstatements and is in conformance with 
the approved monitoring plan, the permit and these guidelines. The operator 
is also responsible for a quality assurance which ensures that relevant meas-
uring equipment is calibrated, adjusted and checked at regular intervals in-
cluding prior to use, and checked against measurement standard traceable to 
international measurement standards.418 
                                              
411 According to Section 2 „Definitions“ of the Monitoring Guidelines, “reporting period” 
means one calendar year during which emissions have to be monitored and reported, 
whereas a “trading period” means a multiple year phase of the emission trading scheme 
(e.g. 2005-2007 or 2008-2012) for which a national allocation plan is issued by the 
Member State. 
412 Section 4.2. of the Monitoring Guidelines.  
413 Section 8 on “Reporting” of the Monitoring Guidelines.  
414 Article 6, paragraph 2, subparagraph c) of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
415 According to Section 2 “Definitions” of the Monitoring Guidelines, “monitoring plan” 
means a detailed, complete and transparent documentation of the monitoring methodol-
ogy of a specific installation, including documentation of the data acquisition and data 
handling activities, and the system to control the trueness thereof. 
416 For a detailed description see Section 4.3. of the Monitoring Guidelines. 
417 The reporting format according to Section 14 of the Monitoring Guidelines has to be 
used unless an equivalent electronic standard protocol for annual reporting has been 
published by the EU Commissions. See Section 8 on “Reporting” of the Monitoring 
Guidelines.  
418 Section 10.3.2. of the Monitoring Guidelines.  
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The emission reporting is then subject to an external verification. Member 
States are responsible to ensure that the reports submitted by operators and 
aircraft operators are verified in accordance with the criteria set out in Annex 
V of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.419 The objective of the verification is 
to ensure that emissions have been monitored in accordance with the guide-
lines and that reliable and correct emissions data will be reported. In author-
izing external verifiers, Member States shall consider respective guidance 
issued by the European Cooperation for Accreditation (EA).420  
Member States shall ensure that, by 30 April of each year, the operator of the 
installation surrenders a number of duly verified emission units equal to the 
total emissions from that installation or aircraft operator and that these are 
subsequently cancelled.421  
The ETS-Directive and the Monitoring Guidelines only regulate some fun-
damental requirements and aspects of the verification process. Details are 
left to Member States. Most, but not all Member States developed specific 
national verification guidance often based on internationally acknowledged 
criteria. Quality checks of verification reports are also carried out in many 
Member States, but not in all.422 These differences in practice are not deemed 
to comply with the requirements of the internal market and might incur 
higher costs than necessary, if qualified verifiers are not able to do their job 
across the internal market.423 
Therefore, with Directive 2009/29/EC, the Commission aimed at ensuring a 
common approach, higher consistency, transparency, improved cost effec-
tiveness of monitoring and reporting standards.424  
By 31 December 2011, the Commission shall adopt a regulation for the 
monitoring and reporting of emissions which shall be based on the principles 
for monitoring and reporting set out in Annex IV of the Consolidated ETS-
                                              
419 Article 15 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
420 Section 10.4.1. of the Monitoring Guidelines. There are currently no harmonised criteria 
for accreditation of verifiers and accreditation requirements differ between Member 
States. 
421 Article 12, paragraph 2a of the Consolidated ETS-Directive with regard to aircraft op-
erators and paragraph 3 with regard to stationary installations.  
422 See EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, “Application of the Emission Trading Directive 
by EU Member States – reporting year 2008”, Technical report No. 13/2008, 54/55, 
available at <http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/technical_report_2008_13>. 
423 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 71. 
424 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 63. 
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Directive, taking into account the most accurate and up-to-date scientific 
evidence available, in particular from the IPCC.425 Moreover, it may also 
specify requirements for operators to report on emissions associated with the 
production of “goods produced by energy intensive industries which may be 
subject to international competition”.426 
Also by 31 December 2011, the Commission shall adopt a regulation for the 
verification of emission reports based on the principles set out in Annex V of 
the Consolidated ETS-Directive regarding the accreditation and supervision 
of verifiers.427  
3.7.2 Registration in the EU-ETS 
In all the existing carbon markets, emission units exist exclusively unchar-
tered and in electronic form. Therefore, the ETS-Directive asks Member 
States to provide for the establishment and maintenance of an electronic 
registry in order to be able to record every transaction.428  
Commission Regulation 994/2008/EC of 8 October 2008 provides the details 
for an integrated Community system of registries, consisting of the registries 
of the Community and its Member States.429 
In phase I of the EU-ETS, the 25 Member State registries were supposed to 
be connected by means of the Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL). But when the trial period started on 1 January 2005, there was only 
one operating national registry.430 
In phase II, with the start of the first commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol, Member State registries function at the same time as registries for 
the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol and are, therefore, connected by and to 
                                              
425 Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
426 Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
427 Article 15, of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
428 Article 19 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
429 Commission Regulation 994/2008/EC of 8 October 2008 for a standardised and secured 
system of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil, OJ L 271/3, 11.10.2008, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:271:0003:0003:EN:PDF>. Commission Regulation 994/2008/ 
EC replaces Commission Regulation 2216/2004/EC of 21 December 2004. 
430 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 9. 
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the International Transaction Log (ITL) managed by the UNFCCC for the 
purposes of the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, every single transfer of emis-
sion units (within a registry or between two registries) needs to pass through 
the ITL.  
Although the technical standard for the co-operation between registry, ITL 
and CITL is well developed, the ITL’s entry into the EU-ETS introduces 
technical, political and administrative risks.431 The technical risks are due to 
the fact that messages will have to pass through more systems, which in-
creases the scope for errors and misuse. Indeed, on 19 January 2011, the 
European Commission suspended transactions, except for allocation and 
surrender of allowances, in all EU-ETS registries in response to an unauthor-
ised access to EU-ETS-registry accounts in Romania (“cyber theft”). A simi-
lar incident happened earlier in Germany. Therefore, the European Commis-
sion asked the national registries for a report on the adequacy of their secu-
rity measures. Normal operation could be resumed only after review and 
approval of the national reports by the Commission.432  
For phase III, the Consolidated ETS-Directive foresees to merge registries 
into a single EU-wide registry. Emission units issued from 1 January 2012 
onwards shall be held in the Community registry.433 The new registry will be 
operated by the Commission and will replace all EU-ETS registries currently 
hosted in the Member States. All transactions taking place in the registry will 
be subject to the approval of the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), 
the successor of the CITL.434 Nonetheless, each Member State shall continue 
to be able to fulfil the execution of authorized operations under the 
UNFCCC of the Kyoto Protocol.435 The Commission shall adopt a Regula-
tion for a standardised and secured system of registries in the form of stan-
dardised electronic databases containing common data elements to track the 
issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of allowances.436 
                                              
431 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 87. 
432 As of 26 July 2011, most of the registries are “partially operational”. For actual status 
of the registries check at <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/registrySearch.do; 
jsessionid=vcPsTnSLdGND6Sg52zZ72Kp4yV9pL8bC12kQ6QTrpSNhGFXhQmpJ!715 
1055>. 
433 Article 19, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
434 See latest update of 18 July 2011, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/>. 
435 Article 19, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
436 Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive That Regulation shall also 
include provisions concerning the use and identification of CERs and ERUs in the 
Community scheme and the monitroing of the level of such use. In addition, Article 19, 
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Compliance is recorded in accounts associated with each emitting installa-
tion are maintained in registries.437 These registries record the initial alloca-
tions to installation accounts, all transfers in and out of accounts and the 
annual surrender of allowances for compliance. Neither the prices of these 
transfers nor the value of a transaction nor the date of transfer is reported in 
the CITL.438 The registry of origin for every surrendered allowance is re-
ported, however, the identity of the installation to which the allowance was 
initially issued is not reported.439 
The Registry Regulation provides for the nomination of an “additional au-
thorized representative”.440 For any transaction with EUAs or Kyoto emis-
sion units, the agreement of the additional authorized representative is re-
quired in addition to the agreement of an authorized representative. This 
provision allows EU Member States to permit a holder of an EUA to use it as 
a security.441 
Because EUAs are not fully exchangeable with all Kyoto emission units, the 
original identity of the converted AAUs has to be tagged and traced in the 
registry. Only because the origin of each EUA is traced, the EU-ETS may 
use a different definition of what is allowed to be traded within the 
scheme.442 
3.7.3 Temporal Flexibility 
The forward transfer of emission reductions in time is referred to as “bank-
ing”, which means that an over-fulfilment of the target in the current com-
mitment period can be carried over to subsequent commitment periods. The 
opposite is referred to as “borrowing”: Emission units from a subsequent 
                                              
paragraph 4 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive asks for appropriate modalities for the 
Community registry to undertake transaction and other operations in case of non-binding 
arrangements with third countries or with sub-federal or regional entities according to 
Article 25, paragraph 1b of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
437 See Section 1 „Accounts“ of Commission Regulation 994/2008 of 8 October 2008. 
According to Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive, 
any person may hold emission units. 
438 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 15. 
439 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 4. The CITL data on the installation origin of surrendered emis-
sion units is made publicly available five years after the surrender date.  
440 Article 19, paragraph 2 of Commission Regualtion 994/2008/EC. 
441 POHLMANN, 352. 
442 BAZELMANS, 300. 
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allocation year are placed in installation holding accounts for compliance 
purposes.  
3.7.3.1 Banking  
As a general principle, EUAs are valid for one trading period.443 For each 
phase, the EU sets a multi-year cap with no limit on banking within that 
phase.444 Due to the experience in phase I, banking of EUAs from phase II to 
phase III was introduced. Through the conversion which is mandatory ac-
cording to Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive, enti-
ties build up emission unit reserves. With this mechanism, the Commission 
intends to avoid that entities are deprived of their property if over-allocated 
and unused emission units lose their validity at the end of a commitment 
period.445 Four months after the beginning of each period, emission units 
which are no longer valid and have not been surrendered and cancelled shall 
be cancelled by the competent authority to be replaced with emission units 
valid for the current period.446  
As for offsets from abroad, Article 11a introduced by Directive 2009/29/EC 
explicitly allows banking of CERs /ERUs into phase III. Before the entry 
into force of an international agreement on climate change, operators may 
request to receive emission units valid from 2013 onward in exchange for 
unused CERs and ERUs issued for emission reductions up until 2012 from 
project types which were eligible for use in the Community scheme during 
the period from 2008 to 2012.447 The competent authority shall make such an 
exchange on request until 31 March 2015.  
However, once an international agreement on climate change has been 
reached, only credits448 from projects from third countries which have rati-
fied that agreement shall be accepted in the Community scheme from 1 
                                              
443 Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Original ETS-Directive. 
444 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 3. 
445 EPINEY, 237. 
446 Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
447 Article 11a, paragraph 2 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. Since CDM enjoyed a 
“prompt start” authorized by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, all unused CERs ob-
tained as of 2001 can be used to assist in achieving compliance in phase III.  
448 The term “credits” is used instead of CERs or ERUs, because a continuation of the 
project-based mechanism of Article 6 and Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol cannot be 
taken for granted.  
3 The Emission Trading Scheme of the European Union 
 88
January 2013.449 With regard to new projects started from 2013 onwards, 
only CERs from LDC may be exchanged for emission units.450 
Banking allows installations and operators covered by the EU-ETS to save 
unused emission units for use in future years.451 By allowing EUAs and 
CERs to be banked, the banking provisions helped to prevent the potential 
over-allocation in phase II. This over-allocation led to a complete price col-
lapse of the EUA towards the end of phase I.452  
Bankability of emission units means that nearly 40 per cent of phase III ef-
fort could be met by carry-over from phase II, without companies having to 
invest in reducing domestic emissions. The EU-ETS will not require domes-
tic emissions reductions for the next seven years.453 Consequently, banking 
may also be viewed as a “decelerator” that leads to fewer emissions reduc-
tions in later program years.454  
Another effect of banking is the bypassing of restrictive eligibility for offsets 
in phase III. By swapping of CDM/JI credits for EUAs in phase II, they can 
be banked and used for offsetting in the phase III.455 
3.7.3.2 Borrowing 
Borrowing is the possibility to use (“borrow”) emission units from future 
periods for which allocations have not yet been fixed to demonstrate compli-
ance in an earlier year.456  
Borrowing can be made from the next year’s allocation since each year’s 
endowment of emission units is placed in installation holding accounts at the 
end of February in each year, two months before the surrender of emission 
units for the past year’s emissions is required.457 
                                              
449 Article 11a, paragraph 7 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. Article 28 of the Consoli-
dated ETS-Directive provides for adjustments applicable upon the approval by the 
Community of an international agreement on climate change. Within three months of the 
signature, the Commission shall submit a report and a legislative proposal. 
450 Article 11a, paragraph 4 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
451 JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 792. 
452 DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 19. 
453 SANDBAG, 14. 
454 MCALLISTER, 424. 
455 DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 21. 
456 JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 792. 
457 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 17. 
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Hence, at the time of determining compliance, they dispose of two annual 
sets of EUAs to cover their emissions except for the final year of each trad-
ing period when only one set is available. This feature will be progressively 
phased out as the EU shifts to 100 per cent auctioning and, hence, fewer 
emission units will be allocated at the start of the year. As of 2012, the EU-
ETS will include the possibility of moving forward the auctioning of emis-
sion units from future years if prices rise high. This possibility constitutes an 
example of “intra-trading period borrowing”.458  
The analysis of compliance trading in phase I by TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN 
shows that an unique feature of the EU-ETS, the ability to borrow against 
the next year’s allocation, was used by many participants.459 The sharply 
increasing rate of trading for compliance purposes in each of the years of the 
first trading period indicates it. This behaviour is also strongly suggested by 
examination of installation level data where a significant number of installa-
tions appear to have borrowed for compliance in 2005 and 2006 and paid the 
borrowing back in 2007 with large imports of non-domestic EUAs.460 
Borrowing is not seen favourably from an environmental perspective. Firstly, 
borrowing entails the risk that mitigation measures may not be taken in fu-
ture periods either, for example due to lack of enforcement or if a company 
goes bankrupt. Secondly, companies may have an incentive to rely heavily 
on borrowing to artificially raise their futures compliance cost curve and 
then argue that they need softer targets because otherwise the costs would be 
prohibitive.461 
A study which analyzed the CITL data on cross-border trades, borrowing and 
banking during the concluded first trading period of the EU-ETS identified a 
surprisingly active cross-border trading within the EU-ETS. It was many 
times greater than what would have been needed to assure compliance for 
the installations in the four Member States that were in a net short posi-
tion.462 
                                              
458 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 17. 
459 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 27. 
460 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 27. 
461 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 18. 
462 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 27.  
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This finding shows that compliance trading is not the only, or even the main, 
reason for participation in emission units markets. Most trades seem to be 
motivated by financial considerations such as hedging forward positions.463 
3.7.4 Non-Compliance with Reduction Target 
For every reported and verified tCO2e an installation under the EU-ETS 
emitted, the operator of the installation has to surrender one EUA. A short-
age of EUA can be compensated by purchasing emission units from other 
entities within the EU-ETS or by purchasing CERs or ERUs from abroad. 
For failure to surrender sufficient allowances by 30 April each year, a fine of 
40 EUR was applied for each metric tonne of CO2 emitted during the pilot 
phase. During phase II, the fine amounts to 100 EUR. Starting in 2013, this 
amount will be annually adjusted for inflation.464 Those fined must also 
make up the deficit by buying the relevant volume of EUAs.465 Additional 
civil and criminal penalties, for example for fraudulent reporting, are left to 
Member States, under the condition that relevant legal provisions are noti-
fied to the European Commission and that they are effective, proportionate, 
and dissuasive. Finally, the obligation to publish the names of the offending 
entities adds a “name and shame” element to the compliance regime.466 
The ETS-Directive is the only EU law to prescribe financial penalties that 
must be applied automatically for non-compliance.467 At the same time, it is 
the only consistent penalty in the Directive. For any other non-compliance 
events (e.g. failing to monitor in accordance with the monitoring plan), each 
Member State would implement different requirements as provided for in 
national legislation and policies.468 
Penalties shall be laid down by Member States and must be “effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive.”469 Penalties that make the act of non-compliance 
unattractive are essential to ensure the effective operation of an Emission 
Trading Scheme. Only if penalty payments are sufficiently high, covered 
                                              
463 TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 3.  
464 Article 16, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
465 CONVERY/REDMOND, 94. 
466 Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive. See also 
STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 19. 
467 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 6. 
468 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 83. 
469 Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive.. 
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entities will either reduce emissions or buy additional emission units on the 
trading market.470 
Aircraft operators are subject to the same non-compliance penalties as they 
are applicable to all other operators under the EU-ETS.471  
3.7.5 Enforcement 
The Member States are responsible for enforcing compliance.472 Member 
States have considerable flexibility to determine the types of offences that 
penalties are applied for. Therefore, objectives of the amendments to the 
ETS-Directive were (1) to reinforce compliance by ensuring that all opera-
tors in the same system are subject to similar compliance checks and penal-
ties/enforcement actions and (2) to ensure compliance also in the longer 
term. 473  
Enforcement provisions on Community level exist only with regard to air-
craft operators. In the case of insufficient coverage with emission units, the 
administering Member State shall, as a first step, publish the name of the 
non-compliant aircraft operator in addition to the fine of 100 EUR per tCO2e 
in excess.474 In the event of an aircraft operator failing to comply with the 
requirements of the ETS-Directive and where other enforcement measures 
have failed to ensure compliance, its administering Member State may re-
quest the Commission to decide on the imposition of an operating ban on the 
aircraft operator concerned.475 An operating ban may not only be imposed in 
case of non-compliance with invalidated emission units, but also in case of 
any other breach against the provisions of the ETS-Directive.476 Each Mem-
ber State shall enforce any decision within its territory.477 
                                              
470 MACE ET AL, 66. 
471 Article 16 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. See also POHLMANN, 346.  
472 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 10. 
473 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 83. 
474 BARTLIK, 205. 
475 Article 15, paragraph 5 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive.  
476 BARTLIK, 205. 
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3.8 Performance of the EU-ETS 
Emission trading was initiated as an instrument for environmental protec-
tion. Emission trading was also initiated as an instrument to reduce the costs 
to meet a given emission target. There are, consequently, two indicators 
available for assessing the performance of an Emission Trading Scheme: 
price and effected emission reductions.  
3.8.1 Carbon Price 
The price of emission units is a relatively clear and transparent indicator to 
assess the performance of an Emission Trading Scheme.478 In phase I of the 
EU-ETS, prices were expected to be around 8 EUR to 12 EUR. However, 
prices increased to over 30 EUR in mid-2005. In April 2006, the news that 
most EU Member States produced fewer tonnes of emissions than allocated 
caused a collapse of the carbon price.479 Prices declined to 15 EUR and, by 
February 2007, prices fell to less than 1 EUR where they remained until the 
end of phase I.480 
In phase II, prices started at around 15 EUR and increased to almost 30 EUR 
due to extraordinarily high energy prices up to mid-2008. Since 2008, eco-
nomic recession has led to fewer emissions and the voluminous supply of 
offsets from the CDM has led to this year’s prices of about 10 EUR to 15 
EUR.481 
However, conclusions on the basis of the development of the carbon price 
only have to be drawn with caution. This development alone does not neces-
sarily provide hard proof that the Emission Trading Scheme was either effec-
tive or ineffective in reaching particular policy goals. The reason is that it 
remains often difficult to show that particular effects are necessarily the di-
                                              
478 For a historical overview over the price development for EUAs see POINTCARBONNEWS, 
Volume 09, Number 28, 16 July 2010, available at <http://www.firstclimate. 
com/uploads/media/CarbonMarketEurope.pdf>. For a comprehensive chart of the his-
torical price development from 2005 to mid-2009 see GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEIL- 
MAYR/FAZEKAS, 10, based on data from Point Carbon. See also WRÅKE, 7. 
479 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 12-15; GRUBB, 1. 
480 MCALLISTER, 415, citing ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 13, noting that although the price of phase 
I emission units collapsed, the trading of phase II emission units since 2005 has estab-
lished a market price of about 20 USD. See also ELLERMAN/JOSKOW. 
481 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 12. 
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rect consequence of a policy instrument chosen, in this particular case emis-
sion trading.482  
Summing up, the performance of the EU-ETS is positive in so far as a car-
bon price is successfully established. The volatility of the price, however, 
was extreme.483 Instruments to reduce volatility would be helpful. By more 
generous banking provisions, first measures against volatility have been 
taken. 
3.8.2 Effected Emission Reductions 
The performance of an Emission Trading Scheme may also be assessed by 
quantifying the effected emission reductions. A quantification of emission 
reductions, however, is marked by uncertainty and intransparency. It in-
volves the construction of a counterfactual estimate of what emissions would 
have been in the absence of the EU-ETS. This counterfactual estimate should 
take into account actual economic growth, energy prices, and whether all of 
these variables affect what emissions would have been without a CO2 
price.484  
ELLERMAN/BUCHNER were the first ones to quantify the aggregate emission 
reductions with a careful quantification and discussion of the different possi-
ble counterfactuals.485 Their studies suggest that the EU-ETS in its first two 
years cut emissions by 50-100 million tCO2 per year, or by around 2.5-5 per 
cent.486 Whether this estimation is adequate or not cannot be proved. 
MCALLISTER, for example, estimates that emissions by covered sources 
increased during phase I by about 2 per cent, contrary to the goal of reducing 
emissions for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.487 
                                              
482 FAURE/PEETERS (eds), 6/7. 
483 See WEBER/DARBELLAY, 275, explaining the extreme volatility with the fact that the 
carbon market is very young. Time and more certainty about its futures prospect should, 
according to WEBER/DARBELLAY, lend it the credibility needed to achieve a certain de-
gree of market stabilization. 
484 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 34. 
485 CONVERY, 125.  
486 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 11, referring to DENNY ELLERMAN/BARBARA 
BUCHNER, “Over-Allocation Or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS 
Based on the 2005-2006 Emissions Data”, in: Environmental and Resource Economics, 
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According to information of the EU-Commission, emissions of 2008 were 
3.06 per cent lower than the 2007 level.488 In a presentation of 14 July 2011, 
CONNIE HEDEGAARD, present European Commissioner for Climate Action, 
pointed out that "average annual emissions per installation in 2010 were 
around 8 per cent lower than when the ETS was launched in 2005".489 
Notwithstanding the optimistic comments by the EU-Commission, the per-
formance of the EU-ETS in terms of effected emission reductions is consid-
ered to be unsatisfying.490 The main cause is the different approaches to allo-
cation adopted by the Member States in phase I and phase II of the EU-ETS 
and the resulting lenient over-all cap of the EU-ETS.491  
3.9 Outlook on the Future of the EU-ETS  
A functioning market for emission units has been developed within the EU-
ETS. Although there have been plenty of rough edges in the early years, a 
cap-and-trade infrastructure is in place including registries, monitoring, re-
porting and verification institutions. A significant segment of European in-
dustry is incorporating the price of CO2 emissions into their daily production 
decisions.492 These early insights into the functioning of carbon markets are 
valuable and must be considered as a success.  
Yet, the EU-ETS is not pulling its weight.493 Even if sources comply with the 
cap, no program will achieve its environmental goals if caps are not stringent 
enough.494 Until the situation of surplus emission units in the EU-ETS is 
resolved, the pressure on energy-intensive companies to reduce emissions 
will remain low, as will carbon prices.495  
                                              
488 EU COMMISSION, “Emissions trading: EU-ETS emissions falls 3 per cent in 2008”, Press 
Release 18 May 2009, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/09/794&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. 
489 CONNIE HEDEGAARD, “The ETS is delivering real emission reductions”, Speech at the 
European Parliament of 14 July 2011, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressRelea 
sesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/527>. 
490 SANDBAG, 11. 
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With the harmonized allocation rules of Directive 29/2009/EC, the first step 
into the right direction is taken. Still, the problem of too many emission units 
remains.496 And new challenges are ahead.  
The first challenge is the inclusion of aviation expanding the volume of the 
EU-ETS by about 10 per cent. How will the swapping of EUAAs for EUAs 
work in practice? Will the unrestricted access to EUAs cause carbon leakage 
in the energy-intensive sectors?497  
The second challenge is to address the issue of the Non EU-ETS sectors. 
How can additional sectors be included into the EU-ETS?498 Will further 
climate-energy measures of the Commission to achieve reductions in the 
Non EU-ETS sectors be effective?499 
It is not the intention of the European Union to focus on emission trading as 
an only measure to achieve emission reductions.500 The Emission Trading 
Scheme of the European Union must be looked at as one of many pieces 
within the entire mosaic of the European Union’s climate change policy. 
Consequently, Member States are encouraged to take complementary action 
                                              
496 SANDBAG, 17. SANDBAG, a not-for-profit campaigning organisation based in the United 
Kingdom which is favourable towards emission trading as a concept, proposes to tackle 
the surplus of emission units available by granting tax incentives against cancelled emis-
sion units. An alternative would be to allow companies to use the emission units as al-
ternatives to offsets for their emissions generated in sectors such as transport which are 
not currently covered by the ETS. The latter proposal would signify a de-facto inclusion 
of Non EU-ETS sectors into the EU-ETS. 
497 KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, 335. 
498 See, for example, FLACHSLAND/BRUNNER/EDENHOFER/CREUTZIG, in: Flachsland, Disser-
tation, 2010, 99-142. The authors analyze design options and economic impacts of in-
cluding the European road transport sector into the EU-ETS. 
499 EPINEY, 239, contesting the effectiveness of the measures introduced with Decision 
406/2009/EC of 23 April 2009. 
500 When presenting the European Climate Change Programme in 2000, the former EU 
Environment Commissioner MARGOT WALLSTRÖM stated that “(…)the key to meeting 
our Kyoto commitments is not to concentrate on one or the other sector, or one or the 
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tegral part of this Programme and the Community's implementation strategy". Press Re-
lease of 8 March 2000 the European Commission available at <http://euro 
pa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/232&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
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and to consider the introduction and the implications of additional regula-
tory, fiscal or other policies.501 
                                              
501 Preamble, recital 23 of the Original and Consolidated ETS-Directive: “Emission allow-
ance trading should form part of a comprehensive and coherent package of policies and 
measures implemented at Member State and Community level. (…) Member States may 




4 The Emission Trading Scheme of Switzerland 
4.1 Introduction 
For the Kyoto commitment period from 2008 to 2012, Switzerland has im-
plemented a combined system of “Voluntary Measures” and a “Steering 
Fee” on fossil fuel in order to reach the emission reduction targets. As of 
2013, the Federal Council strives for a linkage of the Emission Trading 
Scheme in Switzerland with the EU-ETS because of “increased advantages 
of emission trading in a larger trading scheme”.502  
Some commentators call the Swiss system in place “Emission Trading 
Scheme” (CH-ETS) or “cap-and-trade” system.503 Others avoid these terms 
when describing the current CO2-regime in Switzerland.504 In their view, an 
enlargement of the market would not be a “linkage” of the EU-ETS to the 
CH-ETS, but an “access for Swiss companies” to the EU-ETS.505 
4.2 Current Legislation in Switzerland 
With parliamentary resolution (“Bundesbeschluss”) of 2 June 2003, the Fed-
eral Council was empowered to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC 
by the Swiss Parliament. Switzerland thereby took on the commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions between 2008 and 2012 by 8 per cent versus the 
1990 levels and receives the corresponding amount of “Assigned Amount 
Units” (AAU).506  
                                              
502 BURKHARDT, 76. 
503 For example HAUSER, 818; BURKHARDT, 75, 80; KECKEIS, 829. 
504 For example BALLY, 849, distinguishing between “market-economy-oriented measures” 
(such as CO2-Fee, emission credits and emission certificates) and “command-and-
control measures” (such as emission requirements for vehicles and the obligation to 
compensate). 
505 BALLY, 854. This thesis uses the term “CH-ETS”. 
506 The calculated assigned amount for the five years period is 242’838’402 tCO2e. See 
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The assigned amount per year for Switzerland is split up into emission units 
some of which are passed on to companies with reduction targets under the 
CO2-Act.507 If its emissions remain below this level, Switzerland can sell its 
excess emission units on the Kyoto carbon market.  
4.2.1 CO2-Act of 8 October 1999 
In its so-called “Sustainability-Article”, the Constitution of Switzerland calls 
for a balanced and sustainable relationship between nature and the demands 
of the population.508 Article 74 of the Constitution requires the federal legis-
lation to protect the population and its natural environment according to the 
polluter-pays principle.509 The Environmental Protection Act (“Umwelt-
schutzgesetz”) stipulates that pollution must be restricted at the source of its 
origin.510 
On this legal basis, the CO2-Act of 8 October 1999 was introduced. It regu-
lates the transfer of the assigned amount of emission units to Swiss compa-
nies and entered into effect on 1 May 2000.511  
The CO2-Act forms the central pillar of Swiss climate policy. Its first objec-
tive is to reduce the emissions of climate-relevant CO2 arising from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels by 10 per cent by 2010 versus the 1990 level. Its sec-
                                              
<http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/initial_reports_under_the_kyoto_protocol/applic
ation/pdf/initial_report_-_update_following_review.pdf>.  
507 FOEN, Emission Credits, Offsetting and Trading, 1-3. 
508 Article 73 of the Constitution of Switzerland: “The Confederation and the Cantons shall 
endeavour to achieve a balanced and sustainable relationship between nature and its 
capacity to renew itself and the demands placed on it by the population.” Cited accord-
ing to an unofficial English translation, available at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/ 
101/index.html#id-3-ni8-4>. 
509 Article 74, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Switzerland: “The Confederation shall 
legislate on the protection of the population and its natural environment against damage 
or nuisance.” Article 74, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Switzerland: “It shall ensure 
that such damage or nuisance is avoided. The costs of avoiding or eliminating such 
damage or nuisance shall be borne by those responsible for causing it.” Cited according 
to an unofficial English translation, available at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/ 
101/index.html#id-3-ni8-4>. 
510 Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Environmental Protection Act (“Umweltschutzgesetz”).  
511 SR 641.71; AS 2000 979. Various amendments have been made. The most important 
ones are the obligation to use a part of the CO2-Fee for energy efficency programs in the 
building sector as of 1 January 2010 and the amendment regarding fossil fired power 
plants as of 1 January 2011. See HAUSER, 814. 
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ond objective is compliance with the national Article 3.1-commitment of the 
Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHG emissions between 2008 and 2012 by 8 per 
cent versus the 1990 level. 
The CO2-Act defines the yearly average of the years 2008 to 2012 as deci-
sive for the determination of compliance with the first objective of a 10 per 
cent-reduction of CO2.512 It applies differing reduction requirements for the 
emissions originating from heating fuel and for the emissions originating 
from motor fuel.513 The consumption of heating fuels must be reduced by a 
total of 15 per cent, whereas the consumption of motor fuels (fuels for inter-
national flights excluded) must be reduced by 8 per cent.514  
The committed reduction of CO2 emissions is primarily to be achieved 
through voluntary measures on the part of companies and private individu-
als.515 If the voluntary measures fail to produce the desired effect and com-
pliance with the reduction targets of the CO2-Act becomes unlikely, the CO2-
Act attributes the competence to the Federal Council to introduce a steering 
fee on fossil fuels (CO2-Fee).516 The CO2-Act leaves the option to design 
differing CO2-Fee systems for heating fuel and for motor fuel to the Federal 
Council.517 The CO2-Fee was to be introduced as of 2004 at the earliest.518 
The amount of the CO2-Fee has to be approved by the Federal Assembly.519 
The CO2-Act does not explicitly create an Emission Trading Scheme.520 It 
foresees the mechanisms on which the current CH-ETS is based on: The 
crediting of offsets effected elsewhere and the CO2-Fee on emissions ef-
                                              
512 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Act. 
513 In the EU-ETS, there is no explicit differentiation between heating and motor fuel. De 
facto, however, motor fuel is not covered by the EU-ETS because the transport sector is 
excluded from the EU-ETS. 
514 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Act.  
515 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Act. 
516 Article 3, paragraph 2 and Articles 6 to 11 of the CO2-Act. Regarding the nature of the 
CO2-Fee see BORLAT, 1288: „Cette taxe a la nature d’une taxe d’incitation.“ 
517 Article 7, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Act: “Der Bundesrat kann die Abgabesätze für fossile 
Brenn- und Treibstoffe nach Massgabe der Erfüllung der Reduktionsziele unterschied-
lich festlegen. Er kann die CO2-Abgabe auch nur auf Brennstoffen oder nur auf Treibs-
toffen erheben.“ 
518 Article 6, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Act. 
519 Article 7, paragraph 4 of the CO2-Act.  
520 Compared to establishment of the EU-ETS by an explicit ETS-Directive, the absence of 
any CH-ETS “Founding Act” is striking. The fact that the EU-ETS is based on an ETS-
specific Directive demonstrates that the creation of an ETS became part of an interna-
tional political agenda of the EU. 
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fected by individual companies as an instrument to protect the population 
and its natural environment as provided for in the Constitution. 
4.2.2 CO2-Crediting-Ordinance of 22 June 2005 
In the Kyoto carbon market, states may offset their emissions by participa-
tion in emission reduction projects beyond national borders.521 Likewise, the 
CO2-Act provides for the use of emission units generated abroad and allo-
cates the competence to decide on the adequate calculation of emission units 
from abroad to the Federal Council. 522  
With the “Ordinance on the Crediting of Emission Reductions Achieved 
Abroad” (CO2-Crediting-Ordinance) of 22 June 2005, the Federal Council 
creates an unilateral link between the Kyoto carbon market and the Emission 
Trading Scheme in Switzerland.523 The CO2-Crediting-Ordinance entered 
into force on 1 January 2006.  
The CO2-Crediting-Ordinance limits the use of emission units from abroad 
to 2 million tCO2e per year.524 This amount corresponds to about half of the 
annual national reduction commitment according to the CO2-Act.525 In order 
to guarantee a certain level of quality and verification, the scope of emission 
units from abroad is limited to Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) and 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) issued in accordance with Articles 6 and 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol.526 In addition, the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance stipu-
lates that “authorisations” (“Bewilligungen”) granted abroad for the emis-
sion of a specific volume of CO2 are admitted to the Swiss crediting system 
                                              
521 Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol providing for “Joint Implementation”-projects (JI) and 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishing the “Clean Development Mechanism” 
(CDM).  
522 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the CO2-Act: “Verminderungen der Emissionen, die im Aus-
land erzielt und von der Schweiz oder von in der Schweiz ansässigen Unternehmen fi-
nanziert wurden, kann der Bundesrat bei der Berechnung der Emissionen nach diesem 
Gesetz angemessen berücksichtigen. Er regelt die Anforderungen und berücksichtigt da-
bei international anerkannte Kriterien.“ 
523 In a unilateral link, entities in system A can purchase and use units from system B for 
compliance but not vice versa. SCHÜLE/STERK, 5. 
524 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance. 
525 FEDERAL COUNCIL, CO2-Fee-Dispatch, 4899. 
526 Article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph a of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance.  
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“provided these authorisations have been issued by states with comparable 
emission trading regulations”.527  
According to the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance, anyone who wishes to have 
accounted emission units achieved abroad to contribute to reaching the na-
tional reduction targets fixed in Article 2 of the CO2-Act must submit an 
application to the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN).528 In the ex-
planations concerning the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance, it is clarified that this 
provision addresses, “for instance”, the sponsorship of the “Climate 
Cent”.529  
4.2.3 CO2-Fee-Ordinance of 8 June 2007 
Foreseeable non-compliance with the targets of the CO2-Act incited the Fed-
eral Council to become active. Simultaneously with the CO2-Crediting Ordi-
nance, on 22 June 2005, the Federal Council published its “Dispatch on 
Approval of the CO2-Fee for Fossil Heating Fuels” asking for approval of 
the Federal Assembly for a proposed CO2-Fee on heating fuel.530  
Intense political controversy had forced the Federal Council to propose a 
discriminatory treatment of heating and motor fuel.531 With the proposed 
                                              
527 Article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph b of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance. It is not explic-
itly mentioned what kind of authorisation is referred to. Probably, the term is meant to 
open doors for future links with other Emission Trading Schemes.  
528 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance: “Wer im Ausland erzielte Emis-
sionsverminderungen auf das Reduktionsziel nach Artikel 2 des Gesetzes anrechnen las-
sen will, muss beim BAFU ein Gesuch einreichen.” In the EU-ETS, the Linking-
Directive of the EU allows to use CDM and JI credits directly „through the issue and 
immediate surrender of one allowance in exchange for one CER or ERU“ to offset re-
duction obligations. Preamble, paragraph 5 of the Linking-Directive, repeated in Article 
11a, paragraph 1 of the Linking-Directive and introduced into the Consolidated ETS-
Directive. 
529 Explanations concerning CO2-Crediting-Ordinance, 3. The accounting procedure for 
companies is addressed in Article 12 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
530 According to Article 7, paragraph 4 of the CO2-Act, the amount of the CO2-Fee on 
heating fuel has to be approved by the Federal Assembly.  
531 For a summary of the Swiss climate policy of the past years see <http://www.wwf. 
ch/de/derwwf/themen/klima/klimapolitik/schweiz/>. New efforts to align the provisions 
for heating and for motor fuel failed. On 1 June 2010, the National Council voted with 
108 against 82 again against the introduction of an Article providing for a CO2-Fee on 
motor fuels in the Draft CO2-Act. See <http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/ 
d/n/4814/326160/d_n_4814_326160_326182.htm>; On 8 March 2011, the Council of 
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CO2-Ordinance of 22 June 2005, the Federal Council intended to introduce a 
CO2-Fee of 35 CHF on heating fuel. Whereas for motor fuels, the so-called 
“Climate Cent” (“Klimarappen”)532 was introduced as of 1 October 2005, it 
took two years of tedious deliberations until the Federal Assembly decided in 
March 2007 to put forward a more modest CO2-Fee on heating fuel with 
graduated introduction.533 On 8 June 2007, the Federal Council accepted the 
Federal Assembly’s proposal and the revised CO2-Fee-Ordinance entered 
into force on 1 July 2007. The CO2-Fee currently amounts to 36 CHF per 
tCO2.534 As a tax, the CO2-Fee is unique because it is a pure steering tax 
which is redistributed to both the population and the business sector.535 
The CO2-Fee-Ordinance provides for Fee-exemption if a company concludes 
a voluntary Target Agreement with the Swiss authorities. Article 12 of the 
CO2-Fee Ordinance stipulates that FOEN allocates “CO2 emission rights” of 
the amount of the agreed reduction target.536 The company consequently has 
to invalidate the “emission rights” corresponding to the effected emis-
sions.537  
                                              
States voted 21 against 16 in favour of anintroduction of an Article providing for a CO2-
Fee on motor fuels in the Draft CO2-Act. See <http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/s/ 
4817/347688/d_s_4817_347688_347689.htm>. 
532 The so-called “Klimarappen” corresponds, in fact, to 1.5 “Rappen” ( 0.015 CHF) for a 
litre of motor fuel. 
533 A CO2-Fee of 12 CHF per tCO2 (corresponding to 0.03 CHF per litre heating fuel) in 
2008, if the emissions from heating fuel in 2006 is reduced by less than 6 per cent com-
pared to 1990; a CO2-Fee of 24 CHF per tCO2 (corresponding to 0.06 CHF per litre 
heating fuel) in 2009, if the emissions from heating fuel in 2007 is reduced by less than 
10 per cent compared to 1990; CO2-Fee of 36 CHF per tCO2 (corresponding to 0.09 
CHF per litre heating fuel) in 2008, if the emissions from heating fuel in 2008 is reduced 
by less than 13.5 per cent compared to 1990. Article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraphs a, b 
and c of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
534 Status since 1 January 2010. See <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/ 
medieninformation/00962/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=27541>. 
535 CLAASEN/ARNOLD. 56.  
536 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance: “Das BAFU teilt den von der Abga-
be befreiten Unternehmen im Umfang des CO2-Frachtziels CO2-Emissionsrechte für die 
Jahre zu, in denen das Unternehmen von der Abgabe befreit ist. (…)“ 
537 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance: “Die von der Abgabe befreiten Un-
ternehmen müssen die Emissionsrechte und Emissionszertifikate bis zum 1. Juni des Jah-
res, das auf die erstmalige Befreiung von der Abgabe folgt, und dann jährlich bis zum 1 
Juni 2013 nach Massgabe der effektiven Emissionen entwerten.“ 
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4.2.4 Post 2012-National Legislation 
The CO2-Act requires the Federal Council to propose new reduction targets 
for the period after 2010 “accurately timed”.538 A first draft of a renewed 
CO2-Act has been submitted to the Parliament by the Federal Council on 26 
August 2009 accompanied with the “Dispatch on Swiss Climate Policy after 
2012”.539 The Federal Council proposed that the reform of the legislation 
takes the form of an indirect counter-proposal to the federal popular initia-
tive "For a healthy climate".540 
The Draft CO2-Act intends to continue and improve the existing Emission 
Trading Scheme for energy-intensive businesses in analogy to the basic pro-
visions of the EU-ETS. The objective will be a link with the EU-ETS.541  
Whereas in the current CO2-Act emission trading is not directly addressed, 
the Draft CO2-Act explicitly establishes an Emission Trading Scheme and 
contributes its entire Chapter 3 to emission trading and compensation. A 
second novelty of the Draft CO2-Act is the reference to adaptation measures 
to climate change.542 
For the adoption of the proposed Draft CO2-Act, a one-year deadline was 
extended twice. According to current provisions, the Federal Assembly must 
agree on the Draft CO2-Act by 29 August 2012.543 The main discussion 
                                              
538 Article 2, paragraph 6 of the CO2-Act.  
539 See Press Release of 28 August 2009, available at <http://www.news.admin.ch/message/ 
index.html?lang=en&msg-id=28680>.  
540 The federal popular initiative "For a healthy climate" demands a reduction in emissions 
of GHG gases by a minimum of 30 per cent by 2020 versus the 1990 levels; this is to be 
achieved by implementing measures within Switzerland domestically. The background 
of the initiative is the objective of limiting global warming in the long term to a maxi-
mum of 2°C in comparison with the pre-industrial level. 
541 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7474: “Angestrebt wird ausser-
dem die Kompatibilität mit dem EG-Emissionshandelssystem (EG-ETS), um eine Ver-
knüpfung der Systeme zu ermöglichen.“ See also <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumenta 
tion/medieninformation/00962/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=28680>. See also KECKEIS, 
833. 
542 Article 1, paragraph 2, subparagraph d of the Draft CO2-Act.  
543 According to the Decision of the Council of State of 1 June, available at 
<http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/n/4819/356078/d_n_4819_356078_356079.ht
m>; and according to the Decision of the National Council of 8 June 2011, available at 
<http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/n/4819/356078/d_n_4819_356078_356079.ht
m>. 
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points concern the reduction rate versus the 1990 level,544 the tariffs of the 
CO2-Fee545 and the level of compensation requirement for manufacturers and 
importers of fossil motor fuels.546 A further significant point is the question 
of compensation from abroad. Claiming conformity with the international 
requirement of supplementarity, the Draft CO2-Act states that half of the 
emission reductions may be achieved through reduction measures abroad.547 
There is a political controversy as to whether the Draft CO2-Act in its current 
form is adequate. Proponents of emission trading are of the opinion that the 
provisions of 20 per cent domestic emission reductions and the CO2-Fee on 
                                              
544 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Draft CO2-Act: „Die Treibhausgasemissionen sind bis zum 
Jahr 2020 gegenüber 1990 gesamthaft um 20 Prozent zu vermindern. Der Bundesrat 
kann Zwischenziele festlegen“. As a variation, it is proposed to reduce 30 per cent versus 
the 1990 level, if important emitters commit to comparable efforts. FEDERAL COUNCIL, 
Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7489. See also BURKHARDT, 72. 
545 Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-Act: “Der Abgabesatz beträgt je Tonne CO2 36 
Franken. Der Bundesrat kann ihn bis auf höchstens 120 Franken erhöhen, falls die CO2-
Emissionen aus Brennstoffen bis zum Jahr 2014 nicht um 18 Prozent und bis zum Jahr 
2017 nicht um 21 Prozent gegenüber 1990 vermindert werden.“ As a variation, a CO2-
Fee of 60 CHF is proposed with the possibility to raise the amount up to 180 CHF if the 
CO2-emissions from heating fuel could not be reduced by 21 percent by the year 2014 
and by 27 percent by the year 2017.  
546 Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-Act: “1. Wer nach dem Mineralölsteuergesetz 
vom 21. Juni 1996 Treibstoffe in den steuerrechtlich freien Verkehr überführt, muss ei-
nen Teil der CO2-Emissionen, die bei der energetischen Nutzung der Treibstoffe entste-
hen, kompensieren, indem er dem Bund Emissionszertifikate abgibt. 2. Der Kompensati-
onssatz beträgt 25 Prozent. Der Bundesrat kann ihn bis auf höchstens 35 Prozent erhö-
hen, soweit dies zur Erreichung des Reduktionszieles nach Artikel 3 notwendig ist.“ As a 
variation, a compensation of 40 per cent is proposed, which can be raised to 50 per cent. 
547 Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-Act. See also FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy 
after 2012-Dispatch, 7472. The federal popular initiative “For a healthy climate”, on 
contrary, proposes an emission reduction of at least 30 per cent versus the 1990 level 
achieved without emission units from abroad entirely within Switzerland. The National 
Council, in its deliberations of June 2010, has agreed on a reduction target of minus 20 
per cent to be achieved by domestic abatement measures only (“Inlandkompensation”). 
This decision is accompanied by the competence for the Federal Council to increase the 
reduction target to up to 40 per cent if other major emitters take comparable measures. 
In this case, only one fourth of the additional reductions must be achieved in-country. 
(See BUNDESAMT FÜR UMWELT (BAFU), “Das revidierte CO2-Gesetz nach der National-
ratsdebatte”, 26 July 2010 available at <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/00493/06577/ 
10620/index.html?lang=de>.) In March 2011, the Council of States followed the Na-
tional Council’s decision on the offset-provisions. The Council of States took this deci-
sion despite of the opposed recommendation of its Committee for the Environment, Spa-
tial Planning and Energy. 
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motor fuel as foreseen in the current Draft CO2-Act is detrimental and, there-
fore, should be opposed by a referendum or, as an alternative, the validity of 
the current CO2-Act shall be extended by parliamentary initiative.548 Other 
economic groups, to the contrary, consider the Draft CO2-Act with its 20 per 
cent domestic reduction as an opportunity for Swiss companies to increase 
Switzerland’s worldwide role as a “cleantec-pioneer”. In their view, 20 per 
cent domestic reduction can be achieved without any economic disadvan-
tages - well to the contrary. 
The extension of the current CO2-Act could, indeed, be an elegant way to 
continue what has been functional so far. A hasty decision on a new regime 
and a hasty implementation risks to preclude deficient or imperfect details. 
In addition, an extension of the current CO2-Act would allow a deepened 
discussion about advantages and disadvantages of a linkage of the CH-ETS 
with the EU-ETS. 
4.3 Coverage of the Swiss Emission Trading Scheme 
(CH-ETS) 
The CO2-Act’s objective is to reduce the emissions in the current period 
primarily through voluntary measures.549 “Emission allowances”550 are allo-
cated to companies as a result of a voluntary Target Agreement (“Zielverein-
barung”) with the Swiss authorities.551 The design of the voluntary measures 
and the Target Agreements are facilitated by a mandated agency.552  
                                              
548 MARKUS HOFMANN, „Klimagesetz verlängern statt revidieren“, in: Neue Zürcher Zei-
tung (NZZ), 9 September 2011, 13. 
549 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Act. See also Article 4 of the CO2-Act, providing for 
voluntary measures not only in the heating fuel sector, but also in the motor fuel sector. 
The privately established Swiss “Climate Cent Foundation”, therefore, contracted 
agreements with some 83 companies in the motor fuels sector. Overall, these agreements 
should yield emissions reductions of 0.22 million tonnes of CO2 over the period 2008 to 
2012, at a pre-agreed price of 125 CHF per tonne. See <http://klimarappen.ch/ 
en/programmes/target-agreements.html>.  
550 “Allowance” is the term used by the translation of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance by the 
Swiss authorities. In this thesis, the term is only used when referring to a direct or indi-
rect citation of a text of the Swiss authorities. When referring to tradable emission units 
in general, the term “emission unit” is used. 
551 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance: “Das BAFU teilt den von der Abga-
be befreiten Unternehmen im Umfang des CO2-Frachtziels CO2-Emissionsrechte für die 
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The Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) agreed with the 
UNFCCC secretariat that the assigned amount per year for Switzerland is 
48.25 million tCO2e according to the Kyoto provisions.553 This assigned 
amount requires a yearly net reduction of more than 4.5 million tCO2e per 
year.554  
The CH-ETS covers, according to a publicly available list on the internet, 
currently 435 installations with allocated emission units.555 These 435 instal-
lations account for about 3 million allocated tCO2e per year.556 The CH-ETS, 
consequently, equals the size of about 0.15 per cent of the size of the EU-
ETS.557 
4.3.1 Periods 
The CO2-Act states that the national emission reduction target of 10 per cent 
applies to the year 2010.558 Decisive for the determination of compliance are 
                                              
Jahre zu, in denen das Unternehmen von der Abgabe befreit ist. (…)“ According to 
BORLAT, 1289, almost 1’000 companies have negotiated a Target Agreement by 2010 
and obtained exemption from the CO2-Fee in return. BORLAT, an employee of the 
DETEC himself, reports on one appeal against a Target Agreement filed with the 
DETEC so far.,  
552 Article 4, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Act: „Der Bund kann geeignete Organisationen mit 
der Unterstützung und der Durchführung freiwilliger Massnahmen beauftragen.“ Arti-
cle 29, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance providing for support by mandated agen-
cies according to Article 16 and Article 18 of the Energy Act of 26 June 1998, SR 730.0. 
553 See <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05538/05540/index.html?lang=en>. 
554 According to the initial report under the Kyoto protocol, Switzerland has a calculated 
base-year emission of 52’790’957 tCO2e. <http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/initial 
_reports_under_the_kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/initial_report_-_update_following 
_review.pdf>. The difference between the base-year emission and the assigned amount 
per year corresponds to the yearly net reduction requirement. 
555 See NAP of Switzerland, available at <https://www.national-registry.ch/ListePnaq.aspx? 
Period=01&menu=yes>, accessed on 14 November 2011. 
556 KECKEIS, 831. The total allocation for the period 2008 to 2012 amounts to 16’346’705 
tCO2e. Calculated on the basis of the NAP of Switzerland, available at <https://www.na 
tional-registry.ch/ListePnaq.aspx?Period=01&menu=yes>. 
557 In the EU-ETS, the final allocations of emissions units in phase II amounts to almost 
2’000 million tCO2 per year. GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 12. 
558 Article 2, paragraph 1, of the CO2-Act: “Die CO2-Emissionen aus der energetischen 
Nutzung fossiler Energieträger sind bis zum Jahr 2010 gegenüber 1990 gesamthaft um 
10 Prozent zu vermindern (…).“ 
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the average emissions during the period from 2008 to 2012.559 Or, expressed 
differently: The reduction target for the year 2010 must on average be main-
tained also over the whole period 2008 to 2012.560  
The CO2-Fee-Ordinance provides for the transposition of the national emis-
sions reduction target into individual targets for companies. Because a Target 
Agreement entails the exemption from the CO2-Fee and because a Target 
Agreement may be concluded as of any starting date, the relative provision 
in the CO2-Fee-Ordinance uses the complicated formula: “The reduction 
target is set for 2010. Decisive is the average of the years of CO2-Fee-
exemption of the company.” 561 
The Draft CO2-Act defines 2020 as the new target year.562 Emission units 
which were not used in the first period 2008 to 2012 can be used in the sub-
sequent period without restriction.563 In his Climate Policy after 2012-
Dispatch, the Federal Council stresses that 2020 as the new target year re-
mains the same regardless of the outcome of international negotiations on 
climate change policies.564 It thereby adheres to the decision taken by the EU 
to design 2013 to 2020 as the next commitment period. 
4.3.2 Gases covered 
The CO2-Act covers, as its name indicates, CO2 as the most eminent of all 
GHG emitted by the use of fossil energy.565 These CO2 emissions from fossil 
heating and motor fuel cover some 80 per cent of the total GHG emissions in 
                                              
559 Article 2, paragraph 1, phrase 2 of the CO2-Act: „Massgebend für die Erreichung dieses 
Ziels ist der Durchschnitt der Jahre 2008 bis 2012.“  
560 Explanations concerning the CO2-Fee-Ordinance, 4. 
561 Article 7, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance: „Das Begrenzungsziel wird für das 
Jahr 2010 festgelegt. Massgebend für die Zielerreichung ist der Durchschnitt der Jahre, 
in denen das Unternehmen von der Abgabe befreit ist.“ 
562 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
563 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7475. 
564 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Change after 2012-Dispatch, 7466. 
565 Article 1 of the CO2-Act: „Mit diesem Gesetz sollen die CO2-Emissionen vermindert 
werden, die auf die energetische Nutzung fossiler Energieträger (Brenn- und Treibstoffe) 
zurückzuführen sind (….).“ 
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Switzerland.566 GHG emission sources from international aviation and from 
other sources than the use of energy are not covered.567  
The fact that, unlike the coverage of the Kyoto Protocol, only CO2-emissions 
are covered by the current CO2-Act, is perceived as a disadvantage. In its 
Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, the Federal Council proposes that, 
henceforth, the scope of covered gases by the Swiss legislation shall be iden-
tical with the scope of the international legislation.568 The Draft CO2-Act 
consequently addresses all the GHG emissions, “in particular the CO2-
emissions originating from the use of fossil energy”.569 
However, since only companies with a voluntary Target Agreement are in-
cluded in the scheme, the CH-ETS covers only 12 per cent of the CO2-
emissions from heating fuel and 6 per cent of all the CO2-emissions in Swit-
zerland.570 The quantity of the GHG gases included in the CH-ETS, hence, is 
very modest compared to the quantity of GHG emitted in the Non CH-ETS 
sector. (Figure 6) 
                                              
566 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7460. 
567 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Act: “Die Emissionen aus der energetischen Nutzung 
fossiler Brennstoffe sind gesamthaft um 15 Prozent und die Emissionen aus fossilen 
Treibstoffen (ohne Flugtreibstoffe für internationale Flüge) gesamthaft um 8 Prozent zu 
vermindern.” Not covered, apart from international aviation, are GHG emissions in ag-
ricultural and industrial production, the carbon increment in the biomass (sinks), carbon 
as a result of waste incineration and the not-energetically caused CO2 in cement produc-
tion. See FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7460. 
568 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7460 and 7488. However, this 
intention is not reflected in the text of the Draft CO2-Act.  
569 Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Draft CO2-Act: „Mit diesem Gesetz sollen die Treibhaus-
gasemissionen, insbesondere die CO2-Emissionen, die auf die energetische Nutzung fos-
siler Energieträger (Brenn- und Treibstoffe) zurückzuführen sind, vermindert werden. 
(…)“  
570 According to calculations of ENAW. Interview with Dr. Armin Eberle and Mr. Oliver 
Luder, 19 November 2010. In a press release of the Council of the European Union is-
sued on 20 December 2010, it was calculated that the CH-ETS applies to around 6.5 per 
cent of the 52 million tCO2e emitted by Switzerland per year. COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, “EU to link its greenhouse gas emissions trading system with Swit-
zerland”, Brussels 20 December 2010, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/118632.pdf>.  
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Figure 6: CH-ETS Sectors versus Non CH-ETS Sectors 
The CH-ETS covers only about 6 per cent of all the CO2-emissions in Switzerland. 
4.3.3 Sectors and Allocation  
4.3.3.1 Sectors and Allocation through Target Agreements 
The allocation of emission units to Swiss companies is triggered by a Target 
Agreement, a voluntary measure according to the current CO2-Act. Target 
Agreements may be concluded as a single company or in a group of compa-
nies.571 The Target Agreement includes an absolute “freight aim” and an 
“intensity aim” as a relative indicator for the effectiveness of the meas-
ures.572 The freight aims are adjusted each year in relation to the company’s 
                                              
571 Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3 and Article 8, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance 
provide for Target Agreements concluded by a group of companies. If a group of com-
panies does not meet its target, the individual target of each company is decisive for de-
termination of (non-)compliance. Article 18, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
572 Article 8, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
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production growth, with the final adjustment taking place in 2010.573 Having 
reached and concluded a Target Agreement with the competent Swiss au-
thorities, the Confederation issues in an Act of Disposal the company’s re-
spective emission units.574 
The conclusion of Target Agreements is facilitated by the “Energy Agency 
for the Economy” (ENAW) which was founded in 1999 as a result of the 
discussions which led to the current CO2-legislation. Its purpose is to be a 
service-provider for industrial companies according to Article 29, paragraph 
3 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. It consults member-companies how to reduce 
CO2-emissions by increasing energy efficiency through the economically 
most profitable measures. A respective framework agreement with the Swiss 
authorities was concluded in 2001.575 
ENAW supports companies calculating their reduction options by using a 
"bottom-up" approach: a company's potential to reduce emissions from a 
technical and economic viewpoint is assessed on the basis of projected pro-
duction and emissions, taking into account any CO2 reduction measures al-
ready implemented.576 
Due to the different starting positions, ENAW divides the addressed compa-
nies into three groups: the Energy-Model for large scale consumers (“Ener-
gie-Modell”), the “Benchmark-Model” for small and medium-sized compa-
nies with intensive energy consumption and the SME-Model (“KMU-
Modell”) for other small or medium-sized business entities.  
                                              
573 Article 8, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance and Enforcement Instruction of 2 July 
2007, revised on 22 December 2009, 18. The so-called “ex-post adjustment” is not fore-
seen any more for the post-2012 regime. 
574 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance: „Das BAFU teilt den von der Abga-
be befreiten Unternehmen im Umfang des CO-Frachtziels CO2-Emissionsrechte für die 
Jahre zu, in denen das Unternehmen von der Abgabe befreit ist. Frachtzielanpassungen 
verändern den Bestand der Emissionsrechte. Wurden einem Unternehmen zu viele Emis-
sionsrechte zugeteilt, so kann ihm das BAFU Emissionsrechte entziehen.“ According to 
an interstate treaty, companies located in Liechtenstein may also conclude a Target 
Agreement beginning in 2010. See ENAW, Tätigkeitsbericht, 14. 
575 ENAW, Tätigkeitsbericht, 10. The framework agreement was renewed in 2004 and 2008 
and expires, according to the current agreement, in 2012.  
576 In order to conclude Target Agreements, their energy consumption has to be recorded 
and efficiency potentials have to be identified that can be exploited while maintaining 
economic viability. With support of an expert from the ENAW, a basic forecast is then 
made regarding the development of CO2 emissions up to 2010. This is used for defining 
the targets for CO2 emissions. See <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/ 
05538/05540/index.html?lang=en>. 
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Only Target Agreements with companies adhering to the Energy-Model trig-
ger emission units to the extent of the targeted emissions for 2008 and 2009 
and three times the targeted emissions for 2010. Companies adhering to the 
Benchmark-Model commit to emission reductions in percentage and are not 
allocated any emission units for trading. The same principle applies to SME-
companies which may buy emission units for compliance but don’t receive 
any emission units for trading.577  
Since 1999, some 2000 companies from industry, business and service sec-
tors have decided to cooperate with ENAW.578 Less than a quarter of these 
companies are CH-ETS-participants.  
4.3.3.2 Post 2012-Sectors 
In contrast to the current system, the Draft CO2-Act defines emission trading 
to be a self-contained instrument a part from the CO2-Fee and the instrument 
of CO2-Fee exemption through the conclusion of a Target Agreement.579 It 
differentiates between two categories of ETS-participating companies: Arti-
cle 12 addresses companies which may be included in the CH-ETS, Article 
13 addresses companies whose inclusion in the CH-ETS is mandatory. As 
under the current legislation, participating companies in the CH-ETS will be 
exempt from the CO2-Fee.580  
The Draft CO2-Act delegates the competence to decide on the inclusion of 
industrial sectors into the CH-ETS to the Federal Council.581 According to 
the Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, a participation in the CH-ETS will 
be mandatory for companies with yearly emissions of more than 10’000 
tCO2e from specific sectors.582 Voluntary may be the participation for en-
                                              
577 Enforcement Instruction of 2 July 2007, revised on 22 December 2009, 17-20. See also 
<http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/index.html?lang=en>. 
578 The 2000th company has joined ENAW in December 2010. See <http://www.pressepor 
tal.ch/de/pm/100005471/100615763/die-enaw-feiert-2000-klimaschuetzer-ehrung-der-fir 
men-dambach-ag-und-schenk-gmbh>. 
579 KECKEIS, 834. 
580 Article 14 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
581 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Draft CO2-Act: „Der Bundesrat bezeichnet die Wirt-
schaftszweige. (…)“ 
582 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7474, spells out the limit of 
10'000 tCO2e. It is not mentioned in the Draft CO2-Act. Sectors: Power supply (e.g. 
combined heat and power plant, cogeneration plant for heat and power), coking plant 
and petroleum processing (e.g. refineries), metal production and machining (e.g. raw 
iron and steel), production of metal produces, production of glass, glassware, ceramic, 
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ergy-intensive companies with more than 5’000 tCO2e yearly emissions.583 It 
is estimated that these provisions concern about 50 sites, 85 per cent of 
which participate already today in the CH-ETS.584 Newly added will be re-
fineries, some power supply sites and some chemical industry sites. Aviation, 
however, has not been in consideration to be included in the CH-ETS so far. 
Studies assume that the CH-ETS as designed by the Draft CO2-Act will 
cover the emissions of around 6 million tCO2e, including almost 100 com-
panies with 130 facilities. The majority of the emissions, about 5 million 
tCO2e, will be emitted by only 30 facilities with a yearly freight (“Jahres-
fracht”) of over 25’000 tCO2e each.585 
4.3.3.3 Post 2012-Allocation 
The Draft CO2-Act remains vague regarding the allocation of emission units. 
It foresees a yearly free-of-charge allocation of emission units “in so far as 
they are necessary for the GHG-efficient operation”. The rest of the emis-
sion units are to be auctioned.586 The Federal Council is competent to regu-
late the details “taking into consideration comparable international regula-
tion”.587  
According to a study of FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, most of the Swiss 
companies included in the ETS belong to a sector which, according to the 
EU regulation, is inclined to carbon leakage.588 Therefore, if respective EU 
provisions are incorporated by Switzerland, auctions of emissions units for 
the period from 2013 to 2020 can be expected to be rare. 
                                              
manufacturing of stones and earths (e.g. cement, lime and bricks), manufacturing of cel-
lulose, pulp and paper, manufacturing of chemical produces and refuse incineration 
plants. FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, 57, estimates that some 43 companies will have to 
participate in the CH-ETS on a mandatory basis.  
583 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7474, spells out the limit of 
5'000 tCO2e. It is not mentioned in the Draft CO2-Act.  
584 FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, 9. 
585 FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, 7 and also 134. 
586 Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-Act: “Sie werden kostenlos zugeteilt, soweit sie 
für den treibhausgaseffizienten Betrieb der ETS-Unternehmen notwendig sind. Die übri-
gen Emissionsrechte werden versteigert.“ 
587 Article 16, paragraph 3 of the Draft CO2-Act: “Der Bundesrat regelt die Einzelheiten 
und berücksichtigt dabei vergleichbare internationale Regelungen.”  
588 FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, 57. 
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4.4 Definition and Recognition of Trading Units 
4.4.1 Measurement of a Trading Unit 
Being a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, the Swiss system for the accounting of 
emissions is based on the same unit of “one metric tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent”, translated into “tCO2 equivalent” or, in short, “tCO2e”.589 
The CO2-Crediting-Ordinance of 22 June 2005 foresees two categories of 
emission units eligible to be accounted in the CH-ETS: Certificates (“Zerti-
fikate”) according to Article 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and authoriza-
tions (“Bewilligungen”) to emit a defined amount of CO2 provided that these 
authorizations have been issued in states with comparable emission trading 
rules.590 The over-all term for all securitized emission units used by the 
Swiss authorities at the time was “emission credits”.591 
The Draft CO2-Act published on 26 August 2009, however, deviates from 
this linguistic practice by defining „emission rights“ („Emissionsrechte“) as 
tradable “authorizations” (“Bewilligungen”) for emitting a defined amount 
of GHG gases.592 “Emission certificates” (“Emissionszertifikate”) are de-
                                              
589 Almost all schemes currently emerging do in fact rely on the same quantitative unit of 
trading based on the Kyoto Protocol. The one exception is the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) in the north-eastern and mid-atlantic States, a scheme based on “short 
tonnes”, which is less than a metric tonne (namely 907.18474 kg). SCHÜLE/STERK, 12. 
590 Article 2, paragraph 1 a) and b) of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance.  
591 FOEN, Emission Credits, Offsetting and Trading, 1. See also Explanations to the Regist-
ry-Ordinance of 27 September 2007, 2, Fn.3: “Die vom BAFU zugeteilten Rechte wer-
den als “Emissionsrechte” bezeichnet. Emissionsgutschriften aus Projekten in Entwick-
lungsländern (sog. CDM nach Artikel 12 des Kyoto-Protokolls) und aus anderen Indust-
rie- oder Transitionsländern (sog. JI nach Artikel 6 des Kyoto-Protokolls) sind „Zertifi-
kate“. Als Oberbegriff für die „Emissionsrechte“ und die „Zertifikate“ wird der Begriff 
„Emissionsgutschriften“ verwendet.“ 
592 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Draft CO2-Act: “Emissionsrechte sind handelbare Berech-
tigungen zum Ausstoss von Treibhausgasen, die vom Bund oder von Staaten mit vom 
Bundesrat anerkannten Emissionshandelssystemen zugeteilt werden.” Whether the car-
bon market’s traded good constitutes a property right is, however, ambiguous and widely 
disputed. For a comprehensive summary of the discussion see WEMAERE/STRECK/ 
CHAGAS, chapter 3.1. “The ethical dimension”, 37-40. 
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fined, in accordance to the current practice, as internationally recognized 
attestations on emission reduction units achieved abroad.593 
4.4.2 Certificates - Offsetting from Abroad 
Emission units generated abroad according to the provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol may be purchased and transferred by private companies or, in 
parallel, by governments as the Kyoto Protocol facilitates international 
government trading at the country level. Hence, both private entities and 
governments may undertake project-based emission reductions in developing 
countries via the CDM.594  
The current CO2-Act accords the competence to decide on the crediting of 
emission reductions achieved abroad to the Federal Council.595 Whereas the 
FOEN is the responsible Office for the implementation of the Kyoto Proto-
col’s legal requirements in Switzerland, a national Secretariat called “Swiss-
flex” has been established within the Climate Division of the FOEN respon-
sible for the flexible mechanisms. The national Secretariat represents the 
Swiss Designated National Authority (DNA) under the Clean Development 
Mechanism as well as the Designated Focal Point (DFP) under Joint Imple-
mentation. 
Guidelines of the FOEN spell out the general requirements: An entity or 
person domiciled in Switzerland and wishing to participate in a CDM project 
activity and to transfer resulting CERs from the CDM Registry into an ac-
count of the Swiss national register requires a “Letter of Approval” from the 
Swiss DNA under the Clean Development Mechanism.596 The accounted 
reductions in emissions from abroad are recorded in the National Registry 
                                              
593 Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Draft CO2-Act: „Emissionszertifikate sind international 
anerkannte handelbare Bescheinigungen über im Ausland erzielte Emissionsverminde-
rungen.“ However, there is no definition of the legal nature of emission units in the 
Swiss jurisdiction. ZUMBACH, 36. 
594 ANGER, 2045. 
595 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the CO2-Act: „Verminderungen der Emissionen, die im Aus-
land erzielt und von der Schweiz oder von in der Schweiz ansässigen Unternehmen fi-
nanziert wurden, kann der Bundesrat bei der Berechnung der Emissionen nach diesem 
Gesetz angemessen berücksichtigen. Er regelt die Anforderungen und berücksichtigt da-
bei international anerkannte Kriterien.“ 
596 Switzerland’s National Guidelines and Procedures for Approving Article 12 Projects, 
most recent edition dated 18 November 2010, available at <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/ 
emissionshandel/05556/05558/index.html?lang=en>. 
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and shadowed to the national account of Switzerland as an Annex-B Party of 
the Kyoto Protocol.597 
Although Switzerland, in principle, accepts all types of projects which are in 
accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, there are qualitative restrictions with 
regard to eligibility of CDM-projects. The use of certificates generated 
through projects with nuclear plants or gigantic hydroelectric power and the 
use of certificates generated through projects using genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) is restricted.598 
With regard to quantity, the CO2-Act demands that the crediting must be 
“adequate”.599 The CO2-Crediting Ordinance states more precisely that with 
regard to Switzerland’s commitment on international level reductions in 
emission achieved abroad may be credited to the reduction target for the 
years 2008 to 2012 to the extent of a maximum average of 2.0 million tCO2e 
per annum.600 
On company level, companies with a Target Agreement may, as a general 
principle, fulfil a maximum of 8 per cent of their CO2 emission target by 
means of reductions in emissions achieved abroad.601  
                                              
597 Article 3, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance. 
598 Switzerland’s National Guidelines and Procedures for Approving Article 12 Projects, 1-
2: “The Swiss DNA accepts all types of projects which are in accordance with the Kyoto 
Protocol. Activities related to the construction or rehabilitation of nuclear plants are not 
considered as being in accordance with these provisions. Afforestation and reforestation 
projects using genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or alien invasive species are not 
eligible for a Swiss Letter of Approval or Authorization. In the case of hydroelectric 
power projects generating more than 20 megawatt, project participants are required to 
provide prove of respected recommendation contained in the report of the World Com-
mission on Dams and the relevant international criteria and guidelines. Apart from the 
criteria listed above, the issuance of the Letter of Approval or Authorization may be re-
fused only in exceptional cases, where projects are in breach of Swiss Foreign or Devel-
opment Policies.” 
599 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the CO2-Act.  
600 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance. Amended in accordance with 
No. I of the Ordinance of 26 August 2009, in force since 1 November 2009 (AS 2009 
4781). 
601 Article 5, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance. See also Enforcement Instruc-
tion, 19, with regard to Energy-Model companies and see also Enforcement Instruction, 
20, with regard to Benchmark-Model companies.  
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Fossil fired power plants, the permit of which is linked to the obligation to 
fully compensate their emissions, may offset up to 30 per cent by emission 
units from abroad.602  
Also for companies under Article 9 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance, this share 
amounts to a maximum of 30 per cent.603 Companies are covered by Article 
9 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance if a reduction within the entity is technically not 
possible or economically not affordable. In the explanation to the CO2-Fee-
Ordinance, the example of newly entering companies with production sites 
according to the newest technical standard is mentioned.604  
4.4.3 Reduction Units bought by the Swiss “Climate 
Cent Foundation” 
With the CO2-Fee-Dispatch of 22 June 2005, not only the CO2-Fee on heat-
ing fuel was introduced. In addition, the commercially set up Climate Cent 
on motor fuels was granted a temporal testing phase.605 With the income 
generated by the Climate Cent, the “Climate Cent Foundation” acquires 
CO2 emission reductions generated by companies which have concluded a 
voluntary Target Agreement with the Swiss Confederation. The Foundation 
has committed to compensate for a total of 2.4 million tCO2e out of which 
only 2 million tCO2e may be compensated through emission units from 
abroad.606 
If, by 2007, no apparent emission reductions in the motor fuel sector were 
achieved, the Federal Council was to introduce a CO2-Fee on motor fuel in 
analogy to the CO2-Fee on heating fuel.607  
                                              
602 HAUSER, 821/822, referring to the amendment of the CO2-Act of 18 June 2010, in force 
as of 1 January 2011. 
603 Article 5, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Crediting-Ordinance. 
604 Explanations concerning CO2-Fee-Ordinance, 5. 
605 The concept of the “climate cent” as a voluntary measure in accordance with the Swiss 
carbon law was developed and refined over the years 2001 to 2003. The task was to co-
ordinate the concept within the wider context of climate policy. On the history of the 
Climate Cent-Foundation see <http://klimarappen.ch/fileadmin/Downloads/Geschich 
te_Klimarappen_EN.pdf>. 
606 BURKHARDT, 74. 
607 FEDERAL COUNCIL, CO2-Fee-Dispatch, AS 2005 0801. An additional agreement was 
signed in February 2009, in which the Foundation committed to achieve further CO2 re-
ductions. On 1 June 2010, the National Council voted with 108 against 82 against the in-
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The Climate Cent Foundation has acquired over-fulfilments by 243 compa-
nies in the heating fuel sector with Target Agreements, amounting to 1.31 
million tonnes of CO2 over the period 2008 to 2012. In the first auction 
round, CO2 emission reductions were acquired at a price of 70 CHF, in the 
second auction round at a price of 100 CHF per tonne.608  
Compared to the prices of EUAs in the EU-ETS which have fallen from over 
30 EUR in 2008 to about 15 EUR in 2009/2010 and, finally, to 10 EUR in 
November 2011, the prices paid by the Climate Cent Foundation cannot be 
considered as true market prices.609 
4.5 Compliance Issues 
The compliance regime of an Emission Trading Scheme comprises the en-
tirety of the provisions that ensure participants hold emission units equal to 
their effected emissions during the relevant compliance period.610 
4.5.1 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
Monitoring, reporting and verification in Switzerland is regulated through 
the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. CO2-Fee exempted companies must report to na-
tional authorities over mandated agencies.611 These are the same agencies as 
the ones mandated for the support in concluding a Target Agreement, namely 
                                              
troduction of an Article providing for a CO2-Fee on motor fuels in the Draft CO2-Act. 
See <http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/n/4814/326160/d_n_4814_326160_326 
182.htm >; On 8 March 2011, the Council of States voted 21 against 16 in favour of an 
introduction of an Article providing for a CO2-Fee on motor fuels in the Draft CO2-Act. 
See <http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/s/4817/347688/d_s_4817_347688_3476 
89.htm>. 
608 See <http://klimarappen.ch/en/programmes/target-agreements.html>. About on fifth of 
the Climate Cent Foundation’s total commitments was spent for domestic projects. See 
NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (NZZ), “Ein Bärendienst für den Klimaschutz”, 30 March 
2011, 26. 
609 For a historical overview over the price development for EUAs see POINTCARBONNEWS, 
Volume 09, Number 28, 16 July 2010, available at <http://www.firstclimate.com/ 
uploads/media/CarbonMarketEurope.pdf>. 
610 HAITES/MULLINS, 57. 
611 Article 11, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
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ENAW.612 The “Enforcement Instruction of FOEN and SFOE to the ENAW” 
of 2 July 2007, revised on 22 December 2009, substantiates the requirements 
for Target Agreements and their implementation. According to the Enforce-
ment Instruction, it is the responsibility of the CO2-Fee exempted company 
to provide for the yearly entering of the data and for the accuracy of the data. 
This responsibility shall be lived up to “with highest diligence”.613 
Monitoring, reporting and verification issues are addressed by chapter M of 
the Enforcement Instruction.614 ENAW has developed a monitoring system to 
support the implementation of the Target Agreements which is based on 
measures aimed at reducing energy consumption on the one hand and based 
on consumption fuel economy data on the other hand.615 
The verification is done by ENAW whose moderators check the entered data 
thoroughly. In a second step, random queries by ENAW search for inconsis-
tencies and peculiarities.616 The monitoring application is the basis for the 
data which is fed into the National Registry.617 
With the Draft CO2-Act, no substantial changes in the monitoring system are 
foreseeable. ETS-companies will have to continue to report on a yearly ba-
sis.618 However, there is an indication that the introduction of the Monitoring 
Guidelines of the EU is likely.619 Within chapter 3 in the Draft CO2-Act on 
emission trading and compensation, the Federal Council receives the compe-
                                              
612 Article 29, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Fee–Ordinance, in accordance with Article 16 and 
Article 18 of the Energy Act of 26 June 1998, SR 730.0. 
613 Enforcement Instruction of 2 July 2007, revised 22 December 2009: “Unternehmen, die 
von der CO2-Abgabe befreit sind, sowie freiwillige Zielvereinbarer haben ihren Pflichten 
zur Berichterstattung und Monitoring mit grösster Sorgfalt nachzukommen (…)” 
614 The provisions for monitoring in the CH-ETS are very modest compared to the monitor-
ing, reporting and verification provisions in the EU-ETS. The Monitoring Guidelines of 
the EU-ETS contain 85 pages. 
615 ENAW, Tätigkeitsbericht, 5. 
616 Enforcement Instruction of 2 July 2007, revised 22 December 2009, 29. 
617 The public does not have any access to the monitoring data. Interview with Dr. Armin 
Eberle and Mr. Oliver Luder on 19 November 2010. 
618 Article 17 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
619 The new Monitoring Guidelines of the EU, dated 18 July 2007, contain 85 pages. Avail-
able at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:229:0001: 
0085:EN:PDF>. 
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tences to regulate on specifications concerning the allocation of emission 
units and, thereby, “considers comparable international regulation”.620  
Although drafting the details of the MRV mechanisms is left to the Member 
States, the Monitoring Guidelines of the EU are, compared to the current 
Swiss provisions, very comprehensive. The European Commission recog-
nized that these differences in practice are not deemed to comply with the 
requirements of the internal market and might generate higher costs than 
necessary.621 In case of a linkage, Switzerland will have to harmonize its 
provisions with the ambitious MRV-requirements in the EU and, assumably, 
will have to increase MRV efforts considerably. 
4.5.2 Registration 
All units, the Kyoto units as well as European or Swiss Units, exist exclu-
sively unchartered and in electronic form.622 Every transaction, hence, must 
be recorded in a registry which centralizes the accounting data, provides 
transparent monitoring of reductions, and tracks transactions to avoid the 
double counting of reductions. The registry’s purpose is to assure that reduc-
tions are maintained over time and are not sold more than once through 
transparent reporting and tracking of reductions.623 After the incidents of 
“cyber theft” which occurred in the EU-ETS in January 2011,624 the Swiss 
National Registry has made the “four-eyes-principle” mandatory for every 
transaction as of summer 2011.625  
Since the CH-ETS has established an unilateral link with the Kyoto carbon 
market by accepting emission units from abroad, all transactions with 
CERs/ERUs must be recorded in the National Registry to account for com-
                                              
620 “Der Bundesrat regelt die Einzelheiten und berücksichtigt dabei vergleichbare interna-
tionale Regelungen.” Article 16, paragraph 3 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
621 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 71. 
622 Article 12, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. For general information see 
<http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05564/index.html?lang=en>. 
623 PASSERO, 523.  
624 The Commission closed the registries to market transfers of EUA emissions permits on 
19 January 2011 as news came to light that security of the online registry systems had 
been breached in the Czech Republic, Austria and Greece. See CARBONPOSITIVE, 
Carbon News and Info, 31 January 2011, available at <http://www.carbonposi 
tive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=2253>. 
625 As informed on the homepage of the National Registry, available at <https://www.natio 
nal-registry.ch/>, accessed on 9 August 2011.  
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pliance with the Article 3.1-commitment of the Kyoto Protocol.626 For sim-
plicity, Switzerland uses the National Registry also in the national CH-ETS. 
The National Registry is an online accounting system which ensures the 
accurate recording of emission units. Each of the emission units has an un-
ambiguous serial number. Every transaction is checked and confirmed by the 
International Transaction Log (ITL) which is established and run by the Se-
cretariat to the UNFCCC in Bonn.627 
The responsibility for the National Registry in Switzerland is accorded to the 
FOEN.628 Rules regarding the National Registry were published in the Ordi-
nance of the FOEN on the National Registry of 27 September 2007 (“Regis-
try-Ordinance”). Article 1 of the Registry-Ordinance stipulates that any 
company or person to receive or trade with emission units must dispose of an 
account in the National Registry: an operator’s account (“Betreiberkonto”) 
for companies with assigned emission units; a personal account (“Per-
sonenkonto”) for persons without assigned emission units.629  
Companies with assigned emission units handle the cancellations of emis-
sion units themselves by transferring the emission units from a stock account 
(“Bestandeskonto”) into a retirement account (“Rückgabekonto”). The na-
tional authorities check the retirement account to determine compliance of 
the committed companies.630 
In accordance with the Kyoto regulation, the Registry-Ordinance asks fol-
lowing registry data deemed “not particularly sensitive” to be published 
                                              
626 The Kyoto Protocol requires the participants in the Kyoto market to have a National 
Registry responsible for ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, trans-
fer, acquisition, cancellation and retirement of emission units. Eligibility to participate in 
the market-based mechanisms depends on compliance with the methodological and re-
porting requirements under Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 and Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 
4 of the Kyoto Protocol. To have a National Registry in place is one of the six eligibility 
criteria as defined by the Marrakesh Accords. 
627 Explanations to the Registry-Ordinance, 1. The Status of the national registries must be 
recorded according to a Standard Electronic Format (SEF). Decision 14/CMP.1; Deci-
sion 15/CMP.1 section I.E. The standard Status tables for each Party are publicly avail-
able at <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventori 
es_submissions/items/5270.php>. 
628 Article 12, paragraph 4 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
629 Article 2 of the Registry-Ordinance.  
630 Explanations concerning National Emissions Trading Registry, 2. 
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electronically:631 A list of participants holding an account in the National 
Registry;632 a list of accounts opened in the national registry;633an annual 
summary of quantity of emission units per type of operation made in the 
National Registry.634 
Also CH-ETS specific information is or will be publicly available, among 
others: A list of installations in the CH-ETS; a compliance status of opera-
tors; a list of non-compliant installations. The total quantity of emission units 
in each account and the identity of sellers and buyers of emission units is 
considered to be confidential information and thus not publicly available.635  
In collaboration with the FOEN, the Bernese Cantonal Bank (BEKB) has 
established a trading platform for “Swiss Emission Units” (CHUs). 636 The 
platform is ready for operation since November 2009. Every transaction 
performed over the BEKB-platform must be followed by the respective 
transaction in the National Registry.637 So far, no transaction has been regis-
tered over the BEKB-platform. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, until 
2010 companies included in the ETS had agreed on relative emission reduc-
tion targets that were based on production levels. This created uncertainties 
with regard to whether the company was short or long and, therefore, most 
companies decided to wait to sell emission units. Since 2010, the targets 
have been fixed. Secondly, ETS companies have been long over the past 
years by around 0.5 million tonnes per year according to recent figures from 
the Swiss Environment Ministry.638 
                                              
631 Article 11 of the Registry-Ordinance, pursuant to paragraphs 45 and 48 of the annex to 
decision 13/CMP.1. See the menu item “public reports”, available at <www.national-
registry.ch>. 
632 Paragraph 48, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
633 Paragraph 45, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
634 Paragraph 47, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
635 According to Decision 13/CMP.1, paragraph 47, subparagraph a, d, f, l. See introductory 
site to <www.national-registry.ch>. 
636 Available at <https://www.otc-x.ch/markt/instrument/valor/999999.html>, accessed on 
14 November 2011. 
637 The other option for trading in the CH-ETS is over-the-counter (OTC) trading. If and 
how many OTC-transactions have taken place so far is not known.  
638 CLAASEN/ARNOLD, 56.  
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4.5.3 Temporal Flexibility 
According to the Kyoto Protocol and its implementation modalities, the sur-
plus ERUs, CERs and AAUs, may be carried forward into the subsequent 
commitment period for compliance purposes.639 The forward transfer of 
emission units in time is referred to as “banking”, which means that an over-
fulfilment of the targets in the current commitment period can be carried 
over to subsequent commitment periods.640 The opposite is referred to as 
“borrowing”: Emission units from a subsequent allocation year are placed in 
installation holding accounts for compliance purposes. 
Swiss emission units which were not used in the first period 2008 to 2012 
can be used in the subsequent period without restriction.641 Borrowing is de-
facto also possible. Emission units were allocated for the entire period from 
2008 to 2012, but compliance is to be established only after the end of the 
period.642  
For the post 2012-period, the Draft CO2-Act foresees maximal temporal 
flexibility. Emission units which were not used in the first period 2008 to 
2012 can be used in the subsequent period without restrictions.643 
4.5.4 The CO2-Fee as an Instrument for Compliance  
For Non ETS-companies, the CO2-Fee currently constitutes a kind of a tax. 
For ETS-companies, on the contrary, the exemption from the CO2-Fee is the 
key incentive to participate in the CH-ETS. At the same time, the CO2-Fee is 
the central compliance instrument of the current CH-ETS.644  
                                              
639 Article 3, paragraph 13 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the general carry-over. Para-
graph 15, annex to decision 13/CMP.1 specifies the carry-over for ERUs, CERs and 
AAUs. The RMUs may not be carried-over. Paragraph 16, annex to decision 13/CMP.1. 
640 While many trading systems allow banking, the EU-ETS is unique among cap-and-trade 
programs in allowing borrowing. However, there are several important limitations on 
banking and borrowing in the EU-ETS. The most important is that no inter-period bank-
ing or borrowing is allowed. TROTIGNON/ELLERMAN, 17.  
641 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7475. 
642 HAITES/MULLINS, 62. 
643 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7475. 
644 In the EU, the compliance instrument is a fine of a fixed sum per tCO2e emitted in ex-
cess. Additional civil and criminal penalties, for example for fraudulent reporting, are 
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Article 13 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance foresees a reimbursement of the CO2-
Fee for tax-exempt companies on demand. The tax-exempt companies have 
to hand in a formal request for reimbursement containing a summary of the 
paid CO2-Fee amount, the invoices thereof and detailed information on 
quantity and kind of the purchased fossil fuel.645 The demand has to be 
handed in before 30 June of the following fiscal year.646 A demand for reim-
bursement must amount to at least 100 CHF.647 From each demand, 5 per 
cent are deducted for covering administration costs, 50 CHF minimal and 
1’000 CHF maximal.648 
Under actual legislation, a non-compliant company (compliance may also be 
achieved by compliance trading) has to pay back the redistributed CO2-Fee 
inclusive interests to the Directorate General of Customs.649 Compliance 
may also be achieved by compliance trading. The amount to be paid back in 
case of non-compliance shall be set by the Directorate General of Customs 
per Act of Disposal.650 The payment must be settled within 60 days.651 In 
case of delayed payment, an interest on arrears of 5 per cent has to be 
paid.652  
With the currently discussed Draft CO2-Act, participation in the CH-ETS 
and the CO2-Fee as an instrument for compliance will be de-connected. The 
participating companies in the CH-ETS will still be CO2-Fee exempt, but the 
sanction in case of non-compliance will be a fixed sum. The Draft CO2-Act 
foresees a penalty of 160 CHF per tCO2e in case of non-compliance with the 
Target Agreement.653 
                                              
left to Member States, under the condition that the relevant legal provisions are notified 
to the European Commission and that they are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 
645 Article 13, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance.  
646 Article 14, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
647 Article 15, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
648 Article 15, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
649 Article 19, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance: „Unternehmen, die ihre Verpflich-
tung nicht erfüllen, müssen die zurückerstatteten Abgaben samt Zinsen an die Oberzoll-
direktion zurückbezahlen.” 
650 Article 19, paragraph 2 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance. 
651 Article 19, paragraph 3 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance 
652 Article 19, paragraph 4 of the CO2-Fee-Ordinance 
653 Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Draft CO2-Act: „Die ETS-Unternehmen müssen dem 
Bund für Emissionen, die weder durch Emissionsrechte noch, soweit zulässig, durch 
Emissionszertifikate gedeckt sind, einen Betrag von 160 Franken pro Tonne CO2-
Äquivalente (CO2e) entrichten.“ In the EU-ETS, the excess emissions penalty shall be 
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4.5.5 Non-Compliance with CO2-Fee-Provision 
According to the CO2-Act, defraudation of the CO2-Fee will be fined with an 
amount up to three times the unlawfully advantage.654 Compromising the 
CO2-Fee may be fined with an amount up to 100’000 CHF.655 Pursuing and 
judging authority is the Federal Customs Administration.656 The competence 
for regulation of imposition of sanctions behooves to the Federal Council.657  
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Act disposes a fine up to 100’000 CHF 
for deliberate and negligent compromising of the CO2-Fee, Article 13, para-
graph 2 disposes a fine up to 30’000 CHF for heavy cases or relapses. The 
Draft CO2-Act does not mention deliberate and negligent compromising of 
the CO2-Fee and foresees a fine up to 30’000 CHF for heavy cases or re-
lapses.658 
4.6 Performance of the CH-ETS 
On 19 November 2010, the FOEN published the emissions projections for 
the period 2008 to 2012. The total of the effected emissions in 2008 and 
2009 were both above the respective Kyoto target.659  For the whole com-
mitment period of 2008 to 2012, FOEN projects, consequently, a yearly 
emission amount of up to 0.8 million tCO2e above the committed target of 
                                              
100 EUR for each tonne of CO2e emitted for which the operator or aircraft operator has 
not surrendered emission units, increasing from 1 January 2013 onwards in accordance 
with the European index of consumer prices. Article 16, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Con-
solidated ETS-Directive. 
654 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Act; Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
655 Article 13, paragraph 1 of the CO2-Act disposes a fine up to 100’000 CHF for deliberate 
and negligent compromising of the CO2-Fee, Article 13, paragraph 2 disposes a fine up 
to 30’000 CHF for heavy cases or relapses. The Draft CO2-Act only disposes for a fine 
up to 30’000 CHF for heavy cases or relapses (Article 39, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-
Act). 
656 Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
657 Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
658 Article 39, paragraph 2 of the Draft CO2-Act. 
659 See FOEN, “Kräftiges Wirtschaftswachstum stellt Erreichung des Kyoto-Ziels in Frage“, 
available at <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformation/00962/ind 
ex.html?lang=de&msg-id=36308>. The tendancy has not changed since. See MARKUS 
HOFMANN, “Auslagerung der Emissionen in Schwellenländer. Zwiespältige Bilanz der 
internationalen Klimapolitik“, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), 11 November 2011, 15. 
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48.6 million tCO2e per year, the effects of the Swiss forests as sinks and the 
effected purchase of emission units by the Climate Cent Foundation in-
cluded. 
The projected surplus of emissions cannot simply be declared to be a failure 
of the CH-ETS. Firstly, the CH-ETS covers only about 6 per cent of the total 
GHG emissions in Switzerland. Secondly, the entire industry sector in Swit-
zerland has reduced emissions quite effectively. According to the monitoring 
data of ENAW, the some 2000 companies supported by the ENAW have reg-
istered a reduction of more than 1 million tCO2e in 2009.660 The projected 
surplus of emissions is a result of slow progress in limiting emissions from 
the building sector as well as a result of undamped increase of emissions in 
the transport sector. 
As emission units generated according to the provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol abroad may be purchased and transferred by private companies or, 
in parallel, by governments, it is now considered whether the Climate Cent 
Foundation may purchase CERs in such an amount as to cover the Swiss 
excess emissions in order to be in compliance with the committed reduction 
target for the ending Kyoto commitment period 2008 to 2012.661 
4.7 Outlook on the Future of the CH-ETS 
A Swiss Emission Trading Scheme exists. It is a system based on voluntary 
measures offering incentives for self-regulation, representing an element of a 
changing relation between state and individuals.662  
But the Swiss Emission Trading Scheme exists (almost exclusively) on pa-
per. The only known transactions realized so far are the emission units 
                                              
660 See ENAW, “Schweizer Unternehmen reduzieren mehr als 1 Million Tonnen CO2 pro 
Jahr”, available at <http://www.enaw.ch/medien/resultate/96-was-bringt-die-teilnahme-
am-energie-modell-der-enaw->. 
661 GIORGIO MÜLLER, “Freiwilliger Klimaschutz in Gefahr”, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
(NZZ), 30 March 2011, 27. 
662 HAUSER, 823. The EU-ETS, by contrast, is less self-regulated and more intensively 
controlled by Member States. HAUSER, 1285. On new models of governance and col-
laborative networks consisting of nation states and non-state actors in combating climate 
change see also CHARLOTTE STRECK, “New Partnerships in Global Environmental Pol-
icy: The Clean Development Mechanism”, in: Journal of Environment & Development, 
Volume 13, Number 3, September 2004, 295-322. 
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bought by the Climate Cent Foundation.663 A carbon market with a true mar-
ket price has not yet been established in Switzerland.  
Of course, the current CH-ETS is a complicated result of a complex search 
for a political compromise.664 As it was the case with the EU-ETS, the pri-
mary goal of a trial phase must be to develop the infrastructure and to pro-
vide the experience to enable the successful use of a cap-and-trade system to 
limit GHG emission in Switzerland during the next compliance period.665 
From this perspective, the CH-ETS is a success. 
The Swiss Emission Trading Scheme is only a little piece in the puzzle of the 
comprehensive Swiss climate policy. This puzzle failed to prevent Switzer-
land from missing its reduction target. Estimations propose a likely desidera-
tum of up to 0.8 million tCO2 respectively both under the CO2-Act as well as 
under the Kyoto Protocol.666  
The missed reduction target is not the result of a lack of effectiveness of the 
CH-ETS. On the contrary, efforts of the ENAW working with ETS-
companies and the efforts of the cement industry have resulted in a reduction 
of about 4 million tCO2e yearly.667 The surplus of emissions in Switzerland 
is due to a failure to act within the Non CH-ETS sectors, namely transport 
and, to a less dramatic extent, the building sector.  
Emissions from transport continue to increase unhindered, the idleness in the 
legislation process concerning the transport sector undermines the confi-
dence in the decisiveness of Switzerland to play a leading role in combating 
climate change on international level. As HAUSER argues, a climate change 
policy based on incentives for voluntary measures must be based on credibil-
ity. The fact that Switzerland renounces from taking action to tag also the 
                                              
663 In the EU-ETS, in contrast, a volume of 15-20 million tCO2e is traded daily. About half 
of the transactions are realized over one of the four existing stock exchanges (ECX, 
Bluenext, Nordpool, EEX), the rest is traded over-the-counter (OTC). ECOPLAN, 31. 
664 ZUMBACH, 57, adding that legislation as a result of a democratic process, in particular in 
Switzerland, seldom ends up in perfect legislation. 
665 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 45. 
666 See FOEN, „Erreichung der Reduktionsziele von Kyoto-Protokoll und CO2-Gesetz“, 19 
November 2010, available at <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/09570/09572/index.ht 
ml?lang=de>. 
667 GIORGIO MÜLLER, “Freiwilliger Klimaschutz in Gefahr”, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
(NZZ), 30 March 2011, 27. 
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GHG emissions from transport with a carbon price undermines the credibil-
ity of its climate change policy.668  
                                              
668 HAUSER, 824: “Ein wirksamer Anreiz, die Ziele durch freiwillige Massnahmen zu errei-
chen, setzt voraus, dass die Konsequenz der Nichterreichung der gesetzten Ziele bekannt 
ist und als verbindlich betrachtet wird. Indem trotz offensichtlicher Nichterreichung des 
Reduktionsziels bei den Treibstoffen gerade in diesem Bereich auf die Einführung der 





5 Linking Emission Trading Schemes 
5.1 Introduction  
In 2010, emission units of the EU-ETS, EUAs, accounted for 84 per cent of 
the global market value.669 In order to further expand and strengthen the 
international carbon market, the European Commission envisions building a 
network of links between the EU-ETS and third country’s cap-and-trade 
systems.670 
As most studies will affirm, linking Emission Trading Schemes is possible 
even between quite different systems. A high degree of harmonization be-
tween connected markets may be desirable, but is by no means a necessity.671 
Successful, however, will it only be where a number of conditions is satis-
fied.672 The most important feature is thereby the credibility and mutual con-
fidence.673 
Since its inception, the Swiss Emission Trading Scheme has been developed 
with the aim to be compatible to link up with the EU-ETS. Similarly, the 
EU-ETS was designed to be enlarged by linking to third country’s Emission 
Trading Schemes. Serious hindrances to link the two Emission Trading 
Schemes are, hence, not to be expected. 
                                              
669 WORLD BANK, 2011, 9.  
670 DAMIEN MEADOWS, “The European Union’s Approach to International Credits”, in: 
WORLD BANK, 2011, 15. 
671 MEHLING, 114.  
672 MEHLING, 115, Table 5.1. Mandatorily compatible must be: (1) continuity of the scheme; 
(2) no ex-post adjustments; (3) absolute caps; (4) no price caps/safety valve. Desirable 
though not essentially compatible design features are: (1) covered sectors; (2) commit-
ment periods; (3) fungibility of emission units; (4) environmental stringency; (5) possi-
bility of banking emission units; (6) offset crediting; (7) enforcement rules. Optionally 
compatible design features are: (1) new entrants and closures; (2) allocation method; (3) 
leakage control mechanism; (4) monitoring and verification; (5) registries. 
673 MACE ET AL., 51/52. The authors identify the same four essential design features as 
MEHLING but distinguish between the features of ex-post adjustments and unconstrained 
borrowing, which is essentially the same mechanism. 
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5.2 Linking in Theory 
Linking occurs when a tradable emission unit system’s regulatory authority 
allows regulated entities to use emission units from another system in order 
to meet compliance obligations.674 However, recognition alone will not yet 
facilitate effective trading. For transactions to occur between linked 
schemes, a link also needs to allow the flow of emission units across 
schemes. 
Yet, linking remains possible even when central design elements of the af-
fected carbon markets differ.675 Questions of compatibility ultimately reside 
in the political domain.676  
5.2.1 Form of Linking 
A link between carbon markets can assume various manifestations, with 
differences in degree, scope, and the direction of trading flows.677 Emission 
Trading Schemes may be linked through a direct or through an indirect 
mechanism. The linkage may be multi-, bi- or unilateral.  
5.2.1.1 Direct Linking 
Direct linking means to allow regulated entities to directly purchase and use 
emission units from another trading scheme for their domestic compliance 
obligations.678 Direct linking is the mutual recognition of allocated emission 
units in each domestic ETS for compliance purpose. The emission units from 
one ETS are fully fungible and valid in another country’s ETS.679 Direct 
links may be multi-, bi- or unilateral.  
In the case of a full bilateral or multilateral link with freely traded emission 
units between two or more schemes, each scheme’s emission units must be 
                                              
674 JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 791. The linkage of domestic tradable emission units systems is 
different from the state-to-state trading envisaged under Article 17 of the Kyoto Proto-
col, whereby signatories to the Protocol can trade their „assigned amounts“. 
675 MACE ET AL., 51. 
676 MEHLING, 115. 
677 MEHLING, 113. 
678 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 23. 
679 BAZELMANS, 305. 
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equally valid for compliance in the other scheme.680 The current EU-ETS, 
for example, may be described as a system of 30 largely independent, but 
inter-linked national Emission Trading Schemes, which have agreed to make 
their emission units tradable within the EU-ETS while adhering to certain 
common EU rules, procedures, guidelines and criteria.681 
In an unilateral link, system A can purchase and use emission units from 
system B for compliance but not vice versa.682 This creates a one-way flow 
of emission units between Emission Trading Schemes, which can give the 
regulated domestic industry additional flexibility in locating cost-effective 
emission reduction opportunities.683 Unilateral links are, therefore, some-
times also called one-way links. The best-known example of a one-way link 
is the CDM of the Kyoto carbon market. 
Leakage may be considered as an unilateral and unintended de-facto linkage 
in the absence of formal linkage systems: Trade and movements in carbon-
intensive activities flow from high to low price countries.684  
5.2.1.2 Indirect Linking 
An indirect link occurs when two schemes A and B are linked to another 
system C by a common acceptance of emission units generated under system 
C but not to each other.685 There is no mutual acceptance of allocated emis-
sion units under each domestic ETS necessary, but only shared standards and 
acceptance of project-based emission units.686 
As a result, the two indirectly linked systems will compete for emission units 
from the third system. This indirect linkage will reduce the difference be-
tween the two cap-and-trade system’s emission units prices. If there is a suf-
ficient supply of emission units at a price below the two cap-and-trade sys-
tems’ pre-link emission unit prices, and if there are no constraints on the use 
of these emission units in either system, then prices in the three systems will 
converge.687  
                                              
680 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 23; SCHÜLE/STERK, 5; MEHLING, 119.  
681 POHLMANN, 343; ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 4. 
682 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 23. 
683 MACE ET AL., 76. 
684 METCALF/WEISBACH, 23. 
685 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 24. 
686 BAZELMANS, 305. 
687 JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 798. 
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A scheme that establishes a multi-, bi- or unilateral link to another scheme 
also establishes indirect links with any other schemes to which the latter is 
linked.688 Developments in one scheme will subsequently affect the supply 
and demand for emission units in each other scheme.689 
An indirect link also occurs when bilateral or multilateral linkages are chan-
nelled through an intermediary. For example, markets may be linked via 
each country’s governments under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Under 
such an approach, an entity in scheme A wanting to sell emission units to 
scheme B would hand the respective amount of emission units to its gov-
ernment. The government would convert these emission units into AAUs and 
transfer them to the government of scheme B. Government B would then 
convert these AAUs into its national emission units and issue them to the 
buyer.690 In fact, most emerging Emission Trading Schemes will probably be 
indirectly linked through the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, because most systems 
plan to allow regulated entities the use of CERs.691  
5.2.1.3 Institutional Considerations 
Linking Emission Trading Schemes requires not only agreements on how the 
link will be designed but also how the environmental effectiveness of 
schemes to be linked can be sustained in the long term.692 Therefore, the 
institutional set-up of a linkage needs careful considerations. As integration 
becomes more aligned with domestic political priorities, participating juris-
dictions may be willing to consider more formal arrangements to promote 
further market integration. 
Linking arrangements may range from a multilateral treaty fully integrating 
Parties into a single mandatory cap-and-trade scheme to loose cooperation 
between linked jurisdictions.693 MEHLING describes five ways an understand-
ing to create a link can be reached between different trading schemes: (1) 
through binding international agreements such as treaties; (2) through mutual 
recognition of emission units by way of reciprocal rules in the domestic law 
                                              
688 MEHLING, 114, referring to MEHLING/HAITES, “Mechanisms for Linking Emissions 
Trading Schemes”, in: Climate Policy, Volume 9, Number 9, 2009, 169-184. 
689 MEHLING, 114. 
690 SCHÜLE/STERK, 5. 
691 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 24. 
692 STERN, xxiii, advocates clear revision rules covering the basis for allocation in future 
trading periods in order to create greater predictability for investors. 
693 MACE ET AL., 77; MEHLING, 122.  
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of participating jurisdictions; (3) through purely political arrangements; (4) 
through trans-boundary contracts entered into under private international 
law; and (5) through unilateral linkages. 694 
Most likely, a direct bi- or multilateral link will be formalized by an interna-
tional treaty.695 In a majority of cases, the adoption of international treaties – 
and especially multilateral treaties – also entails a cumbersome and often 
challenging ratification process. On the other hand, this approach would 
provide a high degree of legal certainty and transparency.696 Likewise, a 
withdrawal from the treaty and subsequent amendments are subject to formal 
constraints implying that any provision for adjustment or suspension of the 
link should already be included in the treaty from the outset.697 This way, 
changes to link will not necessitate full recourse to the formal procedures 
outlined above. Such a simplified process may also be extended to additional 
links with further partners, for instance through the inclusion of all recog-
nized emission unit types in a schedule contained in an annex or protocol.698 
A bilateral or multilateral link can also be created by way of a political un-
derstanding on the mutual recognition of emission units, coupled with do-
mestic legislation adjusting each scheme. Such reciprocal links have the 
benefit of obviating lengthy ratification procedures.699 Coordination between 
markets can be achieved through informal negotiations.  
A mutual recognition agreement might establish a supranational mechanism 
to oversee the Parties’ national decision-making, to establish the standards 
                                              
694 MACE ET AL., 73, referring to MICHAEL MEHLING, “Bridging the Trans-Atlantic Divide: 
Legal Aspects of a link between regional carbon markets in Europe and the United 
States,“ in: Sustainable Development Law and Policy, Winter 2007, 46. 
695 MACE ET AL., 73. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Article 2 
paragraph 1(a), 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, defining a “treaty” as “an interna-
tional agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by interna-
tional law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instru-
ments and whatever its particular designation”. The term “treaty”, hence, is used to de-
scribe any form of agreement between two or more states or international organizations 
that creates legally binding rights and obligations for Parties and that is governed by in-
ternational law in relation to its validity, application, interpretation and enforceability. 
696 SCHÜLE/STERK, 5. 
697 MEHLING, 121. 
698 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 29, referring to MEHLING/ HAITES 2009. 
699 MEHLING, 121. 
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and procedures for mutual recognition, to adjudicate the implementation of a 
regime, or to certify assessment bodies under the regime.700 
An umbrella agreement harmonizing certain features of the domestic trading 
schemes and specifying mandatory procedures may also be used to create an 
institution with limited powers, such as a “treaty secretariat” or a “clear-
inghouse facilitating trading”.701  
Ultimately, a central institution mandated with broad governance functions 
may even assume powers similar to those presently exercised by central 
banks, including the creation of an emission unit reserve for strategic inter-
vention in the supply.702 Important functions of such a clearing house must 
also be to avoid reductions in the environmental effectiveness of linked 
schemes and to reassure all stakeholders that the schemes are and continue to 
be comparably stringent.703 
Alternatively, governments may come to an informal agreement to amend 
their respective emission trading legislation. A formal way of documenting 
an agreement could be for example a joint political declaration or a memo-
randum of understanding.704 An unilateral link can be established through 
inclusion of a clause in the architecture of each trading scheme, specifying 
the conditions for recognition of foreign emission units.705 Because the 
clause establishing the link remains within the remit of national jurisdiction, 
the link can also be unilaterally altered or terminated at any point in time.  
In the absence of a formal link, private market participants could use private 
law to bridge trading schemes by creating a system for the conversion of 
units. Regulated entities may enter into private agreements to swap emission 
units recognized in one system for those recognized in another. In fact, his-
tory has already provided an example of a swap between two private compa-
nies bridging the trading schemes of Denmark and the United Kingdom in 
2002.706 Individuals may also open “personal holding accounts” in the reg-
                                              
700 MACE ET AL., 80. 
701 MEHLING, 122/123; SCHÜLE/STERK, ii. 
702 MEHLING, 123/4. 
703 SCHÜLE/STERK, ii. 
704 SCHÜLE/STERK, 5. 
705 MEHLING, 119.  
706 SCHÜLE/STERK, 6. 
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istries, facilitating the trading of CERs, for example, between companies and 
individuals.707 
However, linking arrangements based purely on administrative or technical 
regulations, without a corresponding mandate in formal law, thus risks being 
perceived as deficient in legitimacy.708 
More important than the legal form may be the question whether the linking 
agreement and the framework of commitment are credible and enforce-
able.709 A central authority such as a treaty secretariat or a clearing house 
could contribute to transparency and predictability. Due to the significant 
economic implication of linked Emission Trading Schemes, there is a need 
for certainty and transparency in the linking process. The more diverse the 
forms of linkages in place are, the less transparency governs the market. 
Whether an agreement is about the linkage of two Emission Trading 
Schemes or whether an agreement creates a stand-alone trading structure, 
negotiators should focus on creating a framework of commitments that are 
credible and enforceable, rather than focus excessively on the legal form of 
those commitments.710 
5.2.2 Linking the Coverage of Sectors and Gases 
Differing sector or gas coverage is not a matter of institutional compatibility. 
An unequal coverage of sectors and gases does not create any hindrance for 
linking two trading schemes. As long as a linked trading scheme meets all 
other political and technical linking requirements, it does not affect the envi-
ronmental effectiveness, either.711  
In October 2007, at the occasion of the incorporation of the ETS-Directive 
into the EEA Agreement, the European Commission reminded of the mini-
mal requirements for national or regional Emission Trading Schemes to join 
the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme. Third country’s Emission Trading 
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Schemes must be mandatory, set absolute limits on emissions, have robust 
registry systems and stringent MRV- and compliance-provisions in place. 712  
However, differences in sectoral coverage may cause concerns regarding 
competitiveness if one scheme imposes emission constraints on sectors 
whose competitors are not covered in the other scheme. Such economic dis-
crimination can be mitigated by economically efficient cap-setting. The eco-
nomic impact would be the same as in an economy-wide Emission Trading 
Scheme covering all emitters.713  
Differing sectors and gases may also raise questions regarding the necessary 
political support for linking under these circumstances. Therefore, a har-
monization of coverage may be politically appropriate in the context of a 
linking agreement. 
Competitive disadvantages and potential discrimination due to diverging 
treatment of sectors in two trading regimes, however, are not caused by link-
ing and would also occur in its absence.714 
5.2.3 Cap-Setting in a Linked ETS 
The stringency of the cap is a design feature that leads to a significant trans-
fer of wealth from the system with a stricter cap to the system with a more 
lenient cap.715  
5.2.3.1 Absolute versus Relative Targets 
In any Emission Trading Scheme, two types of reduction targets are conceiv-
able: (1) absolute caps, which limit the total emissions during a specified 
period; and (2) relative targets, which are defined as emissions per unit of 
output or activity, such as gross domestic product or energy consumption per 
unit of input.716  
                                              
712 EU COMMISSION, “Emissions trading: Commission announces linkage EU ETS with 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein”, Press Release of 26 October 2007, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1617>. 
713 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 7. 
714 MACE ET AL., 71; SCHÜLE/STERK, 11. 
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Relative targets require that allocation takes place in two steps. An initial 
allocation based on projected production levels is followed by an ex-post 
adjustment when the effective production levels are known.717 This may lead 
to spikes in liquidity at the moment of adjustment and will also affect the 
scheme with absolute targets. Linking schemes that differ in the way the 
target is determined may thereby have a negative impact on the liquidity of 
the combined scheme. 718 
Linking schemes that differ in the way the target is determined may also 
have a negative impact on the environmental effectiveness. If participants in 
a relative program are able to sell emission units to participants in an abso-
lute program, an increase in their output will generate more emission units 
and inflate the total quantity of emission units available to participants with 
absolute targets. The emission units can be sold to the absolute sector, thus 
providing an incentive to increase activity, which increases emissions.719 
The linkage of a mandatory trading scheme with a voluntary trading scheme 
– the genuine element of which is not to have any cap because reduction 
efforts are voluntary – is likely to be infeasible due to concerns about rela-
tive levels of stringency.720  
Given the political reality, a perfect balance of efforts is very unrealistic to 
be achieved across various reduction regimes. Competitive issues resulting 
from differing levels of stringency are reality. However, these differences are 
not a result of linking. They would also arise if the two schemes operate 
separately.721  
5.2.3.2 Incentives to Cap-Setting Altered 
When allocation is chosen by sovereign states, the possibility of trading will 
affect their allocation choices.722 When an ETS is enlarged by a link to an-
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other ETS, a government can create additional value for its national entities 
by issuing additional emission units. The side effect is a damage to the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the combined scheme.723  
JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS remind that not all the governments would manage 
the tradeoff between additional value and environmental effectiveness in the 
same manner.724 In an analysis using a game-theoretic approach, HELM con-
cluded that in a linked scheme environmentally less concerned countries 
tend to choose more emission units if these are tradable, while environmen-
tally more concerned countries choose less emission units.725  
More specific results were presented by the study of HOLTSMARK/ 
SOMMERVOLL based on a model assuming a non-cooperative equilibrium. 
They found that trading will give small countries incentives for more gener-
ous allocations, while large countries will have a tendency to reduce their 
number of allocated emission units.726 However, the smaller countries’ incen-
tives towards more generous allocations more than outweigh the larger coun-
tries incentives for tightening their allocations. The result is an overall in-
crease of total allocated emission units.727  
Despite this, a later study of CARBONE/HELM/RUTHERFORD using a cali-
brated general equilibrium model finds that agreements linking various 
Emission Trading Schemes can be effective. In addition, the study found that 
smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often 
perform better than agreements with larger rosters.728 
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5.2.4 Allocation in a Linked ETS 
Differences in the way emission units are distributed to the companies within 
an ETS usually have no impact neither on the functioning of the combined 
ETS nor on the system’s environmental effectiveness, since this is solely 
determined by the overall cap. However, there may be distributional effects 
since free allocation is a transfer of wealth, effectively a lump-sum sub-
sidy.729 
As various authors highlighted, linkage may alter the incentives that coun-
tries face with respect to allocation.730 Governments may be tempted to issue 
more emission units in order to increase the value in the hands of its national 
companies on a linked market.  
Indeed, the pilot period of the EU-ETS has demonstrated that linking itself 
changes the rules of the game. In linked trading schemes, participating states 
will have an incentive to relax their cap in order to become net sellers.731 
Member States were unable to resist the temptation to hand out generously 
emission units, causing the collapse of the price of the EUA at the end of 
2006 and reducing to zero the incentives to abate emissions, to develop al-
ternative fuels and more energy-efficient technologies.732  
5.2.5 Definition and Recognition of Trading Units in a 
Linked ETS 
Clear decisions on the nature and the treatment of emission units are impor-
tant to give legal security and certainty to both governments and private 
entities. Difference in definitions and treatment of emission units can make 
one sub-market of the overall system more attractive than others. Different 
treatment can lead to distortions of the market.733 
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5.2.5.1 Differences in Offsetting Rules 
By providing access to project-based offsetting for both ETS-covered en-
ergy-intensive and Non ETS-covered non-energy-intensive sectors, the CDM 
establishes an indirect link between the two sectors and assures full “where-
flexibility”.734  
If a particular type of emissions units, such as emission units from carbon 
sinks for example, is not recognized in one scheme, companies in another 
scheme accepting this emission unit could use them for domestic compliance 
purposes, thus freeing up “regular” domestic emission units and selling 
them to companies in the first scheme. The scheme’s administrators would 
never be able to tell whether an incoming emission unit has perhaps been 
freed up by use of an external trading unit which they themselves would not 
accept for compliance.735 The political decision in the first scheme about 
which emission units are recognized would thus be bypassed and emission 
units traded may reflect different kinds of underlying emission units or emis-
sion reductions some of which may not be considered politically acceptable 
for interchange (e.g. nuclear or large hydropower).736  
A scheme with a more narrow recognition of emission units may take ad-
justment measures such as the introduction of exchange rates. This would 
increase transaction costs. Another possible means of accounting for emis-
sion units considered “undesirable” that are flowing into the other system 
would be to assess the share of such emission units in the total volume of 
emission units in the other system and discounting traded emission units 
from that system accordingly.737 
The question would therefore probably rather be to which extent the negotia-
tors of both countries would want to maintain their rules for the recognition 
of emission units instead of harmonizing them for the purpose of linking. If 
the inclusion of certain emission units is considered to be intolerable by a 
scheme with a more narrow recognition of emission units, the only option to 
really keep them out would be not to link to schemes which include them.738 
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5.2.5.2 Quantitative Limits of Offsetting 
Differences in quantitative limits of offsetting from abroad (the best known 
emission units are CERs) are not mutually compatible design features.  
If one system prohibits the use of CERs and the other system allows the use 
of emission units for compliance purposes, more internal emission units will 
be freed to use in both systems. An emission unit of a particular type from 
abroad frees up a “regular” domestic emission unit. This can be accounted 
with an emission unit from a linked ETS regardless of the type of the origi-
nal emission unit and thus increase the quantity of the emission units avail-
able in both schemes. The quantity of the emission units available of the 
lenient system will spill over turning the “limited” system to be lenient as 
well. (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7: Offsetting from Abroad in a Linked CH-EU-ETS 
An emission unit of a particular type from abroad frees up a “regular” domestic 
emission unit. This can be accounted with an emission unit from a linked ETS (for 
example Switzerland) regardless of the type of the original emission unit and thus 
increase the quantity of the emission units available in both schemes.  
It may be possible to design mechanisms to avoid adverse outcomes if one 
system’s entitlement to use CERs is much higher than the other’s. For exam-
ple, a mechanism disallowing transfers of CERs could be triggered if the 
percentage of offsets in a lenient system exceeds a certain level, preventing 
any further transfer of offsets from the lenient system into the limited sys-
tem. Prices would then equilibrate separately – potentially shifting prices to 
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significantly different levels if there is a fundamental difference in abatement 
costs between the systems.739 
While it is technically possible to link systems with different offset project 
crediting rules, differing rules can present political difficulties by rising con-
cerns about environmental integrity and the proper role of other program 
goals.740 A program with more lenient rules for additionality, for example, or 
with methodologies that result in significantly greater quantified emission 
reductions for the same types of projects, could in effect set the bar for envi-
ronmental integrity for the entire linked trading system.741  
As a remedy, WINTER suggests a reserve to be hold back by each Annex B-
Party for the purchase and transfer of CERs. A private entity may invest into 
a CDM-project as it is the case in the current system, but the purchased CER 
would not add to the assigned amount but would have to be deducted from a 
special reserve fund each Annex B-Party has to set aside.742  
5.2.6 Temporal Flexibility in a Linked ETS 
5.2.6.1 Periods 
Ideally, commitment periods of linked schemes are synchronized, or have 
long-term allocation trends which guide commitment period allocations.743 
Absolute consistency of periods is not necessary for institutional compati-
bility. Financial markets make it possible to buy emission units of various 
vintages from various program years in advance.744  
Although problems raised by incompatible commitment periods look seri-
ous, they are largely a question of political confidence. It is possible to envi-
sion negotiations or confidence-building measures that overcome these prob-
lems.745 Essential is, however, that the continuity of both schemes appears to 
be credible.746  
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5.2.6.2 Banking 
Differing banking rules are not an obstacle to linking but disparities in bank-
ing rules between linked schemes can create market distortions. If a scheme 
which prohibits banking is linked to a scheme which allows banking, the 
latter would effectively provide a banking option for all the participants in 
the combined market.747 Entities in a scheme with more generous banking 
provisions could have a competitive advantage over entities in schemes with 
less generous rules.748 
5.2.6.3 Borrowing 
The linkage with a system that allows borrowing amplifies the risks and 
volatility of a combined ETS. The ability of participants in one system to 
borrow against periods without a fixed length, or periods for which alloca-
tions are as yet unknown, undermines present penalties for non-compliance - 
and undermine the stringency of the system to be linked. The lack of cer-
tainty would provide substantial pressure for lobbying on future alloca-
tions.749  
Thus, linking a system without borrowing with a regime that allows borrow-
ing may require restrictive provisions to be taken so as to maintain the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the linked trading scheme. Purchases from the 
scheme with borrowing must be restricted to the time after its compliance 
period has been completed. In addition, purchases may be allowed only from 
companies that did not borrow.750 
5.2.6.4 Ex-Post Adjustments 
Once caps have been set and allocations have been made, individual alloca-
tion decisions should not be altered (“ex-post adjustments”).751 Technically 
speaking, ex-post adjustments correspond to the mechanism of borrowing 
and create additional opportunities for politically motivated market influ-
ence. Whereas regulatory certainty is an important prerequisite for the well-
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functioning of a market, ex-post adjustments “run the risk of undermining 
the basis of a stable market upon which industry feels confident to invest”.752  
There are exceptions of specific cases, for example in the case of the closure 
of an installation or in the case of a newly entering ETS-participant. Also, 
ex-post adjustments on a greater scale might be seen as a useful tool for con-
trolling carbon price. If the market is deemed to be too liquid or prices are 
highly elevated, governments could reduce or increase the levels of emission 
units.753  
5.2.7 Governance Issues and Intervention Mechanisms 
in a Linked ETS 
Monitoring, reporting, verification and non-compliance penalties are likely 
to be a central concern in linking systems. Countries will have to be con-
vinced that potential linkage partners have comparable enforcement re-
gimes.754 Only if the overall compliance mechanism of the system is per-
ceived as credible, companies will be able to invest with confidence in a 
functioning market for emissions units with price signals representing a true 
level of scarcity.755 
5.2.7.1 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
Even within the EU Member States, monitoring, reporting and verification 
approaches are not identical though efforts are being made to better coordi-
nate and harmonize the provisions. The European Commission has only 
limited instruments to control the application of the provisions of the ETS-
Directive which is a matter of national bodies of the Member States. There-
fore, serious doubts are raised about whether the enforcement mechanisms 
by national bodies of Member States are sufficient.756 There is, for example, 
the issue with the verifiers. The Consolidated ETS-Directive makes clear 
that the verifier must be independent of the operator so that verification re-
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sults are objective and unbiased under the EU-ETS. But in reality, the veri-
fier is often a third party employed by the operator.757 
The lack of full harmonization, therefore, is not a hindrance to linking. But 
the absence of a system that can be demonstrated to be of equivalent strin-
gency would make linking impossible.758 
5.2.7.2 Non-Compliance Penalty 
Strong compliance mechanisms are essential for cap-and-trade systems. Any 
linked scheme must have clear mechanisms for ensuring compliance and 
quality throughout the entire system in order to ensure the quality of emis-
sion reductions, reporting efforts and the timely surrender of emission 
units.759 While it is not necessary to have identically-specified non-
compliance penalties between linked schemes, penalties must be comparable 
in magnitude and seen to be effective and robust.760 
From the environmental perspective, the financial penalties for non-
compliance should be significantly higher than the cost of emission units. If 
financial penalties for non-compliance with a cap-and-trade system are set 
lower than what would otherwise be the market clearing price for emission 
units, a similar effect is achieved. Lenient non-compliance penalties can 
function, in effect, as a kind of a price cap.761 Stakeholders in a scheme with 
strict non-compliance provisions might also object to linking to a scheme 
with less stringent provisions.762 
5.2.7.3 Cost-Containment Measures 
Some Emission Trading Schemes may include a price cap to limit the costs 
of compliance to provide upper-bound cost certainty to regulated entities and 
prevent unexpectedly severe spikes in prices.763 A so-called “safety valve” is 
an upper bound on prices in each period that is equal to a specified trigger 
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price.764 With this mechanism, the regulator commits to selling emission 
units at a pre-determined price in whatever quantity is demanded once the 
market price for emission units rises above a certain level. This mechanism 
limits the cost of the market participants to the safety-valve level.765 
If a system with strict penalties such as the EU-ETS was linked to a system 
with a price cap or safety valve, the price cap would effectively act as a price 
cap for the combined system.766 As long as the market price was higher than 
the price cap or safety valve level, companies in the price cap system would 
have an incentive to sell their emission units to companies in the other sys-
tem until prices were equalized at the price cap.  
Also, a one-way linkage can decrease the price of emission units in the sys-
tem that establishes the link. One-way linkages will therefore lead to the 
propagation of cost-containment measures.767  
Unless special provisions are taken to ensure that the environmental effec-
tiveness is not affected, total emissions would be higher in the combined 
system than if the two schemes were kept separate.768  
5.3 Economic Consequences of a Linkage 
The consequences of emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol and the 
extended trading through linking are subject to numerous economical analy-
ses. But the quantification of the implications of future policies has to be 
used with caution as the overlapping of international, regional and national 
climate policies make predictions very difficult. 
When quantifying economic implications of a linkage, an important distinc-
tion between presence and absence of a post-Kyoto government trading must 
be made. The existence or non-existence of a post-Kyoto commitment period 
will have considerable implications on the interdependency between sectors 
covered by an Emission Trading Scheme and sectors not covered by an 
Emission Trading Scheme. 
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In the absence of an international project-based mechanism such as the 
CDM, the linking of two domestic Emission Trading Schemes allows flexi-
bility only within the ETS-sectors which are, in the case of the EU-ETS, 
energy-intensive industries provided with generous initial emission units. 
The major compliance burden is, consequently, carried by sectors excluded 
from the linked Emission Trading Scheme. These non-trading segments are 
not able to benefit from a linked and thus enlarged Emission Trading 
Scheme.769 
In the presence of an international project-based mechanism such as the 
CDM, access to project-based offsetting is provided for both ETS- and Non 
ETS-sectors. The CDM, thus, establishes an indirect link between the ETS- 
and the Non ETS-sectors and assures a certain flexibility. Due to the provi-
sions of an international credit pool for all sectors, the CDM has the poten-
tial to level out economic impacts.770 
5.3.1 Cost Effectiveness and Efficiency 
In theory, linking distinct Emission Trading Schemes will increase efficiency 
by taking advantage of the diversity of sources. The diversity of sources 
entails a diversity of costs for emission reduction actions in the larger linked 
system, thus reducing the overall abatement costs and delivering a common 
environmental goal at least-cost.771 This theoretical mechanism is indeed the 
starting point of the EU-Commission’s efforts to enlarge the coverage of the 
Emission Trading Scheme. The Commission believes that new and addi-
tional abatement opportunities offer a high abatement potential and lower 
abatement costs. Lower abatement costs would ultimately lead to lower 
emission unit prices and would thus render the system more efficient.772 It 
has been suggested that compliance costs could potentially be reduced by up 
to 30 to 40 per cent through the inclusion of new sectors and gases provided, 
however, that certain conditions are met including accurate monitoring, re-
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porting and verification.773 Indeed, there are quantifications for a post-Kyoto 
climate policy assuming a policy scenario in line with current EU objectives 
concluding that a global carbon market with trade across all countries and 
sectors would halve the abatement costs compared with the no-trade case.774 
This, however, is only the case if a post-Kyoto agreement is in place and if 
trade is possible across all sectors. In the absence of such an agreement, link-
ing the EU-ETS induces no or only marginal economic benefits for the EU. 
In the absence of such an agreement, the results of quantifications by ANGER 
suggest that linking the EU-ETS to other domestic schemes will not decrease 
total EU compliance costs by more than one per cent. As ETS trading exclu-
sively covers energy-intensive sectors, only these industries would benefit 
from an enlarged trading scheme. The essential part of the economic burden 
is carried by non-trading sectors and cannot be reduced by linking Emission 
Trading Schemes.775 
Also FLACHSLAND/MARSCHINSKI/EDENHOFER question the conventional 
gains-from-trade rationale and warn that the economic benefits of linking are 
not as clear-cut as they may seem.776 As a principal objection to conventional 
gains-from-trade analyses, they suspect that the implicit assumption of a 
“first-best world”, for example one without marked imperfections such as 
distorting taxes or externalities, leads to an overly optimistic and mislead-
ingly clear-cut view on linking. The “theory of the second-best” states that 
optimal conditions hold in a first-best world may no longer be valid in a 
second-best world.777 In the specific case of climate change, a driver for 
imperfection and inconsistency is time. Decision makers are driven by the 
                                              
773 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assessment”, 32, referring to the Final Report of the 
1st meeting of the ECCP working group on emissions trading on the review of the EU-
ETS on the scope of the Directive. 
774 FLACHSLAND/MARSCHINSKI/EDENHOFER, “To link or not to link: Benefits and disadvan-
tages of linking cap-and-trade systems”, in: Flachsland, Dissertation, 2010, 53, referring 
to P. RUSS/J.-C. CISCAR/B. SAVEYN/A. SORIA/I. SZÀBÒ/T. VAN IERLAND/D. VAN 
REGEMORTER/R. VIRDIS, “Economic Assessment of Post-2012 Global Climate Policies: 
Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Scenarios with the POLES and GEM-
E3 Models”, EU Commission Joint Research Centre Report, 2009.  
775 ANGER, 2040. 
776 FLACHSLAND/MARSCHINSKI/EDENHOFER, “To link or not to link: Benefits and disadvan-
tages of linking cap-and-trade systems”, in: Flachsland, Dissertation, 2010, 52. 
777 BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER, 35-37, referring to the general theory of second best of R.G. 
LIPSEY/K.LANCASTER, „The General Theory of Second Best“, in: The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Volume 24, Number 1, 1956, 11-32. 
5 Linking Emission Trading Schemes 
 149
statements of the IPCC which produces pressure to act.778 In addition, inter-
national climate change negotiations are highly politicised because enor-
mous economic interests are at stake. Agreements on climate change, hence, 
always reflect a political optimum instead of a rational maximum.  
The assumption of a second-best world was the starting point of calculations 
by HOLTSMARK/SOMMERVOLL. Based on a model of non-cooperative equi-
librium, they found that effectiveness was reduced through linking of na-
tional emission unit markets.779 HOLTSMARK/SOMMERVOLL concluded that 
linking national emission unit markets may turn out to be less important than 
was concluded in earlier studies. The explanation for these differing views 
may be that the earlier studies ignored how the linkage of emission unit mar-
kets would influence the governments’ incentives to revise their respective 
allocations.780 
Also BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER find that the conditions under which inter-
national emission trading is introduced diverge from the standard environ-
mental economic textbook analyses in several important ways. Analysing the 
impacts on a nation or on a region, they find that impacts are particularly 
seriously diverging where economies deviate from the idealized perfect 
competitive economies.781  
5.3.2 Increasing Liquidity - Decreasing Volatility 
Increasing size and liquidity of carbon markets are often listed as potential 
benefits of linking.782 Larger and thus more liquid carbon markets also re-
duce volatility providing higher predictability and certainty for market par-
ticipants.783 If this may be true observed from a mid- to long-term perspec-
tive, reality looks different from a short-term perspective.  
As the result of a linkage, any difference between the systems’ emission unit 
prices will lead to sales of emission units from the lower price system to the 
higher price system until the systems’ emission unit prices converge at an 
                                              
778 ZUMBACH, 57. 
779 HOLTSMARK/SOMMERVOLL, 4. 
780 HOLTSMARK/SOMMERVOLL, 5. 
781 BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER, 34. 
782 ELLIS/TIRPAK, 8, referring to HAITES/MULLINS; BARON/BYGRAVE ; BLYTH/BOSI. 
783 ECOPLAN, 4. 
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intermediate level.784 Small schemes with lower prices that link to the large 
EU-ETS may see their carbon price increase significantly.785 Small Emission 
Trading Schemes with high prices that link to the EU-ETS may see their 
carbon price drop significantly. Any corresponding increase or decrease in 
emission unit prices in the EU-ETS is likely to be very small because of the 
dominance in terms of volume of the EU-ETS. Volatility – at least in the EU-
ETS – must, consequently, be combated by other means than linking.  
5.3.3 Prevention against Competitive Distortions 
Opponents of the concept of emission trading may argue that the require-
ment to cover effected emissions with the equivalent amount of emission 
units constitutes a burden on ETS-participants and may trigger competitive 
distortion. The uneven financial burden due to the carbon price will lead to 
“structural adjustments” and, eventually, to carbon leakage. Due to this 
argument, the European industry managed to receive generous allocations of 
emission units for free. 
Proponents of emission trading advocate for the linkage as a prevention 
against competitive distortions. A linkage of two ETSs and the enlargement 
of the market would contribute to alleviating competitive distortion between 
participants of one ETS and participants of the other ETS. Linked trading 
schemes would result in fewer competitive distortions for participants and 
reduce the threat of carbon leakage.786 
Linking Emission Trading Schemes brings along various causes for competi-
tive distortions such as unfair allocation methods, differing MRV-provisions 
and non-compliance penalties or asymmetric accounting methods. The most 
serious distortion, however, exists between trading sectors and non-trading 
sectors.787 Generous emission allocation to the benefitting EU-ETS compa-
                                              
784 JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 797. 
785 ELLIS/TIRPAK, 24. 
786 FLACHSLAND, Dissertation, 7; ECOPLAN, 4. 
787 A study conducted by ECOPLAN in 2010 concluded that the marginal abatement costs in 
the EU-ETS currently amount to 16 CHF/tCO2e, in the Non EU-ETS to 82 CHF/tCO2e. 
This difference is due to a (relatively) modest reduction requirement distributed on (rela-
tively) numerous emitters in the EU-ETS. Or expressed differently: As the reduction aim 
in the (relatively) large EU-ETS is small (due to generously allocated emission units), 
the reduction aim for the (relatively) small Non EU-ETS segment is high. In Switzer-
land, the divergence between marginal abatement costs in the ETS and outside the ETS 
is even more serious. The ECOPLAN-study concluded that marginal abatement costs in 
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nies cause a high reduction burden on Non EU-ETS segments which are 
excluded from the trading scheme.788 Considering their high marginal 
abatement costs, these sectors account for almost the entire economic burden 
of the reduction commitment (“sectoral burden shifting”) and cannot be 
reduced by linking.789 
Linking may, however, reduce competitive distortion arising from uncertain-
ty. Many studies indicate that uncertainty will reduce the efficiency of cli-
mate policy.790 Even worse so, small and frequent revisions of an emission 
cap will result in higher cumulative emissions than if policies are altered less 
frequently but more drastically.791 Linking may, hence, contribute to promot-
ing planning reliability, and thus reduce competitive distortion arising from 
uncertainty.792  
5.3.4 Distributional Implications 
While linking may result in an overall reduction of costs, it does not mean 
that everyone is better off.793 Despite possible overall cost savings due to 
linking some participants of each of the linked programs are likely to be 
                                              
the CH-ETS currently amount to 30 CHF/tCO2e, in the Non CH-ETS to 283 
CHF/tCO2e. See ECOPLAN, 20/21. 
788 BORLAT, 1287, referring to various commentators who contest the efficiency of the dual 
system ETS versus Non-ETS. 
789 ANGER, 2040. 
790 WRÅKE, 17, referring to models of Robert MCDONALD/DANIEL SIEGEL, “The Value of 
Waiting to Invest”, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 101, Number 4, 
November 1986, 707-728; AVINASH K. DIXIT/ROBERT S. PINDYCK, “Investment under 
Uncertainty”, 1994. 
791 WRÅKE, 17, referring to a study of SABINE FUSS/J.A. JOHANSSON/J. SZOLGAYOVA/M. 
OBERSTEINER, “Impact of climate policy uncertainty on the adoption of electricity gen-
erating technologies”, in: Energy Policy, Volume 37, Number 2, February 2009, 733-
743. 
792 ECOPLAN, 4:“Ein Haupteffekt der Verknüpfung ist also, dass die Schweizer Unternehmen 
bei einer Verknüpfung mit dem EU ETS weniger Unsicherheiten in Bezug auf den künfti-
gen CO2-Preis haben. In diesem Sinne bringt die Verknüpfung des CH ETS mit dem EU 
ETS mehr Planungssicherheit für Schweizer Unternehmen.“ 
793 A comprehensive discussion is given by BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER; See also KRUGER/ 
OATES/PIZER, 120. 
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financially disadvantaged as a result.794 What may be beneficial to individual 
trading entities may not result in a net benefit for the country.795  
In an early study conducted before the start of the EU-ETS and based on a 
model with multilateral externalities, HELM analyzed environmental and 
welfare effects of international emission trading. HELM concluded that po-
tential emission unit buyers are the most likely candidates to suffer from a 
large negative strategic effect and, therefore, are to be worse off with trad-
ing.796  
Whether net buyers are winners or losers depends also on the pre-link emis-
sion unit price. While net sellers in a domestic Emission Trading Scheme 
with low emission unit prices will benefit from a linkage to a scheme where 
the price for an emission unit is higher, the opposite is true for buyers in the 
first scheme. At the same time, net buyers in the high-price scheme win from 
linking, whereas sellers in such a scheme lose.797  
The pre-link emission unit price depends, on the one hand, on the stringency 
of the cap. Linking different Emission Trading Schemes can have distribu-
tional impacts if entities within a sector in one ETS are treated more strin-
gently or leniently than their competitors in a different ETS.798  
The pre-link emission unit price depends, on the other hand, on the options 
for emission reductions available. The smaller the pool of reduction options 
gets, the more expensive the reduction options tend to be. The reason behind 
the phenomenon is that early reduction measures are relatively cheap be-
cause there is a large pool of reduction options and the least-costly reduction 
options may be picked out first.799 In such a situation, a linkage offers a fresh 
pool of least-cheapest reduction options to be picked out. 
                                              
794 HAITES/MULLINS, iv. 
795 BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER, 34.  
796 HELM, 2745. At the danger of overstretching the conclusion of the analysis, HELM 
speculates that this may even prove a possible explanation as to why the USA has re-
fused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
797 SCHÜLE/STERK, 2, Fn.2; STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, 2, Fn. 3; see also METCALF/WEIS- 
BACH, 7. 
798 ELLIS/TIRPAK, 29. 
799 In the context of the Clean Development Mechanism, the phenomenon is known as 
„low-hanging-fruits“.  
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5.3.5 National Concerns 
Linking two Emission Trading Schemes may cause national concerns of 
governments promoting the tendency to alter their cap-setting.800 This was 
observed in phase I and II of the EU-ETS when the allocation system pushed 
Member States to over-allocate emission units to in-state firms providing 
them an opportunity to become net sellers to the carbon market.801 The allo-
cations for phase II were negotiated against the realization that there was a 
great deal at stake, with phase I having shown the huge financial value of 
emission units, potentially more than 200 billion EUR in total over the five 
years of phase II.802 Not surprisingly, governments were subject to enormous 
lobbying pressures. 
The creation of linkages, therefore, may lead to a substantial flow of capital 
across national borders, influencing the balance of payments of participating 
states.803 The greater the difference in (pre-link) emission unit prices is, the 
greater the inter-system capital flows becomes. A government may not agree 
to such a considerable capital flow to foreign countries by letting national 
companies purchasing (cheaper) emission units from foreign ETS-
participants in a linked market.  
A research of STERK/MEHLING/TUERK revealed that linking the EU-ETS to a 
system with far-reaching cost-containment measures such as the Lieberman-
Warner bill804 in the USA would lead to significant net purchases by the EU 
and a net transfer of wealth, occurring not due to economic activity but 
solely as a result of US regulation. Through linking, the EU would therefore 
effectively cede control over its emission unit prices (and the effect of the 
price signal on emissions) to the USA, a prospect that “would hardly have 
been palatable” to the EU.805 
                                              
800 HOLTSMARK/SOMMERVOLL, 22; HELM, 2737/2738; SCHÜLE/STERK, 13; FLACHSLAND/ 
MARSCHINSKI/EDENHOFER, “To link or not to link: Benefits and disadvantages of linking 
cap-and-trade systems”, in: Flachsland, Dissertation, 2010, 54. 
801 DE SÉPIBUS, Linking, 2008, 2. 
802 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 12. 
803 KRUGER/OATES/PIZER, 119; MEHLING, 110. 
804 On 18 October 2007, Senator Joseph Lieberman and Senator John Warner introduced 
America’s Climate Security Act, also known as the Lieberman-Warner bill, intended to 
reduce the amount of GHG emissions in the USA by creating a national cap-and-trade 
scheme. On 6 June 2008, the Act was defeated by Senate Republicans over worries that 
it would damage the economy. 
805 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK , 3. 
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There are secondary benefits associated with emission abatement which 
include reduced local air pollution, increased energy security due to reduced 
dependency from fossil fuel imports, encouragement of research and devel-
opment and the general economic stimulus that goes along with low-carbon 
investments. If linking leads to a substantial outsourcing of abatement to 
other regions, these co-benefits – (which are not internalized in the emission 
unit price) will be lost.806 Instead of a flow of capital to foreign countries, 
national governments may rather want to promote internal investments to 
promote these secondary benefits.  
In addition, the linkage of Emission Trading Schemes may lower the incen-
tive for stringent national caps for domestic economical reasons. A stringent 
cap induces high abatement costs. With a high price of emission units in a 
non-linked domestic market, there is a strong incentive for technical meas-
ures to reduce emissions. These costs are, seen from another perspective, 
investments into the domestic market promoting research and development 
and creating job opportunities and wealth. For instance, a price cap helps to 
confine abatement costs, but may compromise the stimulation of technologi-
cal change. If, and at what level, the price cap will eventually be set becomes 
a question of which of the two involved policy goals prevails.807 
The analysis of BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER shows that international emission 
trading can even be welfare decreasing because of general equilibrium ef-
fects when there are distortions. It occurs in countries exporting emission 
units when efficiency costs associated with pre-existing distorting taxes are 
larger than the primary gains from emission trading.808 
The risk of large scale emission trading to be welfare decreasing in some 
cases seems not to have been generally appreciated in the environmental 
economics literature so far.809 To the author of this thesis, however, the risks 
of missing domestic policy goals such as preserving environmental integrity 
and, at the same time, balancing national welfare at a reasonable level, ap-
pears to be considerably high, especially in the case of Switzerland as will be 
seen in the following sections. In addition, a linkage raises the question of 
whether the increased flexibility entails other risks such as, for example, a 
                                              
806 FLACHSLAND/MARSCHINSKI/EDENHOFER, “To link or not to link: Benefits and disadvan-
tages of linking cap-and-trade systems”, in: Flachsland, Dissertation, 2010, 55. 
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loss of legitimacy and accountability.810 As long as serious doubts exist as to 
whether emission trading is effectively contributing to net emission reduc-
tions, it can be argued that emission trading does not contribute to the consti-
tutional requirements of preserving the health of the population and of pre-
serving natural resources. 
5.3.6 Impact on Total Global Emissions 
The environmental benefits of emission trading are, consequently, highly 
dependent on the design of the trading system. Most importantly, the amount 
of emission reductions achieved by cap-and-trade stems not from the trading 
as such, but from the stringency of the cap.811 Real-live Emission Trading 
Schemes will not necessarily be environmentally effective and may lead to 
higher emissions. This has been suspected already in the early 1990ies.812  
By virtue of the flexibility afforded to participants, combined Emission Trad-
ing Schemes may even be more detrimental to environmental integrity. Link-
ing Emission Trading Schemes will perpetuate certain features throughout 
the linked market. Price ceilings, generous offset provisions, and weak en-
forcement rules may lead to fewer emissions reductions than emission reduc-
tions in aggregate if each had operated separately.813  
Summing up, altered incentives for cap-setting, questions of competitive 
distortions, distributional implications and (legitimate) national concerns end 
up in making reality “second best”. Fears that the complexity of linked 
Emission Trading Schemes leads to more global emissions must be consid-
ered seriously. 
5.4 Issues in the Case of a CH-EU-ETS Linkage 
Since its inception, the Swiss Emission Trading Scheme has been developed 
with the aim to be compatible to link up with the EU-ETS. Similarly, the 
                                              
810 MEHLING, 110. 
811 STERK/MEHLING/TUERK, in: Climate Strategy, April 2009, 3.  
812 HELM, 2738, referring to PETER BOHM, “Distributional implication of allowing interna-
tional trade in CO2 emission quotas”, in: The World Economy Volume 15, Number 1, 
January 1992, 107-114. 
813 MEHLING, 110.  
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EU-ETS was designed to be enlarged by linking to third country’s Emission 
Trading Schemes. Therefore, the key design features are expected to be gen-
erally compatible and do, as it is expected, not pose any hindrance to a link-
age of the CH-ETS with the EU-ETS.  
However, there are a few issues that deserve to be closely looked at, namely 
sectors and entities covered, the issue of aviation, the volume of the two 
Emission Trading Schemes, the prices, the quantitative limits of offsetting 
and some governance issues.  
5.4.1 Linking in Practice 
5.4.1.1 Mandate for Negotiation 
In the Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, the Federal Council expressed 
clearly that the revised CO2-Act ought to be compatible with the respective 
provisions in the EU in order to enable a link of the two Emission Trading 
Schemes.814 While the Draft CO2-Act, the legal basis for the CH-ETS, is still 
being revised, the Federal Council issued a formal mandate to take up nego-
tiation with the European Union on 16 December 2009.815  
One year later, on 20 December 2010, the EU-Council authorized the EU-
Commission to open negotiation with the Swiss Confederation for a link 
between the two Emission Trading Schemes.816  
5.4.1.2 Conclusion of an International Treaty 
The Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch of 26 August 2009 declares that a 
linkage of the CH-ETS to the EU-ETS shall be put in practice by a multilat-
eral treaty.817 In order to simplify the process, the CO2-Draft delegates the 
competence to conclude an international treaty with the European Union on 
                                              
814 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7474. “Angestrebt wird ausser-
dem die Kompatibilität mit dem EG-Emissionshandelssystem (EG-ETS), um eine Ver-
knüpfung der Systeme zu ermöglichen.“. 
815 See FOEN, “Bundesrat erteilt Verhandlungsmandat für Verknüpfung mit EU-
Emissionshandel“, available at  <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninfor 
mation/00962/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=30717>. 
816 See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/118632. 
pdf>. 
817 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7461. 
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the linkage of the two Emission Trading Schemes to the Federal Council.818 
If, due to the negotiated linkage treaty, a change to the law is required, the 
Federal Council’s competence to conclude this international treaty will be 
dropped.819 
In the European Union, a link of the EU-ETS to the CH-ETS must be ap-
proved by both the European Parliament and the Council deciding with a 
qualified majority.820 Due to shared competences between the European 
Community and its Member States, the link would probably be adopted as a 
mixed agreement to which both the Community and the Member States are 
Parties. 821  
5.4.1.3 Next Steps 
Differences between the Council of States and the National Council have 
inhibited to conclude the Draft CO2-Act so far. A so-called “difference set-
tlement procedure” (“Differenzbereinigungsverfahren”) is inevitable causing 
delay in the domestic legislative process as well as in the international nego-
tiations with the EU. The deadline to agree on the Draft CO2-Act in Swiss 
Parliament has been extended to 29 August 2012.822  
As there is not legal basis for a linkage under the current legislation, the 
negotiations with the EU are unlikely to be formally finalized before August 
2012. The provisions for a linked CH-EU-ETS would then have to be im-
                                              
818 Article 42 of the Draft CO2-Act.  
819 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7516. 
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plemented very efficiently in order to be ready on time for the start of a new 
commitment period as of 2013. 
In the meantime, negotiations between the EU and Switzerland on the link-
age of their respective Emission Trading Schemes are ongoing. 
5.4.2 Sectors and Entities Covered 
The most obvious difference of coverage in a linked CH-EU-ETS concerns 
the size of the entities. The EU-ETS covers installations with more than 
25’000 tCO2e per entity. EU-installations with less than 25’000 tCO2e emis-
sions may be excluded from the EU-ETS.823  
In Switzerland, a participation in the CH-ETS will be mandatory for compa-
nies with yearly emissions of more than 10’000 tCO2e from specific sec-
tors.824 The authors of a study conducted by FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY 
estimate that according to these provisions of the Draft CO2-Act, some 43 
companies will have to participate in the CH-ETS on a mandatory basis.825 
Voluntary may be the participation for energy-intensive companies with 
more than 5’000 tCO2e yearly emissions.826 
The considerable difference in size is likely to have consequences on trans-
action costs faced by participating entities. As the EU-Commission stated in 
its “Impact Assessment” of 2008, the cost-benefit ratio for including small 
emitters appears unbalanced. Therefore, Article 27 was introduced into the 
ETS-Directive enabling Member States to exclude installations from the EU-
ETS which have reported emissions of less than 25’000 tCO2e and, where 
they carry out combustion activities, have a related thermal input below 35 
                                              
823 Article 27 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
824 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7474, spells out the limit of 
10'000 tCO2e. It is not mentioned in the Draft CO2-Act. Sectors: Power supply (e.g. 
combined heat and power plant, cogeneration plant for heat and power), coking plant 
and petroleum processing (e.g. refineries), metal production and machining (e.g. raw 
iron and steel), production of metal produces, production of glass, glassware, ceramic, 
manufacturing of stones and earths (e.g. cement, lime and bricks), manufacturing of cel-
lulose, pulp and paper, manufacturing of chemical produces and refuse incineration 
plants. 
825 FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, 57. 
826 FEDERAL COUNCIL, Climate Policy after 2012-Dispatch, 7474, spells out the limit of 
5'000 tCO2e. It is not mentioned in the Draft CO2-Act.  
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megawatt (“opting-out”).827 In addition, Member States may allow simpli-
fied monitoring, reporting and verification measures for installations with 
average annual verified emissions which are below 5’000 tonnes a year.828  
Different are also the definitions of an installation. Under the ETS-Directive, 
installations with various production sites would be split up into individual 
installations. The consequence is that the list of covered Swiss entities in a 
linked CH-EU-ETS shows a remarkably more elevated number of small 
emitters compared to the current regime.829 
In theory, the difference in coverage between the EU-ETS and the CH-ETS 
is not an obstacle to linking. It may, however, raise concerns regarding com-
petitive disadvantages if the small installations in Switzerland have to bear 
comparably high transaction costs whereas large installations in the EU 
profit from comparably low transaction costs due to higher quantity of emis-
sion units available. 
5.4.3 The Particular Issue of Aviation 
The Aviation-Directive of the European Union has its implications on Swit-
zerland regardless of a linkage of the CH-ETS with the EU-ETS.830 Either 
Swiss carriers arriving to or departing from an aerodrome situated in the 
territory of an EU-Member State must comply with the provisions of the EU-
ETS in the aviation sector. Or Switzerland must adopt adequate measure for 
reducing the climate change impact of these flights deemed to be sufficient 
by the EU-Commission and the Member States.831  
                                              
827 Article 27, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. However, the Commission 
made clear that an exclusion of small emitters from the EU-ETS on the grounds of cost-
effectiveness cannot mean that these installations do not need to contribute to the overall 
emission reduction targets of the EU. The Commissions highlights the need to find other 
more cost-effective measures to ensure the same objective and proposes: “With respect 
to alternative instruments, a CO2 tax might be preferable to the EU-ETS in the case of 
small emitters excluded from the EU-ETS.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Impact Assess-
ment”, 31. 
828 Article 27, paragraph 1b) of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
829 FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY, 48. 
830 Based on prices of 30 EUR per tCO2e, the tickets for a short distance flight would raise 
by 4.6 EUR, the ticket for a long distance flight up to 39.5 EUR. FIRST CLIMATE/ECON- 
ABILITY, 82. 
831 Article 25a, paragraph 1 of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
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Switzerland has, so far, not taken any adequate measures and Swiss aircraft 
operators are preparing for compliance as of the first period lasting from 1 
January 2012 to 31 December 2012. Intercontinental flights from and to 
Switzerland are, under the current regulation, not covered by the EU Avia-
tion-Directive.  
The EU Commission is now confronted with the risk of European airline 
operators moving their intercontinental flights to Swiss airports. Likewise, 
Switzerland may face an increased frequency in intercontinental aviation. 
This might be welcomed in terms of added value in Switzerland.832 But the 
capacity to respond to the increased demand is limited. In addition, increased 
aviation activity from and to Swiss airports would entail an additional envi-
ronmental burden for Switzerland.  
Due to the imminent risk of dislocation of intercontinental flights to Switzer-
land (“carbon leakage”), it is of high importance to the EU to prevent Swit-
zerland becoming an “aviation island in the heart of Europe”. Therefore, it 
is of high interest of the EU to include Switzerland into the aviation provi-
sions of the EU-ETS.833 For Switzerland, an incorporation of the EU-ETS 
aviation provisions may cause some adjustments with non-EU partner and 
the re-negotiation of bilateral aviation agreements.834 For Swiss foreign pol-
icy, this is a trade-off which has to been decided in the light of the larger 
framework of bilateral and international relations.  
5.4.4 Market Volume and Price of Emission Units 
When two Emission Trading Schemes are linked, prices will converge to-
wards the lowest price among significant carbon emitting countries.835 
Switzerland’s overall emissions are insignificant compared with EU’s budg-
et.836 Insignificant is also the market volume of the CH-ETS compared to the 
EU-ETS’s market volume. The current CH-ETS covers about 3 million 
tCO2e.837 In the EU-ETS, the final allocations of emissions units in the cur-
                                              
832 INFRAS, 7, calculates an added value of + 0.15 per cent. 
833 INFRAS, 66. 
834 For the pro and cons of this trade-off see INFRAS, 66.  
835 METCALF/WEISBACH, 23. 
836 ZUMBACH, 48. 
837 The total allocation for the period 2008 to 2012 amounts to 16’346’705 tCO2e. Calcu-
lated on the basis of the NAP of Switzerland, available at <https://www.national-
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rent phase amounts to almost 2’000 million tCO2e per year.838 (Figure 8) The 
CH-ETS, consequently, equals the size of about 0.15 per cent of the size of 
the EU-ETS. The enormous difference in volume has consequences on the 
development of the prices. 
Figure 8: CH-ETS and EU-ETS in Comparison 
The CH-ETS covers about 3 million tCO2e per year. The EU-ETS covers about 
2’000 million tCO2e per year. 
In phase I of the EU-ETS, prices increased to over 30 EUR in the middle of 
2005. In April 2006, carbon prices in the EU-ETS declined to 15 EUR due to 
the news that most EU Member States produced fewer tonnes of emissions 
than allocated. By February 2007, prices fell to less than 1 EUR where they 
remained for the duration of phase I.839  
                                              
838 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 12. 
839 ELLERMAN/JOSKOW, 12-15. 
5 Linking Emission Trading Schemes 
 162
In phase II, EU-ETS prices started at around 15 EUR per tCO2e and in-
creased to almost 30 EUR due to extraordinarily high energy prices up to 
mid-2008. Since 2008, economic recession has led to fewer emissions and 
the voluminous supply of offsets from the CDM have led to this year’s 
prices of about 10 to 15 EUR.840 
In Switzerland, no functioning secondary market for emission units exists so 
far. On the trading platform established by FOEN in collaboration with the 
Bernese Cantonal Bank (BEKB), no transaction has been registered.841 If and 
how many over-the-counter-transactions have taken place is not known offi-
cially.842 The only transaction known on the Swiss market are the emission 
units bought by the Climate Cent Foundation. In the first auction round, 
emission reductions were acquired at price of 70 CHF, in the second auction 
round at a price of 100 CHF per tonne.843  
ECOPLAN assumes that, in the case of a linkage, prices in the CH-ETS would 
drop from an estimated market price of 30 CHF/tCO2e to 16 CHF/tCO2e, 
whereas in the EU-ETS, prices will remain unchanged.844  
So far, Swiss companies did not have to buy any additional emission units in 
order to comply with their Target Agreements. From the perspective of a 
Swiss company, therefore, the option to buy EUAs, even if they may be 
cheap emission units, is not an attractive argument to promote the idea of a 
linkage. Even worse: With a linkage to the EU-ETS, Swiss companies may 
lose the possibility to sell their unused emission units for very attractive 
prices.  
The situation may change with a more stringent cap. If Switzerland commits 
to 30 per cent emissions reduction versus the 1990 level as foreseen in the 
popular initiative “For a healthy climate” in the case of comparable efforts 
                                              
840 GRUBB/BREWER/SATO/HEILMAYR/FAZEKAS, 12. For a complete historical overview over 
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by other emitters, the attractiveness of the large and liquid EU-ETS-market 
may increase. Swiss ETS-participants may then not be able to achieve the 
reductions by their own reduction efforts and will have to acquire signifi-
cantly more emission units from third parties. Unrestricted access to the EU-
ETS might then, indeed, be desirable. 
For participants in the EU-ETS, in return, a linkage with the CH-ETS will be 
of very limited interest. Due to the difference of volume, increased liquidity 
and reduced volatility due to the enlargement of the carbon market is negli-
gible.845 
If there is no linkage with the EU-ETS, the prices of emission units in Swit-
zerland remain volatile, if existent at all. Whereas the EU-ETS may count on 
solid price signals due to a liquid secondary market, Switzerland will have to 
rely on auctions as a price building mechanism in the future.846 
If there is a linkage with the EU-ETS, the price per emission unit will be 
determined by market mechanisms. In its study of 2010, ECOPLAN finds that, 
in the case of a linkage, prices in the CH-ETS would drop to 16 CHF/tCO2e, 
whereas in the EU-ETS, prices will remain unchanged.847 
5.4.5 Quantitative Limits of Offsetting 
In the CH-ETS, the CO2-Act demands that the quantity of offsetting must be 
“adequate”.848 The CO2-Crediting Ordinance states more precisely that, with 
regard to Switzerland’s commitment on international level, emission reduc-
tions achieved abroad may be credited to the reduction target for the years 
2008 to 2012 to the extent of a maximum average of 2.0 million tCO2e per 
annum.849 
In the EU-ETS, there was no limit on the use of CERs during the period 
from 2005 to 2007. For the period from 2008 to 2012, there is a requirement 
that Member States limit their use of CDM and JI credits in the Kyoto period 
to a certain proportion of their emission unit allocation, which is to be speci-
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848 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the CO2-Act.  
849 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the CO2 Crediting-Ordinance. Amended in accordance with 
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fied by each Member State in its National Allocation Plan (NAP). In the 
period from 2013 to 2020, installation operators will be able to use either 
leftover CER and ERU entitlements from the period 2008 to 2012, or an 
amount corresponding to a certain percentage, which is to be set not below 
11 per cent of their cumulated allocation during the period from 2008 to 
2012, whichever is the highest.850 Measures shall also ensure that the total 
allowed use of credits does not exceed 50 per cent of the mandated reduc-
tions.851 
In Switzerland, there will probably be no admittance of offsets from abroad 
as of 2013. The National Council, in its deliberations of June 2010, has 
agreed on a reduction target of minus 20 per cent to be achieved by domestic 
abatement measures only (“Inlandkompensation”). This decision is accom-
panied by the competence for the Federal Council to increase the reduction 
target to up to 40 per cent if other major emitters take comparable measures. 
In this case, only one fourth of the additional reductions must be achieved 
in-country.852 In March 2011, the Council of States followed the National 
Council’s decision on the offset-provisions. The Council of States took this 
decision despite of the opposed recommendation of its Committee for the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy.853 
If the decision of a 20 per cent domestic compensation remains in the post 
2012-legislation but if Swiss ETS-participants may use EUAs for compli-
ance due to a linkage agreement with the EU, Switzerland would thereby 
admit the use of CER “through the backdoor”. (Figure 9) Since the EU al-
lows the use of CERs for compliance purposes within the EU-ETS, EUAs 
are freed up to be used for compliance also in Switzerland. Thereby, emis-
sions in Switzerland would indirectly be compensated by offsets from abroad 
which would be against the provisions as decided by the National Council in 
June 2010 and the Council of States in March 2011.  
                                              
850 Article 11a, paragraph 8, first subparagraph of the Consolidated ETS-Directive. 
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852 BUNDESAMT FÜR UMWELT (BAFU), “Das revidierte CO2-Gesetz nach der Nationalrats-
debatte”, 26 July 2010 available at <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/00493/06577/ 
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Figure 9: Offsetting from Abroad in a Linked CH-EU-ETS 
If Swiss ETS-participants may use EUAs for compliance due to a linkage agreement 
with the EU, Switzerland would thereby admit the use of CER “through the back-
door”. 
5.4.6 Governance Issues in a Linked CH-EU-ETS 
The rules for transferring and surrendering emission units in the EU are re-
gulated through the Registry Regulations taking into account the require-
ments of the Kyoto Protocol. The same applies to the National Registry in 
Switzerland. A linkage of the registries is therefore considered to be a pure 
technical issue.  
More cumbersome are the provisions regarding monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV). The current provisions of Switzerland regarding the 
coverage and regarding MRV differ considerably from the respective provi-
sions in the ETS-Directive. The analysis of FIRST CLIMATE/ECONABILITY 
identifies the need to promote the quality standard of the Swiss MRV-
provisions as well as the sector specific technical MRV-requirements in case 
of a linkage between the CH-ETS and the EU-ETS.854 
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5.5 Expected Performance of a Linked CH-EU-ETS 
Emission trading and linking Emission Trading Schemes is considered to be 
an instrument to reduce the costs to meet a given emission target. Emission 
trading was, originally, also introduced as an instrument for environmental 
protection and the reduction of GHG emissions. Carbon prices and effected 
emission reductions, hence, may serve as two indicators to assess the per-
formance of a linked CH-EU-ETS. A third indicator in the case of linking 
domestic Emission Trading Schemes is the welfare on national level.  
5.5.1 Carbon Price 
Due to the difference of the market volumes, Switzerland would be the price 
taker and prices for Swiss emission units can be expected to decrease.855 
ECOPLAN assumes that, in the case of a linkage, prices in the CH-ETS would 
drop to about 16 CHF/tCO2e, whereas in the EU-ETS, prices will remain 
unchanged.856  
With a linkage to the EU-ETS, Swiss companies may buy cheap additional 
emission units (which they didn’t need to buy so far), but may lose the pos-
sibility to sell their unused emission units for very attractive prices to the 
Climate Cent Foundation. For participants in the EU-ETS, increased liquid-
ity and reduced volatility is negligible.857 
5.5.2 Effected Emission Reductions 
None of the studies commissioned by the Swiss authorities on the future 
CO2-regime in Switzerland addresses the issue of net emission reductions, 
neither on national nor on international level. The generally accepted starting 
point for linking considerations seems to be that the emission reductions 
achieved in a linked Emission Trading Scheme would be the same as the 
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combined emission reductions of the two schemes operating separately.858 As 
assumed by HAITES/MULLINS and illustrated by the above mentioned stud-
ies, the main motivation for linking seems to be, indeed, usually economic 
rather than environmental reasons. 
As carbon prices in the EU-ETS are cheaper, net emissions in Switzerland 
are likely to increase with a linkage of the CH-ETS to the EU-ETS. 
ECOPLAN predicts that whereas emissions reduction effected within the CH-
ETS amounts to 6.7 per cent, emissions reductions effected in Switzerland in 
the case of a linkage with the EU-ETS would decrease to 3.4 per cent.859  
5.5.3 National Welfare 
In the case of a linkage of the CH-ETS to the EU-ETS, about half of the 
emission reductions requirement of Switzerland will be bought by energy-
intensive Swiss entities from participants of the EU-ETS. This reduction 
requirement corresponds to an estimated value of 3 million CHF.860 A link-
age with the EU-ETS hence entails a capital flow out of country of roughly 3 
million CHF. What is the added value Switzerland purchases therefore?861 
The study conducted by ECOPLAN concludes that, from a Swiss perspective, 
a linkage of the EU-ETS and the CH-ETS can not be based on the argument 
of increased well-being.862 This finding is supported by the analysis of 
BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER showing that international emission trading can 
even be welfare decreasing because of general equilibrium effects when 
there are distortions. It occurs in countries exporting emission units when 
efficiency costs associated with pre-existing distortionary taxes are larger 
than the primary gains from emission trading.863  
This theory-based finding is illustrated by the example of Switzerland. Ac-
cording to theory, net buyers in Switzerland would be the winners, net sellers 
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in Switzerland would be the losers in case of a linkage with the EU-ETS. 
Taking into account that sellers in Switzerland could sell an emission unit at 
70 CHF to 100 CHF in the past, and taking into account the fact, that no net 
buyers in Switzerland have emerged, all the CH-ETS-participants are likely 
to become losers in the case of a linkage.  
From a European perspective, increased well-being is not the argument for a 
linkage, either. For the EU, a linkage with the CH-ETS is of political inter-
est: As CONNIE HEDEGAARD, present European Commissioner for Climate 
Action, has revealed when announcing the mandate for negotiations with 
Switzerland, a linkage with the CH-ETS is interesting for the EU because it 
signifies a step towards an OECD-wide carbon market.864 Another reason, 
not as publicly revealed though not less obvious, is that linking the CH-ETS 
to the EU-ETS signifies a serious relief of the fears of European airline op-
erators moving their intercontinental flights to Swiss airports. 
Summing up, the challenges raised by linking are largely political in nature. 
The legal and regulatory issues raised by trading across a link, most will 
usually not follow from the link as such, but from the general operation of 
the underlying carbon markets within general law.865 
The widespread argument that a link of the CH-ETS with the larger EU-ETS 
is attractive for Swiss ETS-participants because it opens doors to a larger and 
more liquid market is, in theory, correct.866 In practice, however, it must be 
considered very carefully whether the EU-ETS, though larger and more liq-
uid, will in fact be attractive for Swiss ETS-participants and whether a link-
age with the EU-ETS would, after all, hit Switzerland’s climate policy tar-
gets in real terms.  
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6.1 The International Climate Policy Framework 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. In order to halt 
the increase in global temperature, deep cuts in global emissions are re-
quired. Almost two decades ago, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) planted the seed to what has become the 
Kyoto carbon market. The basic objective of the Convention is to stabilize 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at a level that would prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate system. The Convention, however, does not 
specify the necessary reduction level nor does it create any legally-binding 
obligations to limit GHG emissions. The major importance of the Conven-
tion for the international climate change framework consists of the fact that 
it provided an objective, as well as basic principles.  
It was with the Kyoto Protocol, adopted by the third “Conference of the Par-
ties” (COP) to the Convention on 11 December 1997, that binding commit-
ments have been agreed for those Parties which are listed in Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The way to achieve compliance with its Kyoto commitment 
is up to each Party. Emission trading is one possible instrument. But there 
are other instruments such as taxes, charges and subsidies.867 If and to what 
extent the Annex B-Parties integrate the market-based flexible mechanisms 
provided for in the Kyoto Protocol into their national instruments is up to 
each Party.  
The carbon market is not uncontested mainly because of the issues of sup-
plementarity and additionality. Supplementarity is intended to preclude 
countries and companies from counting on the flexible mechanisms to by-
pass their national reduction targets. Additionality ensures that a project is 
implemented in addition to what would have been done without the flexible 
mechanisms. Especially the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is sub-
ject to a lot of critical literature and research. The issues are, on the one side, 
its onerous administrative requirements and the complex procedures. On the 
other side, the criticism targets the environmental integrity of the CDM and 
questions the capacity to produce real, measurable and long-term benefits to 
avoid climate change. The difficulties of the CDM arise from the asymmetry 
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in the concept: CERs, the certified emission reductions originating from a 
CDM-project, may contribute to reach the reduction target of the Annex B-
Party where the purchasing installations originates from. But CERs do not 
correspond to a transfer of an assigned amount because the host country of 
the CDM project, by definition a Non-Annex B-Party, has not committed to 
any emission reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol and, therefore, has 
no assigned amount at its disposal. The assigned amount of the CER-
purchasing Annex B-Party hence remains equally elevated in spite of the 
compensation effected elsewhere by transferring CERs. Consequently, each 
CER imported into the registries of an Annex B-Party represents additional 
emissions and, contrary to the emission trading’s environmental objective, an 
increase of the worldwide overall emission cap. 
To counter the criticism, the negotiators in Kyoto intended to create a strong 
compliance regime in order to preserve the environmental integrity of the 
carbon market. Supporters of the Kyoto Protocol highlight the fact that the 
UNFCCC represents the only international instrument to limit GHG emis-
sions which is legally binding. An Annex B-Party not fulfilling its reduction 
commitment will have to face a deduction from the Party’s assigned amount 
for the second commitment period of a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times 
the amount in tonnes of excess emissions. On closer examination, however, 
this mechanism is not an efficient tool. The fact that there is no agreement on 
commitments for the next period makes the deduction approach to be not 
enforceable – because the substantial deduction of tonnes of a Party’s as-
signed amount in a subsequent commitment period does not hurt if there is 
no subsequent period. 
The Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 was expected to pro-
duce an agreement on further commitments for developed countries within 
the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. However, no such agreement was 
reached in Copenhagen and serious concerns about a potential gap between 
the first and subsequent commitment periods under the Protocol came up.868 
Meanwhile, the Conference on Climate Change in Cancun in 2010 has re-
stored trust in the international negotiations. Yet, the Conference on Climate 
Change in Durban in the end of 2011 will unlikely close this serious loop-
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hole in the concept of the Kyoto carbon market. The global carbon market 
will probably have to cope with a so-called “post-Kyoto gap”. 
6.2 The Emission Trading Scheme of the European 
Union 
The Emission Trading Scheme of the European Union (EU-ETS) is the larg-
est and most advanced Emission Trading Scheme worldwide. It functions 
independently from the Kyoto carbon market, yet it is indirectly linked to the 
Kyoto carbon market by the acceptance of emission units from CDM- and 
JI-projects. In 2010, emission units of the EU-ETS accounted for 84 per cent 
of the global market value.869 
During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU and its Member States 
opposed the introduction of any market-based flexible instruments into the 
international climate regime. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the Kyoto 
Protocol would enter into force, the EU conceded, and agreed to the market-
based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. By setting up a legal framework in 
very short time, the Emission Trading Scheme of the EU was able to take up 
operations even before the start of the first Kyoto commitment period. In 
order to increase the cost-effectiveness of achieving the Community emis-
sion reductions target, linking the Community scheme to GHG Emission 
Trading Schemes in third countries was foreseen since its inception. 
In the so-called “Burden Sharing Agreement”, the European Community and 
its Member States agreed to fulfil their Kyoto Protocol-commitments 
“jointly”. The overall commitment of emission reductions of 8 per cent was 
redistributed by giving some Member States such as Luxembourg, Germany, 
Denmark and others a reduction requirement of more than the average of 8 
per cent, whereas Member States such as Portugal, Greece and others are 
allowed to even increase their greenhouse gas emissions above their 1990 
emission levels. 
The EU-ETS was adopted by way of a Directive which had to be transposed 
into national law by each EU Member State. In 2007, the EU-ETS Directive 
was incorporated into the “European Economic Area Agreement” (EEA 
Agreement), linking Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland to the EU-ETS as of 
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1 January 2008. The current EU-ETS may consequently be considered as a 
system of 30 largely independent, but inter-linked national Emission Trading 
Schemes, which have agreed to make their emission units tradable within the 
EU-ETS while adhering to certain common EU rules, procedures, guidelines 
and criteria.870 
The performance of the EU-ETS is generally perceived as positive in so far 
as a carbon price is successfully established. A significant segment of the 
European industry is incorporating the price of CO2 emissions into their 
daily production decisions.871 The volatility of the price, however, was ex-
treme in the past.872 Instruments to reduce volatility would be helpful and 
first measures have been taken by more generous banking provisions. 
Yet, the EU-ETS is not pulling its weight. In terms of effected emission re-
ductions, the performance of the EU-ETS is considered to be unsatisfying.873 
The main cause is the different approaches to allocation adopted by the 
Member States in phase I and phase II of the EU-ETS and the resulting leni-
ent over-all cap of the EU-ETS.874  
Until the situation of surplus emission units in the EU-ETS is resolved, the 
pressure on energy-intensive companies to reduce emissions will remain low, 
as will carbon prices. More than half of the GHG emissions in the EU are 
not covered by the EU-ETS and must be reduced in Non EU-ETS sectors. If 
the EU-ETS cap is set on a non-ambitious level, it is up to the Non EU-ETS 
sectors to make up the difference in order to reach the Kyoto reduction tar-
get.  
With the harmonized allocation rules of Directive 29/2009/EC, the first step 
into the direction of a more solid performance is taken. Still, the problem of 
too many emission units allocated remains. And new challenges are ahead.  
The inclusion of aviation expanding the volume of the EU-ETS by about 10 
per cent as of 1 January 2012 bears considerable uncertainty. Firstly, third 
country airlines claim that the inclusion of these airlines into the EU-ETS is 
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illegal under international law because it is an extra-territorial application of 
EU policy on non-EU carriers and an improper tax or charge contradicting 
the provisions of the Chicago Convention and of the Kyoto Protocol. Even if 
the opinion of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), released on 6 October 
2011, suggests that the EU’s plan to extend the ETS to aviation does not 
interfere with the sovereignty of third countries and complies with all rele-
vant aviation agreements, the final word as not been spoken yet.  
Secondly, there is an asymmetry in the concept. The Aviation-Directive gives 
aircraft operators full access to the EU-ETS. Stationary installations covered 
by the EU-ETS, however, are not allowed to use aviation emission units for 
compliance purposes. This may, on the one hand, increase the worldwide 
overall emission cap.875 On the other hand, the asymmetry in the concept of 
aviation as an additional sector in the EU-ETS increases the risk of carbon 
leakage: If energy-intensive ETS-sectors have to cope with an increased 
demand for EUAs, they may consider to relocate production to countries 
outside the EU. 
6.3 The Emission Trading Scheme of Switzerland 
The Emission Trading Scheme of Switzerland, like the EU-ETS, exists inde-
pendently from the Kyoto carbon market. And like the EU-ETS, the CH-ETS 
is also linked to the Kyoto carbon market by the acceptance of emission 
units from CDM- and JI-projects. But there are serious disparities between 
the two Emission Trading Schemes. Firstly, the scheme in Switzerland 
equals only the size of about 0.15 per cent of the size of the EU-ETS. Sec-
ondly, the history of the Swiss system has produced a deviating concept. 
Being a result of a complex search for a political compromise, the CH-ETS 
is a system based on voluntary measures which offers incentives for self-
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regulation, representing thus an element of a changing relation between state 
and individuals. 
The main characteristic of the Swiss emission trading concept is the direct 
link with a steering fee on fossil fuels. The CO2-Act offers companies the 
option to bindingly commit to emission reduction targets and thereby to par-
ticipate in the CH-ETS in order to get exempted from paying the CO2-Fee. 
For Non ETS-companies, the CO2-Fee currently constitutes a kind of a tax. 
For ETS-companies, on the contrary, the exemption from the CO2-Fee is the 
key incentive to participate in the CH-ETS. At the same time, the CO2-Fee is 
the central compliance instrument of the current CH-ETS since a non-
compliant company has to pay back the redistributed CO2-Fee inclusive in-
terests. With the proposed but not yet agreed Draft CO2-Act, emission trad-
ing in Switzerland will become a self-contained instrument independent 
from the CO2-Fee as it is already the case in the EU.  
With regard to the Draft CO2-Act to be concluded by 29 August 2012, the 
issue of supplementarity is intensively discussed in Switzerland these days. 
According to the current state of parliamentary decisions, offsets from 
abroad will probably not be admitted as of 2013.876 
If regulation provides for a 20 per cent domestic compensation by 2020 in 
the post 2012-legislation but if Swiss ETS-participants are allowed to use 
EUAs for compliance due to a linkage agreement with the EU, Switzerland 
would thereby admit the use of CER “through the backdoor”. Since the EU 
allows the use of CERs for compliance purposes within the EU-ETS, EUAs 
are freed up to be used for compliance also in Switzerland. Thereby, emis-
sions in Switzerland would indirectly be compensated by offsets from abroad 
which would be against the supplementarity-provision as decided by the 
National Council in June 2010 and the Council of States in March 2011. 
It must be acknowledged: Even if market activity is lower than expected, the 
Swiss Emission Trading Scheme exists. But it has neither produced a true 
market price nor has it prevented Switzerland from missing its reduction 
targets.  
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Of course, the current CH-ETS is a complicated result of a complex search 
for a political compromise.877 As it was the case with the EU-ETS, the pri-
mary goal of a trial phase must be to develop the infrastructure and to pro-
vide the experience to enable the successful use of a cap-and-trade system to 
limit GHG emissions in Switzerland during the next compliance period. 
From this perspective, the CH-ETS is a success. 
The ETS being only a little piece in the puzzle of the comprehensive Swiss 
climate policy, the missed reduction target is not the result of a lack of effec-
tiveness in the CH-ETS. The surplus of emissions in Switzerland is, first and 
foremost, due to the idleness within the Non CH-ETS sectors, namely trans-
port. 
6.4 Linking Emission Trading Schemes 
The enlargement of carbon markets by the linkage of domestic Emission 
Trading Schemes has been discussed especially since about 2006 when the 
emergence of Emission Trading Schemes in various regions of the world 
seemed to be realistic and transatlantic links appeared to be a promising op-
tion. In theory, linking distinct Emission Trading Schemes will increase effi-
ciency by taking advantage of the diversity of sources. The diversity of 
sources entails a diversity of costs for emission reduction actions in the lar-
ger linked system, thus reducing the overall abatement costs and delivering a 
common environmental goal at least-cost.878 
The pilot period of the EU-ETS has demonstrated that linking itself changes 
the rules of the game. Linking promotes the concept of offsetting with emis-
sion units from abroad and makes additionality to be a major concern. The 
environmental integrity of the concept is only preserved if emission units are 
given exclusively to projects that have been developed “in-addition-to-what-
would-have-been-done” without the offsetting option. In addition, enlarging 
a trading scheme by a linkage will give participating states an incentive to 
relax their cap in order to become net sellers. Altered incentives for cap-
setting, questions of competitive distortions, distributional implications and 
                                              
877 ZUMBACH, 57, adding that legislation as a result of a democratic process, in particular in 
Switzerland, seldom ends up in perfect legislation. 
878 BARON/PHILIBERT, 123; ELLIS/TIRPAK, 9; HAITES/MULLINS, 1; KRUGER/OATES/PIZER, 
119. Transactional costs and administrative expenses in an ETS, however, are signifi-
cantly higher than in a command-and-control system. WINTER, 297. 
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(legitimate) national concerns end up in making reality “second best”. Fears 
that the complexity of linked Emission Trading Schemes leads to more 
global emissions must be considered seriously. 
While linking may still result in an overall reduction of costs, it does, how-
ever, not mean that everyone is better off. Despite possible overall cost sav-
ings due to linking some participants of each of the linked programs are 
likely to be financially disadvantaged as a result. What may be beneficial to 
individual trading entities may not result in a net benefit for the country and 
in effect to the climate. In the case of a linkage of the CH-ETS to the EU-
ETS, about half of the emission reductions requirement of Switzerland will 
be “effected” by energy-intensive Swiss entities acquiring EUAs from opera-
tors in the EU-ETS. This reduction requirement corresponds to an estimated 
value of 3 million CHF.879 A linkage with the EU-ETS hence entails a capital 
flow out of country of roughly 3 million CHF. In addition, Swiss ETS-
participants will not have any incentives any more to strive for surplus emis-
sion units and to effectively reduce their emissions. Firstly, cheap emission 
units can be bought on the enlarged CH-EU market. Secondly, selling sur-
plus emission units is not attractive any more because the prices of emission 
units drop. This is contrary to the emission trading’s objectives of preserving 
environmental integrity by giving carbon a price and by fostering new tech-
nologies. However, the possibility that, contrary to theory, emission trading 
and the linkage of Emission Trading Schemes might be welfare decreasing in 
some cases has not been generally appreciated in the environmental econom-
ics literature so far.880  
Climate change policy becomes ever more complex. Or, to use the words of 
an expert of the Swiss system: The complexity of the carbon market hits “the 
limit of what is reasonably acceptable”.881 This complexity bears risks such 
as redundancy and conflicting economic versus ecological targets. But it also 
brings along the risk of no participation in the market because it simply is 
too complex to be manageable. To determine the adequate balance between 
regulation and efficiency is an immense challenge – and an urgent priority.882  
                                              
879 ECOPLAN, 20. 
880 BABIKER/REILLY/VIGUIER, 34. 
881 HILDESHEIMER, 49: „Die Umsetzung dieses Systems ist heute an der Grenze der Zumut-
barkeit in Sachen Komplexität (…) Perfektion, die nicht umsetzbar ist, führt nicht zum 
Ziel.“ 
882 WEBER/DARBELLAY, 277. With regard to the CDM, they consider the adequate balance 





Yet, there are arguments in favour of a linkage of the Emission Trading 
Scheme of Switzerland to the Emission Trading Scheme of the EU. Firstly, a 
linkage is a sign of commitment to combat climate change on an interna-
tional level. Indeed, as it is advocated by various commentators, interna-
tional climate policy may be continued through a collection of bottom-up 
linkages serving as a natural starting point in negotiations leading to a top-
down agreement.883 A system of linkages may help to develop the experi-
ence, mutual confidence and credibility necessary for global negotiations to 
succeed. Linking the CH-ETS to the EU-ETS may, therefore, be politically 
adequate to serve as a signal of commitment. Secondly, a linkage of the CH-
ETS to the EU-ETS may contribute to promoting planning reliability, and 
thus reduce competitive distortion arising from uncertainty. Market activities 
in the yet very quiet Swiss carbon market are likely to increase. 
Emission trading per se, however, is not the only and not the most effective 
instrument to combat climate change. Having regional carbon regimes with 
differing instruments rather than an unified global carbon regime does not 
matter if the price of carbon is the same across regions.884 A pragmatic com-
bination of various policies such as tax, subsidies, command-and-control 
policies and voluntary measures to promote climate friendly technologies on 
the one hand and measures to steer consumers’ behaviour on the other hand 
seems to be a promising further research field.885 
                                              
pressure and when regulation does not privilege any market participants to the detriment 
of others. 
883 For example JAFFE/RANSON/STAVINS, 803. See also BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 808: “Il 
semble de plus en plus qu’une nouvelle approche s’esquisse. Elle reposerait sur une dé-
marche de “nationalisation” des actions à mener et se départirait de trop de contraintes 
internationales. Ce serait une approche “bottom up” et non plus une approche “top 
down”.  
884 METCALF/WEISBACH, 4: “For example, one region might have a tax and another a cap 
and trade system; as long as the permit price is roughly in parity with the tax rate, the 
results will be similar to a global regime in that only the most efficient mitigation op-
tions will be pursued.“ On innovative taxation strategies see WEBER, 2011. 
885 WINTER, 298; See also KRUGER/OATES/PIZER, 131. 
